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Abstract 
Proliferation of nuclear weapons portends ominous dangers to the 
very existence of human civilization. The dawn of nuclear age which 
commenced in the wake of detonation of nuclear device by the United 
States on July 16, 1945 at Alamogardo unveiled the gigantic secret of 
atomic energy which if used, cautiously for development of society could 
be blessing for humanity, but if used for military purpose it could be 
catastrophic. The bombing in Japan on August 6, 1945 heralded the 
nuclear age in actuality. Between 1949 and 1964 the number of nuclear 
weapon state had grown to five and this five happen also to be the 
permanent members of the UN Security GQiincil with special 
responsibility to maintain international peace. Since the inception of 
Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty the world has been divided into two 
categories-nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states. The 
unfortunate pattern set by the US in giving nuclear weapons more than 
necessary credibility in terms of power, status and supposed ability to 
deter war has impacted all the nations which turned nuclear. The five 
nuclear Haves asserted that the horizontal proliferation is dangerous to the 
international security because they were convinced that the acquisition of 
nuclear weapon by NNWS could destabilize the whole system. Instead of 
concentrating on vertical proliferation they deliberately shifted emphasis 
on horizontal proliferation. 
There is a division of opinion between the NWS and NNWS about 
the question, whether proliferation is a technical problem or political 
issue. The NNWS, mainly the developing world regard proliferation a 
political issue and not a technical issue as projected by the NWS. It is 
undoubtedly true that a peacefiil global order cannot exist in a world 
ridden with weapons of mass destruction, whether horizontally or 
vertically. 
The proliferation of nuclear weapon is a complex process and no 
particular perspective can solely explain the nuclear proliferation 
phenomenon. Each perspective holds some logic with regard to a 
particular proliferation case. The nuclear programme of all countries of 
the world is shrouded in secrecy. Hence, it is difficult to take into account 
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the exact nature of internal dynamics of a proliferation decision of a state. 
Therefore, secrecy, lack of understanding about the exact nature of 
internal dynamics of proliferation decision and varied motivations of 
states to go nuclear, have led to the grov^ t^h of a number of competing 
perspective about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The security 
concern perspective explains bulk of the cases of nuclear weapons 
proliferation. Even if other motives i.e prestige, technological momentum, 
domestic politics and public opinion played their part in nuclear 
proliferation, but security concern is the most important motives which 
compelled hidia and Pakistan like other nuclear states to acquire nuclear 
weapons. 
Since the nuclear test by India and then Pakistan in May 1998, the 
focus on this region has been ahnost exclusively on the nuclear dimension 
of the confrontation between the two states. The security in South Asia is 
challenged by intaplay of several factors acting on domestic regional and 
global level. Security impUcation is the sole reason for nuclearisation of 
South Asia. The overt nucelearisation of India and Pakistan brought South 
Asia for a short while to the main focus of international stormy and 
sometimes heated discussion in international politics. The tests were 
followed by sanctions and international pressure was mounted on India 
and Pakistan for signing NPT and CTBT immediately and to roll back 
their nuclear programmes. 
The survival of a nation as a territorial, political and socio-
economic entity is the primary aim of all sovereign states, but their 
national security problems are different in their nature and intensity. 
National security has two dimensions i.e. nuclear (external security) and 
non-nuclear (internal security). So India and Pakistan acquired nuclear 
weapons to counter threats or challenges from outside, it could be 
territorial or threat to the country's power, influence and position in 
international political system. While non-nuclear internal dimension of 
security is concerned with the problems related to socio-economic 
problems, interstate migration, drug trafficking, proHferation of small 
arms, and environmental degradation. The relevance of nuclear weapons 
for national security was claimed by both India and Pakistan during the 
Kargil conflict which brought out both the strengths and limitations of 
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nuclear weapons in the context of South Asia. The domestic security 
threats that South Asian nations are Hkely to face in the coming decades 
are common in nature and require a regional approach for their solution. 
Major non-nuclear security threats to the South Asian countries are 
terrorism, drug trafficking, poverty proliferation of small arms and 
environmental degradation. SAARC is bringing the countries and people 
of the region close together. It could draw up a common defense and 
security structure which would encourage regional peace and security and 
deter external or extra regional interference in South Asia. 
The unavailability of nuclear umbrella drove India to be self-
reliant in its nuclear deterrent requirement. The nature of the conflict, 
geographical proximity and an extra regional nuclear power as an 
adversary, made Indian more eager for nuclear weapon acquisition. So 
India's desire to develop a credible minimum nuclear deterrent against 
nuclear blackmail and the threat of use of nuclear weapons justifies 
national security imperatives. For Pakistan's security concern has always 
been India centric. Her desire to make parity with India, to gain regional, 
global status and estabhshment of deterrence posture drove to go nuclear. 
As long as offensive nuclear deterrence continues to be so unabashedly 
practiced by most of the other NWS, the task of the management of their 
deterrent equation is not impossible one. Any initiative for arms controls 
which confines to South Asia will perhaps not be acceptable to India. All 
the geographically relevant countries in the region and beyond the region 
must be included in any meaningfiil dialogue to control nuclear weapons 
whether it is vertical or horizontal proliferation. As for as South Asia is 
concerned, both India and Pakistan should concentrate on nuclear risk 
reduction measure, and track II diplomacy to establish peace and stability 
in South Asia. 
In this work an effort has been made to search for the main 
underlying factors which compelled India and Pakistan to go nuclear. 
The work consists of five main chapters which are as follows: 
Chapter I reviews the concept of proliferation. It provides the 
comprehensive theoretical aspects of nuclear proliferation- vertical and 
horizontal. However, it briefly examines the hypothesis regarding state 
acquisition of nuclear weapons and the currency gained by nuclear 
weapons in playing foreign affairs game and ensuring both national and 
international security. It also provides a comparative assessment of the 
views of non-nuclear states and nuclear states on nuclear proliferation. 
Chapter II evaluates the evolution of nuclear programme of Indian 
and Pakistan. An attempt has been made to analyse the motives force 
which compelled India and Pakistan to go nuclear. 
Chapter III discusses factor of nuclear weapons and their 
implications for South Asia and beyond. Moreover, it undertakes the 
study of responses of nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon 
states of South Asia. It endeavors to look into the prospects of security, 
stability and arms race in the South Asian subcontinent. 
Chapter IV deals with the concept of national security. It provides 
the analysis of nuclear and non-nuclear dimension of national security. It 
emphasizes the regional context of the security problem by delineating the 
linkages between the internal and external threats to the security of states 
in the region. 
Chapter V analyses the evolution of the regional dynamics as well 
as evolution of deterrence in South Asia during and after the cold war 
period and particularly after the Pokharan and Chagai tests conducted by 
India and Pakistan respectively. It tries to explore the possible future 
course of deterrence and emergence of compellence strategy in south 
Asia. 
It could be concluded here that it would be unwise to prescribe a 
disarmament policy for Indian and Pakistan, rather all the geographically 
relevant countries even China, must be involved, in any meaningful 
dialogue on nuclear proliferation in South Asia to do away with the 
scourge of nuclear weapons. 
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Preface 
The topic of this thesis raises two significant questions- nuclear proliferation, and 
security problem in South Asia. In selecting this topic for research, we were motivated 
by the fact that though there has been a lot of talk on nuclear weapons but it gained 
momentum in recent time only. We were also intrigued by the question, as to what 
prompted South Asian countries (hidia and Pakistan) to go nuclear. 
We chose South Asia as the anchor for this study because arms race in South 
Asia was fuelled by western nuclear states for deterrence as the backdrop. The present 
study is based on both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are 
government documents and official reports. Books, article and website bibliography 
related to the topic comprise secondary sources. The approach to this study is historical 
and analytical. 
In this study, an effort has been made to search for the main factors which 
compelled non-nuclear states to go nuclear. The work consists of five chapters which are 
as follows: 
Chapter I reviews the concept of proliferation. It provides the comprehensive 
theoretical analysis of the nuclear proliferation-vertical and horizontal. It also examines 
the hypothesis whether state acquisition of nuclear weapons and the currency gained by 
nuclear weapons in playing foreign affairs game ensures of both national and 
international security. It also provides a comparative assessment of the views of non-
nuclear states and nuclear states on nuclear proliferation. 
Chapter II evaluates the evolution of nuclear programme of India and Pakistan. 
An attempt has been made to analyse the factors which compelled India and Pakistan to 
go nuclear. The evolution of the nuclear tests of 1998, and choices based upon 
considerations of national security. 
Chapter III discusses about the nuclear realities of South Asia for the region and 
beyond. Moreover, it undertakes the study of responses of nuclear weapon states and 
non-nuclear weapon states of nuclearised South Asia. It endeavors to look into the 
prospects of security, stability and arms race in the South Asian subcontinent. 
Chapter IV deals with the concept of national security. It provides the analysis of 
nuclear and non-nuclear dimension of national security. It emphasizes the regional 
context of the security problem by delineating the linkages between the internal and 
external threats to the security of states in the region. 
Chapter V analyses the evolution of the regional dynamics as well as evolution 
of deterrence in South Asia, during and after the cold war period and particularly atter 
the Pokharan and Chagai tests conducted by India and Pakistan respectively. It tries to 
explore the possible future course of deterrence and emergence of Compellence strategy 
in South Asia. 
It could be concluded here, that it would be unwise to prescribe disarmament 
policy for Indian and Pakistan, rather all the geographically relevant countries even 
China, must be involved, in any meaningfiil dialogue on nuclear proliferation in South 
Asia. 
I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to my 
supervisor. Professor Mirza Asmer Beg whose valuable suggestions and ideas on the 
subject were quite useful and helped me to expand my views on the topic. 
I am thankfiil to Prof. Naheed Murtaza Khan, Chairperson, Department of 
Political Science, AMU, Aligarh, for her encouragement, throughout the process of 
getting this work completed. 
Thanks are due to Prof Murtaza Khan and Prof Arif Hammed for their 
encouragement and support. I would fail in my duty if I do not mention the names of my 
teachers Dr. Mohd. Abid (Reader), Dr. Aftab Alam (Reader), Dr. Arshi Khan (Reader), 
Dr. Upendra Chaudhari (Reader), Dr. Nasim Khan, Dr. Rachna Kausal for their moral 
support and unselfish cooperation. 
I am highly indebted to my family members and Mends especially Dr. Manzer H. 
Siddiqui, Dr. Ibrar A. Ansari, Dr. M.H. Faridi, Dr. Mosaib Ahmad, Mr. Kalim Haidar, 
Mr. Ehasanul Haque Siddiqui, Mr. Sohail Ahmad, Mr. Rahat Hasan and Mr. Zafar Alam 
for their moral support and encouragement. 
I place on record my gratitude for the Iielp provided by the Librarian, Jawahral 
Nehru Library, New Delhi, Institute for Defence studies and analyses library New Delhi, 
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thanks to Mr. Mohd. Quasim, Seminar Incharge, Department of Political Science, AMU, 
Aligarh, for providing me books whenever I needed. Mr. Riyasat Ali deserves 
commendation for his painstaking and efficient type-setting. 
The responsibility for the contents, conclusion, errors and omissions is solely 
mine. 
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Chapter I 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter-I 
P r o l i f e r a t i o n of N u c l e a r W e a p o n s 
Introduct ion: 
The rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a danger of 
unimaginable magnitude, their uniqueness lies in their truly awesome 
power of destruction. Nuclear weapons alone have the potential to cause 
total destruction, exterminate humanity, destroy all life from the surface 
of the earth. The totality of destruction wreaked by, and unending 
lethality of nuclear weapons distinguishes it from other class of 
armaments. The first successful detonation of nuclear device by the 
United States at Almogordo on 16th July 1945 unveiled the gigantic 
secret of 'atomic energy' which if used cautiously could be a blessing for 
humanity or else it could unleash catastrophe. The most widely held 
image of nuclear proliferation in progress is a country sedulously 
working to build and test an atomic bomb. The traditional indicator of 
nuclear proliferation is its first nuclear test explosion, marking the birth 
of the nth nuclear weapons power. To be sure, case histories of all five 
recognized nuclear weapons powers faithfully reflect this view of the 
nuclear proliferation process. All five nuclear states doggedly pursued 
nuclear technology explicitly for the purpose of producing weapons. 
Through the late 1950, the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons was 
largely the result of concerted effort to do just that .Inl949 the Soviet 
Union had succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons. The membership of 
nuclear weapon states continued to swell with the UK (1952), France 
(1960) and China (1964). Thus by 1964, the number of Nuclear Weapon 
State (NWS) had grown to five and this five happens also to be the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council with special 
responsibility to maintain international peace. In terms of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the countries are divided into two 
categories - Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon 
States (NNWS). Clause 3 of Article IX of the NPT says that a nuclear 
1 
weapon state is one which has manufactured and tested nuclear weapon 
prior to 1 January 1967.'All the remaining states which do not have any 
nuclear capabilities are strictly known as Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
(NNWS).^ 
Nuclear Weapon Prol i ferat ion: 
The word 'Proliferation' is borrowed from biology meaning to 
'grow rapidly' . According to Concise Oxford Dictionary 'proliferation' 
means grow by multiplication of elementary part or reproduce itself.^ The 
word proliferation is very akin to dissemination and dispersion. As far as 
nuclear weapons are concerned, it gives different meanings. 
The meaning of proliferation had been subjected to exhaustive 
discussion by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) in 
the mid 60s when it deliberated to draft Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). The Indian representative expressed his view that both vertical 
and horizontal proliferation form part of a single whole and the problem 
cannot be dealt with by dealing with only one aspect of it. This element is 
essential and central to our concept of a non-proliferation treaty.^ 
Nuclear strategy by and large has been a product of American 
though, with some notable contribution by French and marginally by the 
Soviet Union and the Britain. The US developed the first nuclear weapon 
and is the only country to have used them in war. In the literature on 
nuclear proliferation, 'vert ical ' proliferation refers to the development 
and multiplication of newer categories of nuclear weapons incorporating 
qualitative improvements. While 'Horizontal ' proliferation refers to 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by a country, which had not hitherto been 
in possession of such weapons. 
Thus proliferation not only tells about the horizontal growth but 
also vertical growth. It is an abuse of English language to term 
acquisition of new nuclear weapons by a new country as proliferation. 
India, a member of the non-aligned non-nuclear countries group in 
ENDC, expressed the view that all aspects of the term proliferation and 
not exclusively the horizontal proliferation, which have been variously, 
termed as present and future proliferation or existing or further 
proliferation^ should be covered by the NPI. 
V.C. Trivedi expresses his view that when people talk of 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, they forget that the problem is not 
merely that of dissemination of weapons, or weapon technology by or 
from one nuclear weapon power to other powers, although that is 
included, that is not merely the problem of the independent manufacture 
of nuclear weapons by a hitherto non-nuclear weapon power although that 
also is included, but, also that of the continued manufacture of nuclear 
weapons by the existing nuclear weapon power. ' 
Horizontal Prol i ferat ion: 
The super powers, engaged in the process of acquiring the mutual 
assured destruction (MAD) capability, were convinced that it was 
essential to stabilize their mutual deterrence, but they felt that a Sixth or 
Ninth country going nuclear could destabilize the whole system. Instead 
of concentrating on vertical proliferation they deliberately shifted 
emphasis on horizontal proliferation. 
The efforts of non-nuclear weapon states, majority of whom are 
developing countries and have been showing interest in development of 
nuclear power for the civilian use of nuclear energy were identified as 
horizontal proliferation. The Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT) 
defines nuclear proliferation as acquisition of nuclear weapons by Non-
nuclear or additional states. This perverse logic arose out of a lot of 
nuclear folk and mythology about horizontal proliferation in the 1950s 
and 1960s to make the non-nuclear states feel guilty that if they choose to 
go nuclear it would constitute a grave threat to world peace and security. 
The US Atlantic Council policy paper on Nuclear power and 
Nuclear weapons proliferation refers to two type of horizontal 
proliferation* a country-specific scenario of states close to weapon 
proliferation, and the long-term proliferation relating to the world-wide 
advancement in nuclear and other industrial technologies 
Schoettle's assessments that -
(i) the domino effect or the chain reaction on regional adversaries and 
competitors. 
(ii) the irresponsible use of nuclear weapon by new nuclear weapon 
powers in the absence of paper command and control. 
(iii) escalation of catalytic war, and 
(iv) the possibility of the international system being swamped by new 
level of complexity in international politics. 
India's nuclear explosion of 1974 has been interpreted by western 
nuclear expert, and defence analyst as opening of floodgates of 
proliferation.'^ The Late Hedley Bull blamed India for providing a new 
route to nuclear proliferation. ' ' William Epistein, the former Consultant 
on Disarmament to UN Secretary General has expressed the view that the 
risk of proliferation has increased with the sudden surge of interest in 
nuclear power... if nuclear weapons do spread to a number of smallest 
countries, the outlook for world survival becomes much more 
gloomy'^.Ford Mitre Report concluded that the resultant impact of 
proliferation of nuclear weapons are serious compared to economic 
benefits of nuclear energy. 
Dr. Fred C. Ikle, former Director of Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency argued in 1976 that the Pakistani attempt to acquire 
a reprocessing plant with such a primitive nuclear programme should be 
regarded as nuclear proliferation per se.'"* Therefore, the so cal led 
'sensit ive' nuclear technology like the breeders, reprocessing and 
enrichment facilities have all come under the purview of the current 
definition of nuclear proliferation. Similarly the arms controllers regard 
the substantially industrialized states as the proliferation-prone weapon 
candidates.'^ 
Lewis Dunn expresses the view that if effort to control 
proliferation proves inadequate, world of 30 or more nuclear weapon 
state, many locked in hostile confrontation could emerge by the late 80s 
or early 90s. Even though in isolated cases such nuclearization of 
regional confrontation could prove locally stabilizing, most frequently 
the outcome would be increased political and military competitiveness, 
confrontation and probably conflict. Moreover, the destructiveness of 
future small power nuclear wars would be significantly greater than that 
of either past local wars or man made or natural disasters. '^ Lewis Dunn 
had predicted that of 1974 would generate a nuclear proliferation chain 
encompassing countries within South Asia, the Middle East and even 
Latin America.'^ He further makes a case for Pakistan's going nuclear to 
deter India. 
Albert Wholstetter was of the view that the acquisition of nuclear 
technology by developing countries for peaceful purposes ultimately ends 
up in nuclear weapons. He called horizontal proliferation as overhung. 
This is in addition to those that might acquire the bomb by an overt 
military programme, which they have not foresworn by cheating or by 
shopping. But the developing countries did not accept the permanent 
linkage between the spread of civilian nuclear technology and 
proliferation of nuclear weapons because they had accepted nuclear 
safeguards.'* For a majority of third world countries which are known as 
least developed, nuclear technology is beyond their reach. 
So there is a Plethora of literature especially published in the west 
which is serious about the horizontal proliferation but they remain silent 
on vertical proliferation. 
Vertical Prol i ferat ion: 
Vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons is the real problem 
holding the key to the future survival of humanity. The Nuclear Weapon 
States (NWS), among them especially the two super powers during the 
cold war, had deliberately created the myth of horizontal proliferation 
with an ostensible objective of diverting the world public opinion from 
the catastrophic dangers inherent in vertical proliferation, and to 
retaining their monopoly. On the pretext of doctrines like maintaining 
delicate balance of terror and the stability of mutual deterrence, the two 
super power provided rationale for vertical proliferation. The 
conventional wisdom about vertical proliferation is that it is nor related 
to the horizontal proliferation because the overkill capacity does not pose 
any threat to the Non Nuclear Weapon States. '^ As Alton Frye, a leading 
proponent of vertical proliferations has argued. 
Some commentators contended that the ongoing strategic 
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union described as 
"vertical proliferation" justified the decision by India and possibly other 
states to test nuclear explosives-"horizontal proliferation", as the jargon 
puts it. This is canard. The technological refinements through the Soviet 
and American arsenals have virtually no bearing in logic or politics on 
the indications of other states to go nuclear. Soviet and American 
weapons threaten each other, not the non-nuclear states. 
Alton Fry's logic of denying any linkage between the vertical and 
horizontal proliferation is not tenable. The vertical proliferation vests 
NWS with such instruments of warfare with which they can continuously 
rely on adopting dangerous postures without any need to resort to nuclear 
war. This very attitude has led to the emergence of doctrines like Mutual 
Assured Destruction (MAD) and the Mutual Deterrence Doctrine. 
The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), a sub group of 
the IAEA has aptly envisaged an essential relationship between the 
vertical and horizontal proliferation. It is not mere quantitative but 
qualitative - retaliatory threat^'. The linkage does not exist merely 
because of the threat to NNWS from the overkill capacity of the super 
powers, but it provides the pretext for inventing a corresponding 
deterrence doctrine under which the proliferators presumably hope to 
stabilize their mutual threatening postures^^. Therefore, the NNWS 
thought mere conventional weapons could not deter nuclear weapons, so 
the desire for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by NNYVS emanates 
directly from vertical proliferation. 
The French strategic analysts, Pierre Gallois and Andre Beafre, 
have advanced certain doctrine regarding nuclear proliferation. Pierre 
Gallois has advanced the case for Proportional deterrence , while Andre 
Beafre advocated the theory of "nuclear poly-centrism and multiple 
deterrence".^'* China also relied upon this theory and in contemporary 
world many developing countries are also having faith in these theories. 
Ali Mazrui in his 1979 Reith Lecture supported the right to nuclear 
energy of third world countries. He was of the view that the 
nuclearization of the non-aligned world would mean not only using 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but using that to reduce the East-
west convulsion^^ and strongly pleaded for the nuclearisation of third 
world. He further added. 
... .The road to military equality is first through nuclear 
proliferation in Third world countries and later through global 
denuclearisation for everybody. African countries will not rise militarily 
fast enough to catch up with even the middle range northern countries; 
but they could rise sufficiently fast to create conditions for substantial 
disarmament in the world as a whole.. . .^ ' 
Ali Mazrui 's argument is valid for developing countries. Albert 
Wholstetter 's view that the reduction in nuclear weapons by Nuclear 
Haves have no relationship with horizontal proliferation. He rightly 
remarked; whether its other advantages, the reduction of the nuclear 
forces of the "superpowers" and of their expenditure of nuclear weapons, 
and a cessation by the super powers of nuclear tests, plainly do not have 
any direct relevance to the proscription of those activities of the states at 
present without nuclear weapons which, without breaking the rules, 
lessen the critical time needed to obtain a capacity to produce nuclear 
explosive.^^ Wohlstetter's view appears against reality. Arms race, 
whether in conventional or in nuclear field, is inter-related. The arms 
race among the developing countries is in fact mainly prompted by the 
NWS who are major arms suppliers. The measures taken for 'nuclear 
disarmament' have rather proved instrumental in the institutionalization 
of vertical proliferation, legitimization of the status quo of the nuclear 
club, and the assumption that nuclear power will not disappear given the 
necessary impetus to horizontal proliferation.'^^ 
There are many political and strategic motives behind the disfavour 
of Nuclear Haves to prevent new state to become nuclear. Firstly, the key 
assumption is that nuclear weapon confers a discrete measure of 
autonomy and room for maneuver in the international system, whilst 
insulating the possessor from nuclear coercion. Consequently the belief 
obtains that acquisition of nuclear weapons by a second tier of nations 
would hasten the diffusion of power and disorder the present hierarchy of 
nations. It is noteworthy that the nuclear aspirants belong to the 'South ' 
whereas four of the five nuclear weapon powers assuming Russia 's 
ultimate co-option therein are in the 'North ' grouping. All five nuclear 
weapon powers are permanent member in the Security Council with veto 
powers over its decisions. So the effort to instutionalise this dispensation 
and shut out more entrants into the veto club is clearly apparent. 
Secondly, these second order nations are situated in regions where 
strategic instability is endemic and major wars have been fought in post 
cold war era. The possibility of likelihood of conventional war which 
escalates into the nuclear level cannot be denied. Lastly, the lack of 
sophisticated Command Control and Communication would increase the 
danger of the use of incipient nuclear forces in irresponsible manner. 
There has always remained the discrete probability of nuclear exchange 
not by design but by accident, miscalculation and or irrationality among 
existing nuclear powers. A view was floated during cold war that the 
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emergence of more nuclear powers might 'catalyse ' a nuclear conflict 
between the Nuclear Haves in support of second order nuclear allies. 
Nuclear proliferation, either vertical or horizontal, is extremely 
dangerous for the mankind. 
Why do States build Nuclear Weapons: 
The United States was the first country in history to have possessed 
nuclear weapons and actually used them during World War II although 
Germany was also in vigorous pursuit of these weapons. The race for 
possessing nuclear weapons between these two states during the war was 
precipitated by the concern of each that the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by the other would drastically change the equation of war. 
Therefore, security concerns emanating from Germany's effort to acquire 
nuclear weapons primarily motivated the United States to embark on a 
nuclear weapons programme. Following the war, the Soviet Union soon 
exploded its own nuclear device to counter the United States possession 
of nuclear weapons as a part of superpower rivalry. Insecurity deriving 
from the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and 
ideological rivalry between the East and the West were conceived as the 
primary variables for Soviet Union's embarking on a crash nuclear 
weapons programme in the aftermath of the Second World War.^^ 
Acquisition of nuclear weapons by Great Britain and France contrasts 
significantly with United States and Soviet motives rooted in mutual 
hostility suspicion and competition. The relationship between nuclear 
weapons and the extent to which perceptions of national status have been 
served through the acquisition of these weapons was important factor to 
'go nuclear ' . China very soon followed the suit of the nuclear weapon 
states by exploding its own nuclear device in 1964. Insecurity and 
prestige was the basic reason for China's acquisition of the nuclear 
weapons capability, because, China wanted to ensure independence by 
dissuading potential aggressors.^' 
Although the conclusion of NPT and CTBT did put barriers to 
nuclear proliferation, still several states clandestinely embarked on 
nuclear weapons programme. Various factors precipitated states to 
initiate their clandestine nuclear pursuit although security concerns 
basically influenced their motivation. The conduct of nuclear weapon test 
by India and Pakistan in May 1998 added a new twist to the proliferation 
as they became the first overt cases of nuclear proliferation in the NPT 
era for which they had to overcome uphill technological and political 
barriers put forward by the international nuclear non-proliferation 
regimes. 
In pursuance of the question why nations 'go nuclear ' , the pivotal 
point in the nuclear proliferation process is the decision to pursue nuclear 
weapons acquisition not having the first weapon actually in hand^^. 
Distinctions between a capability decision, and ultimately possessing 
functional nuclear weapons are crucial to understanding the nuclear 
proliferation process. Many countries may acquire the fundamental 
capability to produce nuclear weapons by intentional effort or as an 
unintended by-product of industrial and economic development. 
There are three general classes of hypothesis regarding a state 
acquisition of nuclear weapons: 
The nuclear technology itself is the deriving force behind decisions 
to acquire nuclear weapons that a technological imperative which pushes 
nations from latent capacity to operational capacity. Government decide ' 
to go nuclear because the technology is available and the technical costs 
manageable and opportunity irresistible. 
The quest for nuclear weaponry results from the systematic effects 
of a discrete set of political and military variables. Nuclear weapons are 
one of a number of policy options states may pursue in trying to 
accomplish foreign, defense, and domestic policy objectives. 
Proliferation decision, therefore, are motivated by political and military 
considerations, and when the proper political-military conditions come 
together a proliferation decision follows. 
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Nuclear proliferation process is largely idiographic. States 'go 
nuclear ' because particular individuals and particular events come 
together at specific times and create the proper conditions. Thus 
decisions to initiate nuclear weapons programme are sui generis. 
In addition to the above three hypothesis for a variety of reasons 
states seek nuclear weapons or 'go nuclear ' because of the following 
reasons. 
1. Security concern 
2. Prestige and status 
3. Technological imperatives 
4. Domestic politics 
Security concerns: 
Motivation of security stands clearly above all other factor which 
compel a state to go nuclear. A state 's decision to acquire nuclear 
weapons is a dynamic function of its search for national security. 
According to Arnold Wolfers the term 'security ' encompasses a wide 
range of goals that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policy 
of security.^'' Arnold Wolfer's exposition of the concept of security, 
though expounded during the thick of cold war period of early 1950s still 
seems valid.^^ He does not deny the potency of security in national 
policies. Security refers to some degree, of protection of values 
previously acquired. As Walter Lippmann has opined: "A nation is secure 
to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core 
values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged to maintain 
them by victory in such a war. This view links security closely to a 
country's ability to deter an attack. 
Some other political scientists- Hedley Bull^', Bertnard Brodie^^ 
Frank Trager and Frank Simonie^^, have defined the concept of security 
in the concept of national security. Realists argue that insecurity is the 
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most important cause of nuclear weapon proliferation. Because states 
operate in a 'self-help' manner in an anarchic international environment, 
a state 's decision to acquire nuclear weapons is the result of its negative 
assessment of its own security position. When a state feels insecure, 
particularly when a nuclear threat emanates from an imminent nuclear-
armed advisory and military confrontation from one or more foreign 
power is imminent the prospective nth country might turn to the nuclear 
option in the hope of bolstering its military capabilities. Whether for 
actual war use or for deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
becomes a viable answer to a variety of military threats.'*° Benjamin 
Frankel argues that a state 's decision to build nuclear weapons is a result 
of its perception of the security equation it faces.'*' The historical 
experience, threat perceptions, the anarchies nature of the international 
system, political rivalry and expectation about the future all combine in 
one form or another to account for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
But in each case, the way in which nuclear weapons were integrated in a 
state 's foreign and defense policy was uniquely rooted in that state 's 
historical experience and traditional approaches to policy making.*^ 
For the realists, nuclear weapons provide the ultimate security for 
the state and a stable condition can be achieved between nuclear rivals 
through the import of the logic of deterrence. For the formerly 
emasculated, every country desires nuclear weapons because countries 
with nuclear weapons are the ones that count. 
The first generation five nuclear states endorsed by the NPT as 
' legal ' nuclear powers, acquired their nuclear arsenals because each state 
perceived a nuclear threat from an actual or potential strategic adversary. 
When United States President H.S. Truman announced the Hiroshima 
bombing, he described the allied scientists as having been in a race of 
discovery against the Germans and thanked Providence that the Germans 
had not won the race.'*^ The Soviet Union's development of nuclear 
weapons was a reaction to perceived American nuclear threat. The Soviet 
atomic bomb, in turn, prompted the development of similar British, 
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French and Chinese bombs. The Chinese bomb, in turn prompted the 
development of Indian nuclear bomb and in turn Indian nuclear bomb 
prompted the Pakistani nuclear bomb. Observing this pattern, Thomas 
Graham concluded that in virtually all of these cases, a nation that has 
gone nuclear has faced an acute security threat from a nuclear armed 
adversary that also had a substantial conventional military capability". 
Today, apprehension that an adversary has, or will have nuclear 
weapons constitutes a major reason for 'going nuclear ' . The Indian bomb 
is generally linked to the development of the Chinese bomb. After the 
Chinese detonation of nuclear test in 16 October, 1964, the former 
director of India's Ballistic Missile Laboratory has concluded that 
national security was the dominant theme in the arguments of his 
country's nuclear proponents.'*^ India's nuclear test was viewed by 
Pakistan as that country's contemplation of acquiring a nuclear weapons 
capability. Amidst such an apprehension, India's explosion of nuclear 
device in 1974 created an irresistible compulsion for Pakistan to acquire 
a capability to produce nuclear weapons, Therefore, the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is a 'chain reaction' of the nuclear security dilemma"*^ 
originally obtained by the 'acquisition of nuclear bomb by the United 
States. The uninhabited proliferation of nuclear weapons between the two 
superpowers have relegated the threat to each other's security to oblivion. 
Weisner and York have correctly observed; "both sides in the arms race 
are thus confronted by the dilemma of steadily increasing national 
security. The clearly predictable course of the arms race is a steady open 
spiral downward into oblivion".'*^ 
Even skeptics of this security argument tend to view it as at least 
partially valid. For instance, Scott Sagan asserts that while "different 
historical cases are best explained by different causal models," still "the 
largest number of past and even current active proliferation cases are best 
described by the security model".'** Kathleen Bailey, likewise, argues that 
"the principal motivations for nuclear proliferation vary from country to 
country", but "Security is the principal reason to initiate a nuclear 
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weapons programme"'' 
Nevertheless, the general argument that security concerns drive 
states to acquire nuclear weapons is problematic and suffers from 
empirical shortcomings. Insecurity is a general condition of the anarchic 
international system, but empirical evidence suggests that very few states 
have gone nuclear. If the general security argument were valid all the 
time, many, if not all states would have developed nuclear weapons. The 
general security argument, thus, fails to explain why only few states have 
built nuclear weapons, while most have not. What is clear is that 
apprehension' of a nuclear adversary or security threat from an enemy is 
not universal nor will all states eventually be compelled to seek nuclear 
weapons as a reaction to every instance of proliferation. The chain 
reaction argument does not necessarily mean that every case of nuclear 
proliferation will lead to another proliferation. For example India is 
concerned about Chinese nuclear weapons in a way that Pakistan is not. 
Likewise Pakistan is concerned about Indian nuclear capabilities in way 
that other neighbours of India are not. It reveals that security threat 
among nations are specific, based on the past experiences of conflict and 
expectation of future hostalities. 
Some countries have built nuclear weapons even though they did 
not confront nuclear-armed adversary for instance Israel, South Africa, 
Argentina and Brazil regarded the possession of nuclear weapons as 
essential for security. Thus we can conclude the security concern, has 
been the main plank to build nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear weapon 
states. 
Prest ige /Status symbol: 
Prestige is often cited as a reason of nuclear weapons proliferation. 
Many states equate nuclear capability with great respect in the 
international community, nuclear power frequently bring a state greater 
status in international fora and offers increased autonomy for many state. 
Such status may result from the military power nuclear weapons 
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inherently and from scientific and industrial strength associated with 
nuclear forces and from the increased attention that a "threshold" 
nuclear state may receive. 
Charles de Gaulle 's perception of France as a global power and his 
justification for nuclear weapons is commonly referred to as illustrative 
of how prestige acts as a major catalyst for nuclear weapons proliferation 
"A great state that does not possess (nuclear weapons) while others have 
them," according to de Gaulle, "does not command its own destiny^' De 
Gaulle always cherished the idea that France must have an independent 
military capability and global political responsibility. He views 
There is no France of worth, notably in the eyes of Frenchmen, 
without worldwide responsibility. That is why she does not approve of 
NATO, which does not allow France her proper role in decisions and 
which is limited to Europe. That is also why she is going to provide 
herself with an atomic armament. By that means, our defence and foreign 
policy will be able to be independent, on which we insist above a l l . " 
Like France, Great Britain is also referred to as a case where 
prestige was an important factor behind its decision to 'go nuclear ' . In 
the last century, Britain was the dominant player in international affairs. 
Even before the Second World War, Britain used to figure prominently in 
world politics. In the aftermath of the war when Britain found that its 
long dominance and influential position in international politics was 
gone, one way of preserving its earlier status was to acquire nuclear 
weapons. As Alfred Goldberg asserted, "Britain should cease to play 
leading role in international affairs was unthinkable, not only among the, 
country's political leaders but among her people as well for the nation 
had long been instinct with a sense of power and failure to accept the 
challenge of atomic energy would have been interpreted as a retreat from 
greatness and an abandonment of power.'^ 
Therefore, France and Britain are usually referred to as the two 
leading cases of nuclear proliferation for the reason of Prestige. This 
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view is strongly supported by Me George Bundy a great scholar in the 
field of nuclear politics. 
It appears that objective, historically, for both the British and 
French governments, has been to have a kind of power without which 
these two ancient sovereign powers could not truly be themselves. This 
requirement has been clear for each government at every moment of 
choice from 1945 onward, and it is not a matter of deterrent strategy as 
such. It is rather a matter of what Britain and France must have, as long 
as others have it, in order to meet their standard of their own rank among 
nation's.^'* 
China's entry into nuclear club in late 1979 becomes significant in 
view of the contemporary geo-politics, especially the sino-Soviet schism 
and ideological differences with the US. Though China officially denied 
that it wanted to achieve a 'Super-status'^^. China's acquisition of 
nuclear weapons was motivated by its desire to attain the status of a great 
power. Pakistan's quest for going nuclear seems to be' mainly motivated 
by its desire to emerge as the leader' of the Muslim world. There are 
about 40 Muslims countries in the Middle East Asia, Africa and South-
East Asia. The brisk pace of nuclearisation by Pakistan is to earn the 
Prestige or status of Great power among the Muslim States. India's 
acquisition of nuclear weapons is perceived by Pakistan analyst as to 
become Giant power in South Asia subcontinent: a nation's ambition to 
become or to be acknowledged a regional power is often mentioned as one 
of the basic prestige factor for acquiring nuclear weapons. Nuclear 
weapons are not a substitute for the fundamental bases of regional power 
but rather a complement to them. "Acquiring nuclear weapons is an act of 
arriving on the nuclear front as one has arrived, or is arriving, another 
fronts of national power and success". '^ 
Many experts espouse that prestiges have played an important role 
in India's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Raju Thomas observed that "If 
India can not obtain the respect of the west because it lacks economic 
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clout, "then it seeks" to obtain such respect through the display of 
nuclear weapons.^'' Therefore, many analysts view that the strongest case 
for going nuclear rested on the foreign policy consideration that only a 
nuclear India could' extract political, military and economic advantages 
from the two superpowers. 
Prestige as a factor to acquire nuclear weapons brings about several 
difficulties. Firstly, nuclear weapons are not the sole criteria for 
conferring great power status. A combination of economic military and 
political capabilities generates such power^*. 
For instance Germany and Japan are not nuclear powers but they 
are considered substantial powers in global politics due to their economic 
and conventional military strength. The cases of Israel, Pakistan, India 
and North Korea clearly demonstrates that even with nuclear weapons it 
is hardly appropriate to accord great power status to them. 
Secondly, prestige is not enough to pursue such a costly 
programme. Indeed, the basic weakness of prestige factor for the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons is that it often misrepresents social, 
political and strategic contexts of nuclear weapon acquisition. 
Thirdly, nuclear weapons may enhance state's international 
'prestige, but that is concomitant outcome rather than a cause. Nuclear 
weapons enhance prestige of a state because it provides more autonomy 
and maneuverability in its pursuits of strategic policies, but that comes as 
subsidiary benefit. 
Kennet Waltz notes: "..by building nuclear weapons a state may 
hope to enhance its international standing. This is thought to be both a 
reason for and a consequence of developing nuclear weapons. One may 
enjoy the prestige that comes with nuclear weapons, and indeed a 
yearning for glory was not absent from de Gaulle's soul. But the nuclear 
military business is serious one, and we may expect that deeper motives 
behind the decision to enter it"^^ 
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Infact, the acquisition of nuclear weapons in an anarchic 
international system provide greater maneuverability and leverage to 
determine outcomes in inter-state interactions. Therefore, nuclear weapon 
can be used to safeguard one's vital national strategic interests .by 
bargaining position of the state in international relations and it can be 
used as instruments of blackmail and compellence and as deterrence 
against the other nuclear states. 
Technological Imperatives; 
The factor that can push a state to build nuclear weapons is the 
technological momentum of a state. But there are two assumptions at the 
core of this argument. The first is that nuclear weapons have universal 
appeal to military officials and planners and political decision makers. 
The second is that the momentum of technological change cannot be 
resisted by specific individuals and organizations opposing it.^^There is 
close relationship between a state's national security decision-making and 
the state of military technological development at a given time. This is 
particularly true with regard to issues relating to war and peace. Although 
a high level of technological development does not automatically lead to 
the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it can be an impetus to move in this 
direction. This was especially true in the first two decades after the dawn 
of the nuclear age, when the norm against the development of nuclear 
weapons was not as strong as is today. The nuclear programme of both 
United Kindom and France were driven in part by technological 
momentum. 
The technological imperative leads a state to follow the same path 
of military development including the building of nuclear weapons. 
Infact, the diffusion of nuclear technology has made acquisition and 
deployment of nuclear weapons easier. Technological determinists argue 
that this phenomenon will inevitably lead to further proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. 
Ralph E. Lapp observed it that the unremitting buildup of the 
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atomic weapons represents just another example of the technological 
imperative - when technology beckons, men are helpless."' The 
deterministic nature of this kind of hypothesis is readily apparent when 
working premises are enumerated: 
1. As the result of continuous national effort to improve the level 
of economic development, the underlying industrial/ 
technological capacity of the nation will progress. 
2. Once the production of nuclear weapons becomes 
technologically and industrially feasible, the sheer momentum 
of technological progress, coupled with the challenge of turning 
an idea into a product, will compel the nation to complete the 
process and "go nuclear. 
3. Consequently, all nations will eventually cross the threshold 
from a latent capacity to the active manufacture of nuclear 
weapons. 
As Dr. Herbert York remarked in reference to the reports of a 
secret Japanese atomic weapons programme during World Warll: 
The Japanese story completes the set, that every nation that might 
plausibly have started nuclear weapons programme did so: Germany, UK, 
the US, the Soviet Union, France, and we now know, Japan. So the case 
has been weakened for those who have argued that governments, or more 
precisely generals, emperors, and Presidents can hold back from the 
decision and say "No". The decision to develop nuclear weapons is not a 
fluke of certain governments, but a general technological imperative.^^ 
Therefore, according to this argument, once nuclear weapons 
technology is invented, there is no escape for every state that is capable 
of building nuclear weapons from doing so. Technology effects decision-
makers and decision making because without the necessary technology no 
state can build nuclear weapons. For instance, Pakistan was hampered by 
lack of necessary technologies. However, as empirical evidence suggests, 
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it fails to explain why many states, have not built nuclear weapons, 
despite having technological capability of manufacturing nuclear 
weapons. Infact, there are more than thirty states that have technological 
capability to embark upon nuclear weapons programme, but they have not 
done so.^^ 
Many other empirical cases of nuclear restraint further highlight 
flaws in the logic of technological imperative. Sweden, Taiwan, South 
Korea, Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa are believed to have initiated 
weapons programmes, only to terminate them later.^'* Perhaps a more 
realistic interpretation of the technological imperative hypothesis would 
postulate that the overall manifestation of the technological imperative is 
spread out randomly over time. In essence though some nations may take 
longer than others to respond to the technological imperative, all will 
eventually succumb. It is noteworthy that the decision to terminate the 
military nuclear programme by, Sweden, South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina 
and Brazil and South Africa was not prompted by the technological 
deficiencies. After the end of the cold war states of Belarus, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan were born nuclear' following the implosion of the former 
Soviet Union. They initially considered preserving their inherited nuclear 
arsenals. But later they relinquished their nuclear status by returning all 
of their nuclear weapons to Russia.^^ Political factors rather than 
technological incapability influenced the decision of these states to 
reverse their nuclear courses. The empirical evidence, therefore, strongly 
suggests that the technological perspective cannot explain the phenomena 
of nuclear restraint and nuclear reversal. The proliferation of nuclear 
weapons is a complex process. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the 
technological imperative argument lies in the claim that technology alone 
causes nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, decision to build nuclear 
weapons is not primarily a technological one. Its primary cause lies in the 
interplay of other variables particularly the politics of security. A state's 
final decision to build nuclear weapons depends on specific security 
threat that it confronts. Technology is also a facilitator to take decision in 
this regard. 
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Domest ic Pol i t ics : 
Domestic factor also influence the decision to build nuclear 
weapons. The bureaucrats acting on the basis of their own individual 
policy preferences or bureaucracies carrying out their specific 
institutional interest attempt to influence a state's decision to acquire 
nuclear w e a p o n s / 
As individuals, bureaucrats have their own unique conceptions and 
ideas about the problems that a state faces. The idea they hold often 
result in state decisions. As an institution bureaucracy also acts m order 
to promote its organizational interests. 
A decision to acquire nuclear weapons, if one adheres to bureaucrats 
political theory, is pushed by key individuals within the scientific and 
defense bureaucratic of states. Once the civilian or military nuclear 
programmes are started decision makers are often bound to rely on 
scientific and defence bureaucracies for technical reasons. In these 
circumstances nuclear weapons development become very likely. Homi 
Bhabha of India and Pierre Guillamat and Pierre Taranger of France are 
often cited as example of bureaucrats who have played pivotal roles in 
the proliferation decision of their particular countries. Mitchell Reiss 
argue that in India the primary responsibility for nuclear development can 
be traced to one individual, Homi Bhabha. So it is believed that Homi 
Bhabha was instrumental in convincing the Indian Prime Minister Lai 
Bahadur Shastri to give military orientation to India 's nuclear 
programme. As Peter Lavoy observes, "Bhabha's well, timed 
interventions helped encourage and empower India's bomb Loby .... 
Shastri authorized Bhabha and other scientific to develop a capability for 
producing nuclear weapons"** In case of France Pierre Taranger played a 
Pivotal role in the development of French nuclear force, and France under 
the Fourth Republic would appear to represent the most striking example 
of minimal political leadership and maximum technocratic direction in 
the orientation of atomic policy"*^. 
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Polit ician's drive to score domestic and political gains may also lead 
a state to build nuclear weapons. Decision to 'go nuclear' is a cheap 
means to acquire domestic popularity as well as a way to arrest erosion of 
domestic support. State's decision to go nuclear is closely associated with 
motive of domestic political consideration, the decision stimulus 
originates within the domestic context - with the launching of the nuclear 
weapons programme intended to affect internal, not external conditions. 
Thus nuclear weapons become a form of domestic political currency. 
Regarding India's PNE of 1974, George Perkovich viewed that "the 
Pokhran blast of 1974 stemmed primarily from domestic dynamics 
meaning that scientist 's 'push ' and Indira Gandhi 's motivation to score 
domestic political gains were mainly responsible for the test.^" Following 
India 's nuclear test on May, 1998, many analysts argued that it was 
nothing but an attempt by Bhartiya Janata Party Politician's to upgrade 
their domestic popularity.^' 
No doubt bureaucrats play an important role in nuclear decision 
making but most important factor which compels a state to 'go nuclear ' is 
politico-strategic decision made by political leaders. The building of 
nuclear weapons is a serious strategic business, which simply cannot 
fully depend on the whim of politicians. Therefore Indira Gandhi 's 
decision to explode the 1974 Pokhran blast was not primarily motivated 
to acquire domestic popularity because of aftermath of the 1971 Indo-Pak 
war as she was at the peak of domestic support. She did not use the PN E 
of 1974 as option when her popularity plummeted before the 1977 general 
election. In the same way Pokhran II by the BJP led coalition government 
was not to upgrade domestic political support but the test was a 
delimitation of a long process of politics of security in India. However 
BJP enjoyed short-term domestic popularity in the aftermath: of the 
nuclear test emanating from the Pokhran II. Thus, domestic factor like 
strong public support for the bomb or bureaucratic pressure to 'go 
nuclear' may impel the political leadership to move in that direction. 
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Thus, proliferation of nuclear weapons is a complex process and no 
particular perspective can solely explain it. It is indeed very tough to pin 
point the exact nature of internal dynamics of a proliferation decision of 
a state. Therefore, secrecy, lack of understanding about the exact nature 
of internal dynamics of a proliferation decision and generally varied 
motivations of state to build nuclear weapons have led to the growth of a 
number of competing perspective about the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. 
However, the perspective of security concern explains majority of 
the cases of nuclear proliferation. Even if other variables such as 
prestige, technological imperatives and domestic politics, played their 
part in nuclear proliferation still security concern is the sole motivator 
for states to 'go nuclear' 
Atom for Peace Programme: 
For a long time the "nuclear" aspect tended to obscure the fact that 
the initial process of manufacturing nuclear weapons is largely an 
exercise in chemical, mechanical, and industrial engineering data through 
the Atom for peace program and its successor removed many 
"unconventional" technical hurdles. Thus, one result of the global push 
for scientific, technical, industrial and economic development over the 
past several decades is that many countries have acquired basic skills and 
resources necessary for manufacturing nuclear weapons. Thus, 
irrespective of specific government interest or lack of interest in 'going 
nuclear ' , a number of countries now possess latent capacities to produce 
nuclear weapons.^^ 
As the atom for peace programme got into full swing, the great 
research reactor "giveaway" begun in many countries acquired reactors 
mostly as gifts from the US and the Soviet Union. It is unclear whether 
this explosion, of interest in possessing research reactors was due to 
demand pull or supply push, but in each case the accessibility of the 
tools for nuclear research increased vastly. 
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More countries had acquired nuclear reactors for the purpose of 
cheap electrical energy. Slowly but surely, countries began to develop 
substantial nuclear infrastructure personnel with requisite knowledge and 
skill, and equipment and plants with productive capacity that could be 
systematically converted into nuclear weapon production. Thus nuclear 
proliferation is the result of the "creeping evolution". It could not be 
viewed as black-to-white jump to nuclear weapon status. During 1964-
1974 no other countries besides for five recognized nuclear weapons 
power had denoted a nuclear weapon but it did not mean that nuclear 
weapons had not advanced. It was moving forward in the form of ever 
developing latent capacities encompassing substantial clear 
infrastructure. 
Nuclear Weapons and World Pol i t ics: 
Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and throughout the decades of the 
cold war nuclear weapons have been at the very center of Soviet 
American national security policies and indeed, of the entire post world 
war second politics. The dropping of bombs over two cities of Japan was 
the first act in the nuclearisation of Post-second world war politics, and it 
was clearly directed as a symbolic-political warning to the Soviet Union 
because United States had no warning from Japan and Soviet Union had 
no nuclear weapons at that time. Infact it was a conscious attempt to 
harness nuclear weapons might for general political and foreign policy 
purpose in the post second world war era. 
United States President Harry S. Truman stated that he was very 
concerned about the unprecedented destructive capabilities of the new 
weapon (atom bomb) and very hopeful about its unique potential ' as an 
influence towards world peace.^^ 
As he saw it, the bomb was the most terrible things ever discovered 
but can\made the most useful''*. To ensure its usefulness and to hinder its 
destructive capabilities, it is necessary to prevent the secret of the 
weapon from falling into the wrong hands. The security of the western 
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democracies would have been at risk if Hitler or Stalin had won the race 
for the nuclear weapons. Harry S. Truman viewed that US nuclear 
superiority was the best guarantee against Soviet expansion and other 
assaults against the international status quo. Truman himself told to the 
Director of the US Atomic Energy Commission David Lilien that, the 
atomic bomb was the mainstay and all he had, and that the Soviet Union 
would have probably taken over Europe a long time ago if it were not for 
that.^^ He viewed that nuclear weapon as a military weapon and never had 
any doubt that it should be used.'^ American Policy makers saw the 
political advantages for being the sole possessor of nuclear weapons and 
viewed that it would strengthen the bargaining position of United' States 
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in the world politics. 
In 1945 Stalin reportedly told to the leading Scientist F.U. 
Kurchatov that 'Hiroshima has shaken the whole world and balance has 
been destroyed. Soviet Union tested nuclear weapon in 1949, he said that 
'If we had been a year or a year and a half later with atomic bomb, we 
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would surely have felt it on ourselves. United States had a nuclear 
monopoly, until the Soviet Union became a nuclear power. It was then 
that a competitive nuclear build up between the two countries began in 
right earnest. The world got divided into two blocs led by the United 
States and Soviet Union and there was political ideological systemic 
rivalry between the two blocs. This was a conflict between two different 
social orders. It was not simply a conventional Great power conflict of 
the kind which balance of power theorists belonging to Realist school of 
International Relations thought that nuclear weapons provide the ultimate 
security of the state and a stable condition can be achieved between 
nuclear rivals through the import of the logic of deterrence. In the first 
decade of the cold war, both US and Soviet leadership developed what we 
might call a defensive nuclear ideology they felt that nuclear weapons are 
essential to prevent both political blackmail and large-scale military 
attack by the other side. 
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Nation's decision to go nuclear was primarily influenced by the 
need to retain global eminence after the world war second. The 
motivation of France was very complex It was either loss of empire, 
rivalry with the United Kingdom or great aspiration of power or 
frustration with the US role in the Suez Canal crisis or the scientific 
technological momentum motivated it to go nuclear.^^ In other words 
France's rational for acquiring nuclear weapons was due to Soviet ability 
to strike at US heartland. 
The cold war was at its zenith when President Dwight Eisenhowever 
took office in 1953. Both countries indulged in an unprecedented nuclear 
arms race to ensure the survivability and retaliatory capacity of their 
respective forces. The nuclear warheads in the arsenals of these two 
powers went up to 50,000. The other three nuclear states i.e. Britain, 
France and China were left far behind as far as their respective nuclear 
arsenals were concerned. The collective security system adopted by the 
west after world war second was quickly undermined by the rivalry 
between the two superpowers. The US had, in effect abondoned collective 
security in favour of containment. Truman Doctrine, though envisaged 
in a world with directly competing interests and the administration 
believed that nuclear weapons could play critical role in the evolving 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. The US monopoly on these awesome 
weapons of Mass destruction seemed an immediate and direct way to 
compensate for Soviet Conventional military superiority in Europe *' 
American nuclear policy to have tactical weapons in Europe was not 
only to counter a possible Soviet Conventional threat on that continent 
but to separate the European battleground from transcontinental Soviet-
US one, because US wanted to maintain an overwhelming nuclear 
superiority both in quantity and quality and to translate this superiority 
into tangible political gains. Moreover, the US ability to lead a rather 
fractious Europe also depended on nuclear weapons. In 1950s Europe 
defence depended upon the US nuclear umbrella. The state of Europe was 
ready to follow the U.S. lead because US was essential for their security 
as well as to deter the threat of Warsaw Pact. 
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Many newly independent nations of Afro-Asian continent and Latin 
America made alliance with nuclear weapon powers and they relied on the 
nuclear deterrent protection provided by the nuclear weapon power. They 
either became members of NATO or of Warsaw Pact. 
US Secretary of state John Foster Dulles announced that any attack 
on the US or its allies would be met in a manner and at a place of our 
own choosing. X2 Throughout the cold war period the central arena in 
which it was fought out was not only Europe but also the third wor Id."^ It 
was, however, in the third world and over third world issues the nuclear 
weapons came closet to actually being used. Apart from the definite 
moment of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the use of nuclear weapons 
was contemplated on several occasions, ranging from the Soviet-Iranian. 
Azerbaijan crisis in 1948 to the Korean crisis of 1950, and Vietnam crisis 
in 1968 to the Israel, Egypt-Syria crisis in 1968.*'* 
It was, of course, the US threat to use nuclear weapons on these 
occasions. During Suez crisis USSR threatened the use of nuclear 
weapons against Israel-U.K.-France expeditionary forces. The 1948 
Berlin Airlift crisis is an exception when the U.S. considered the use of 
nuclear weapons against the USSR over Europe related issue. Nuclear 
weapons have played a major part in the strategic considerations of both 
major and regional powers. They show every sign of continuing to do so. 
The frequency with which nuclear weapons have been brought into play 
in the realpolitik of managing strategic interests is a pointer to a 
disturbing if not dangerous future. It demonstrates the confidence in 
exploiting or failing to comprehend, depending on the nuclear prism of 
the users, the meaning and purpose of a nuclear deterrent by new and 
small nuclear states.** 
It is no coincidence that the five nuclear weapons powers jointly 
constitute and have been variously designated as big powers and great 
powers and are permanent member of the UN Security Council. They 
possess veto authority in UN Security Council. During cold war, 
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permanent members of the UN security council routinely used their veto 
power on issues of importance to their national interests or for their 
"special" friends or a l l ies / ' Nuclear weapons thus became a currency of 
power and conferred a certain mystique that led to their being considered 
prerequisite whereby the hierarchy of nations was ordered. 
The various weapon reductions that have taken place (START-I, 
START-II, ABM Treaty, and the withdrawal and elimination of tactical 
weapons) are mostly arsenal rationalization measures, and will still 
permit enough nuclear weapons to destroy human civilization several 
times over. START II remains unratified by the Russian Duma. US-
Russian efforts to improve and expedite the management and deposition 
of fissile materials stocks slowed down. The ABM treaty is under seize 
by those in USA who prefer quick development of new technology to the 
continuation of nuclear arms control^*. On the one hand five nuclear 
weapons power emphasized on advocating to stop nuclear proliferation 
but they are still insisting on keeping their nuclear arsenal and coercing 
the world to accept their legitimacy. The present nuclear hegemonic order 
restricting nuclear weapons to five members of the Security Council is a 
reaffirmation of the Yalta-Potsdam arrangement. When proposals were 
advocated to include Germany and Japan into the UN Security Council as 
permanent members they are not to be given the veto power.*' In spite of 
their being more powerful economies than the Britain, France and Russia, 
they will not get the same status as the possessors of nuclear weapons. 
In the early 1990s many people hoped that with the end of the cold 
war, nuclear weapons could be placed on the road towards ultimate 
extinction in the conduct of international affairs. With nothing left to 
deter, troublesome deterrent threat could be removed from world politics. 
As Lawrence Freedman has pointed out, much of the debate on 
international affairs focused on how security through fear of mutual 
annihilation could be replaced by security in partnership.^° 
As Lawrence Scheinman has argued, during the cold war, with the 
28 
superpowers pursuing a global competition, both the United States and 
the former Soviet Union had a capacity for controlling the threat of 
proliferation by disciplining their allies. The issues of regional and local 
conflicts were settled within the perspective block.^' With the end of cold 
war the East-West issues have been removed from the centre of world 
politics, regional problems and conflict have became increasingly 
important. Long dormant antagonisms have re-awakened the bitter 
regional rivalries, ethnic tensions and broader disputes. The emergence of 
new supplier states of nuclear-related equipment and globalization of 
high technology have gradually made more and more countries capable of 
developing nuclear weapons along with missile system to deliver them 
rapidly over great distance. 
China has perceived nuclear weapons in terms of their symbology to 
stratify and encrust the hegemony of the US and USSR. Chinese position 
has shifted from an initial dismissal of nuclear weapons as 'paper t igers ' 
to acceptance that they catalysed the peace process to affirm that nuclear 
weapons in the hand of China would erode the nuclear duopoly 
constructed by the two superpower. Like other nuclear weapon states, 
China is also not eager to move towards the elimination of nuclear arms. 
While its declaratory policy of no first use stays firm, it had a tendency 
to put demands on others while trying to avoid measures that would 
constrain itself. At, the same time, it apparently does not want to stand 
isolated at the end of negotiations. China is being socialized into the 
international arms control and disarmament discourse.^^ 
In North East Asia, bigger and smaller Countries have long' been 
involved in disputes over territory and resources. China, an ascending big 
power is followed with particular attention. In North East Asia, there is 
no common framework for conflict prevention and resolution similar to 
the organization of Security and Cooperation (OSCE) to the Europe. 
Many countries of this region had two digit economic growth but their 
military budget growing fast and the line between aims built-up and arms 
racing is wearing thin. Thus, there are significant proliferation pressures 
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in the region stemming from conflicting national interests as well as from 
conventional force build-ups. 
Many countries are advanced enough to build significant nuclear 
arsenals in relatively short time span. North Korea's admission that it 
possesses nuclear weapons and sovereign right to wield nuclear weapons 
as strategic 'deterrence' poses immense dangers to its neighbouring 
states. It is a challenge to the credibility of the US extended nuclear 
deterrence guarantees in the region. The vulnerability of the United 
States and allies to North Korean conventional and nuclear capabilities 
adds urgency to the short fuse lit by the North Korea. It is, however, not 
the superpower's military capability that is in doubt but its ability to both 
keep its promises with allies and simultaneously work its military power 
in the new environment.^^ 
As for the other nuclear weapon states China is also part of the 
second Nuclear Age Problem. Its policy on transfer of nuclear technology 
has been contrary to its assurances. Its part in bringing about nuclear 
capabilities, which are challenging the older deterrence assumptions, has 
been significant. The implications of nuclear weapons and its role in and 
outside the club of five nuclear powers have not been lost. China's ability 
to persuade or coerce North Korea from desisting from its proliferation 
agenda remains doubtful even as its stand on US military action against 
Pyongyang unclear.'^ 
The US and Britain justified the war in Iraq on the ground that it 
possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD). America and its allies 
waged war against Iraq to free Iraq from despotic regime of Sadam 
Hussain and to make Iraq free from weapons of Mass destruction without 
authorisation of U.N. While the alleged possession of weapons of mass 
destruction by Iraq poses no direct threat to the security of the US or its 
allies." 
In the post-cold war era, the Clinton administration has given high 
priority to engaging the Chinese government in an effort to build a 
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relationship based on shared respect for international norms. The urgency 
shown by the Clinton administration is to some extent due to the 
realization of China 's growing military strength and its role in Asian 
security scenario.^* The United States recognizes the fact that China is a 
nuclear weapon power, a regional military power and a global power with 
a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, as well as big marker for 
US goods. US Commerce Secretary Ron Brown said that the U.S. is more 
interested in promoting American business than pressurizing China for 
non-proliferation of Chinese weapon of mass destruction and missile 
delivery system. 
In South Asia, Pakistan has proved to be a worthy ally, helping to 
contain the Soviet influence in Afghanistan during cold war and United 
States has rewarded Pakistan by turning a blind eye to its nuclear and 
missile programme and its proliferation violations. China also gave 
nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan. So India's perception of 
threat from China as well Pakistan and its participation in global arms 
control and disarmament talks, traditional leadership role in the non-
aligned movement, involvement in world politics as one of the most 
populous democratic country in the world strongly motivated to cross the 
threshold. Both Pakistan and India retain nuclear capabilities inspite of 
many international efforts to persuade them to give them up. India views 
its nuclear, rivals as China and other major powers that might deploy 
nuclear weapon into the region and Pakistan's leadership assessed that 
nuclear weapon will deter Indian threat. Nuclear weapons in the sub-
continent will playa decisive part in the conciliation role of the major 
powers, and Pakistan have faith that it is instrument to obtain political 
outcome on Kashmir dispute.^^ 
Nuclear weapons have, however, now become instruments of raising 
international fears and obtaining a political advantage through major 
power involvement. The dividing line between the shadow theatre of 
threats which are denied then repeated and reconfirmed and the reality of 
catastrophic possibilities remains, shadowy. 
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Nuclear Weapons and In te rna t iona l Secur i ty: 
Proliferation of nuclear weapons has long been an issue for 
international security. The first successful detonation of nuclear device 
by the United States at Alamogordo on 16 July 1945 unveiled the gigantic 
secret of atomic bomb. The catastrophic aspect was highlighted when the 
United States dropped atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 
9 August 1945 respectively"^^. The destructive power of one nuclear 
weapon is more than thousands of the conventional bombs. This is enough 
to make them different, but what makes them so different is their 
radioactive fallout. Radioactive fallout occurs when a nuclear weapon is 
exploded on or near the ground because the explosion causes huge amount 
of earth to be sucked up into the air. Particles of the earth become 
contaminated by the radiation from the explosion and return to the ground 
and cause various disease and genetic malformation. However, the effects 
of radioactivity in all out nuclear war would, be catastrophic '^' The 
world's arsenals contain tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, probably 
as many as 60,000. The total explosive power of these weapons is 
equivalent to about 4 tons of TNT for every man, women and child on 
earth. If all, or a significant proportion of them, were used, the 
consequences would be beyond imagination 
The emergence of United States as the only nuclear power gave rise 
to cold war and prompted Soviet Union to make effort in that direction. 
By 1949 the Soviet Union had succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons. 
Thus by 1964 the number of Nuclear weapons state had grown to five. In 
terms of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the 
countries are divided into two categories - Nuclear weapon state and non-
nuclear weapon state. Clause 3 of Article IX of the NPT deals that those 
state, which exploded nuclear weapons prior to Jan 1, 1967 are nuclear 
weapon state. 
The cold war confrontation saw many things but above everything 
else it represented a political-ideological systemic rivalry between the 
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two blocs led respectively by the United States and USSR. This was 
conflict between two different social order. Throughout the cold war 
period Europe was an enduring terrain of tension and the most explicit 
site of the politics of nuclearism associated with cold war hostalit ies." ' 
Many time United States contemplated or tempted to use nuclear weapons 
in cold war period. The decisive reasons for the US eventually deciding 
not to resort to nuclear arms had to do with 
(i) the peculiarly strategic character of nuclear weapons as a means of 
providing general foreign policy support. 
(ii) fear of domestic and international public horror, opprobrium, and 
anger. 
It is not the case that general public opinion in the US was, or is, 
unequivocally anti-nuclear in all circumstances. Majority of the people 
want the complete elimination of nuclear weapon as rapidly as possible 
because it is threat for humankind. No doubt USSR from 60s to 90s 
believed in massive nuclear retaliation. Various issue during the cold war 
international politics hegemonised the notion of security in the latter half 
of the present century. 
The two terms peace and security have predominantly been used in 
the context of external aggression, implying that avoiding war between 
nations is tantamount to sustaining peace and that the ability to avoid or 
stand up to external aggression implies defence of the nation or 
security.'"'* From such a view point, militarisation and war preparedness 
are seen as acts of defence and security maintenance, rather than as intent 
of potential aggression, even though the two are clearly interchangeable. 
The usual justification for the acquisition of nuclear weapons are that it 
is needed to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by another 
country. Underlying the concept of deterrence is the idea of Mutual 
Assured Destruction that any use of nuclear weapons by two countries 
possessing large nuclear arsenal would lead to massive destruction in 
both countries. The idea of deterrence is that faced with this prospect of 
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destruction, no country would initiate war. This notion of deterrence, by 
being articulated often enough seems to have become accepted as true. 
But deterrence is not a law of nature like the theory of relativity 
underlying its various assumption, any of which may turn out to be false 
at any given point of time. And the result of any failure to be 
catastrophic.'°^ Thus, nuclear weapons pose threat to international peace 
and security. 
The problem of nuclear weapons is larger than its purported role in 
international affairs. The accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear 
weapons constitute a threat to the survival of mankind. It has therefore, 
become imperative that states abandon the dangerous goal of unilateral 
security through armaments and embrace the objective of common 
security through disarmament.'^^ For many analysts, policymakers, and 
scholars, global anarchy is the main deriving force behind international 
behaviour, including proliferation of nuclear weapons. States are 
motivated by survival, which can be assured only through independent 
means or alliances with other states. Thus countries facing threats either 
need nuclear weapons to guarantee their sovereignty or credible 
commitments from other countries to protect their security. 
Professor Waltz, believe that the nuclear deterrence relationship 
that existed between the United States and Soviet Union during the cold 
war can be duplicated elsewhere.*°^ From this prospective nuclear 
proliferation has an overall positive effect on international security and, 
therefore, should not be viewed as threat. Thus efforts to halt 
proliferation are viewed as misguided. But some analysts however, 
dispute this logic. They believe that United States and Soviet Union 
deterrence relationship was not always reliable, especially during the 
time of crisis. Furthermore, whether such stability can be recreated under 
different regional and national circumstances. Thus a complicated global 
network of deterrence relationship holds many opportunity for failure and 
increase the risk of nuclear war. After the end of cold war, the fabric of 
international security is showing sign of unraveling. Relations among 
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major powers are deteriorating United Nations is in political and 
economic crisis. The global regimes to stop the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction are under seize 
Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 have shown that not all 
countries share the view that the usefulness of nuclear weapons is 
declining. Years of relentless effort have not eliminated the clandestine 
WMD programmes of the most determined proliferators. The United 
States - Russia nuclear disarmament process is stalled and the situation in 
Asia is particularly fluid, portending negative changes for disarmament 
and non-proliferation in coming years. Another danger posed to the 
international security is by the total stock of nuclear weapons. There are 
5000 nuclear warheads on a status known as a 'hair trigger alert ' round 
the world. United States is ready to launch nuclear weapons within 
second as part of a launch on warning strategy. In the event of an alert, it 
takes three minutes to activate an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM) and virtually no time to send a submarine launched Ballistic 
Missile (SLBM) on its way'^ ' . 109 As a weapon of coercion missile is a 
very effective tool. A nuclear tipped missile becomes a weapons of war 
avoidance. Missile diffusion into the hands of major powers would have 
the strongest impact on international security affairs, embargoes could 
merely retard a programme and not prevent it. During the cold war, the 
nuclear armed missile was the primary 'currency' of the measurement of 
power between the two blocs, and its development, development and 
counter measures because of the stuff of strategy. By 1987, the US had 
deployed some 2,442 strategic and theatre missile, while Soviets had 
2,304 strategic weapons and more than 1700 theatre systems. This was 
quite apart from the thousands of tactical missiles that were strewn across 
Europe, and those fitted on aircraft ."" Such capabilities essentially 
frightened everyone into preventing war between the two. 
The most recent use of missiles was by China into the waters near 
Taiwan in 1995 and 1996. It was classic use of the "force without war" 
principle to fulfill a strategic p u r p o s e ' " . United State started building 
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National Missle Defence (NMD) in Alaska and this worried Russia and 
China. Prospective Missile defence deployments complicate the picture 
and are causing much debate. Proliferation may increase the perceived 
need for missile defence, the dramatic changes in threat assessment 
caused by the emergence of Iran, Israel, North Korea, India and 
Pakistan's medium range missile systems contributed to the new interest 
in missile defence. Alternatively, defence could, among other things, also 
increase and diversify the threat of WMD proliferation, as some states 
including some of the five nuclear weapon states, may try to compensate 
for defensive deployments. The question of missile defence should take 
into account all these implications, so as to have the net effect of 
reducing, not increasing, nuclear dangers, and avoiding further 
destabilization of the international security system. Recently United State 
declared to withdraw from (ABM) treaty, which worried America 's 
European allies because it could begin a new arm race. America's ongoing 
war against Iraq revealed that NATO has reserved the right to eliminate a 
self-perceived threat by any means, including the use of nuclear weapons, 
but says it may require preemptive retaliation against a state building 
WMD for self-defence."^ 
There can he no global order as long as nations armed with 
weapons of mass murder and highly lethal conventional arms pursue 
military strategy that targets civilians as a fair game and deny other states 
the right to equal security. The global politics in this power driven 
system clearly works to the advantage of the powerful where power 
respects power, and power begets more power. No international Treaty 
has ever emerged that militates against great power interest. Arms control 
has been employed by the major powers to reinforce their military pre-
eminence and, "to contribute to a more stable and calculable balance of 
power. As long as there is no global definition of what constitutes 
international security, there can be no even handed security order serving 
as a guarantor of world peace. 
The nuclear test by India and Pakistan in May 1998 awoke the 
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world to the reality that the spread of nuclear weapons had reached a 
dangerous new phase. The test signals that nuclear weapons could be a 
growing part of the strategic landscape of the future. Two regional 
powers with unresolved antagonism had made their nucleaar ambitions 
overt. The resulting conflict would weaken their security and further 
endanger southern Asia."^ The nuclear crisis in South Asia is part of a 
larger global crisis; which is the existence of huge arsenals of nuclear 
weapons in a number of countries, and only domestic pressure will be 
sufficient to close these nuclear complexes down, international treaties 
are necessary but not enough"^. Those who have most fear from these 
arsenals are the domestic populations of nuclear weapons states. 
The use of nuclear weapons in an unintentional way was as 
dangerous for the cold war problems as it is for any other possessor state. 
Many a times, the accidental launching of nuclear weapons was averted 
on time. Here lies the paradox of nuclear deterrence in the sense that it 
actually impaired the position of deterrence, though it was supposed to 
espouse the measures to prevent the accidental use of nuclear weapons"^. 
On the whole, Van Creveld opines that much of the western literature on 
proliferation appears to be distorted, ethnocentric and self-serving. The 
concept of stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons was shattered and 
dismantled, when its possession slipped out of the hands of the 
superpowers, and consequently, it was described as destabilizing when 
they spread to other countries"^. At last, this stands out that nuclear 
weapons are not acquired for deterrence, but to perpetuate the power of 
hegemony. 
The use of nuclear and chemical biological weapon by terrorists has 
been possible for some time, but serious policymakers have traditionally 
seen other threats more seriously. The probability of WMD terrorism may 
still be relatively low, but it is growing with the ability of sub-state 
terrorist group to master the technical challenges of developing and using 
these weapons. National controls on weapon-grade fissile materials were 
tightened during the cold war but now it is increasingly possible that non-
state actors might obtain them'^^. 
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The prospect of WMD terrorism is particularly alarming because it 
would be hard to prevent and the perpetrators hard to identify. The effect 
of WMD terrorism could be so serious that it must be regarded as a 
serious security challenge for the coming decades. Therefore, for 
maintaining and reinforcing the WMD, non-proliferation regimes is vital 
to international peace and security. 
It will be hard to maintain stability and nuclear security under 
these circumstances. It will require a vision and roadmap of how the 
complex issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons can be solved. It also 
requires, at the global level and regional levels new initiatives to stop the 
spread of nuclear weapons and new spheres of strategic cooperation 
among major powers. The world has witnessed a decade of unexpected 
challanges and, disturbances since the end of cold war. There is strong 
risk that the world will become more chaotic and troubled, threatening 
the security of all. There must be a new initiative to make the world 
secure and peaceful. 
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Chapter II 
Nuclear Development in South Asia 
Chapter-II 
Nuclear Development in South Asia 
The nuclear programme of India and Pakistan dated back decades. In the post-
independence era, both countries began their peaceful nuclear programme, focusing 
mainly on research and on energy production. Over time, these programmes grew to 
include military objectives-that is, nuclear weapons production. Both countries found 
variety of political and military reasons for embarking on the production of nuclear 
weapons. The nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan owe their development in 
peaceful and military directions to both foreign assistance and indigenous efforts. 
Many countries have contributed to certain aspect of the nuclear development in 
South Asia in one way or other. There is no doubt that western countries are really 
worthy of the credit of nuclearisation of South Asia. Needless to say, these countries had 
never intended to assist India and Pakistan with their nuclear weapon projects, nor have 
they ever contributed to them directly or knowingly. Nevertheless, they have indirectly 
to a varying extent, helped India and Pakistan with those projects with dual applications. 
The Development of Indian Nuclear Programme: 
The Indian nuclear programme has long historical antecedents. The origin of the 
programme can actually be traced to the pre-Independent era, when a young Indian 
nuclear physicist, Homi Bhaba, who had trained under Ernest Rutherford at Cambridge 
University, returned to India in 1944. He convinced the wealthy, philonthrapic Tata 
family of potential use of nuclear energy. The Tata Institute for F\mdamental Research 
was opened at Bombay in 1945. Bhaba then successfully persuaded India's first Prime-
minister, Jawaharlal Nehru to create Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in 1948. 
Persuading Nehru to make such commitment was not a difficult task because he has 
scientific bent of mind and was already known to the uses of nuclear power in an energy 
deficient country.' 
Nehru considered the past four hundred years of history, for the world developed 
a new source of power that is steam and industrial revolution. But India did not develop 
that source of power despite having all virtue. He expressed his view that we are facing 
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the atomic age; we are on the verge of it if we are to remain abreast of things, we must 
develop this atomic energy.^ Under Bhaba tutelage in the 1950s the DAE fashioned a 
three stage nuclear energy programme. It sought to use indigenous source of uranium to 
produce plutonium possibly both for weapons and for nuclear energy. 
India was an early beneficiary of the United States sponsored "Atoms for Peace" 
programme launched in 1953.^ From the outset the Indian atomic energy establishment, 
under the direction of the Prime-Minister Nehru, enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and 
was largely shielded fi"om public scrutiny. Bhaba's efforts were explicitly directed 
towards the goal of complete mastery and indigenisation of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is 
also quite possible that Bhaba sought to lay the infi-astructural foundations of nuclear 
weapon programme, for the political leadership chose to pursue such an option.'* At a 
political level, however, Nehru remained opposed to India's development of nuclear 
weapons. Indeed, virtually in his all public pronouncement of nuclear related issue, 
Nehru was against the nuclear weapons. His opposition to the nuclear option for India 
drew in part irom his acute concern about the opportunity costs of defence spending in a 
poor, developing nation facing myriad socio-economic challenges.^ The U.S. and Canada 
have been the major player which contributed more in nuclear development of India. In 
1958, India began to acquire the equipment for its Trombay Plutonium reprocessing 
facility, even then justifying it as a scheme to pave the way in the civilian power 
programme for breeder reactors.^ In 1959, U.S. offered training in reprocessing and 
handling plutonium to Indian Scientists. In 1963 U.S. also approved India's purchase of 
two 210-MW boiling water reactors from General Electric for its Tarapur Atomic Power 
Station and agreed to supply fuel for this plant for 30 years in return for India's promise 
not to use the plutonium generated in these reactors for military purposes. 
Canada's nuclear assistance to India includes the building of a 40-MW research 
reactor called Canada-Indian Reactor - United States (CIRUS), for which the U.S. 
supplied heavy water.^ Canada also constructed the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station 
(RAPS) which was completed in 1969. In the same year France agreed to help India to 
develop breeder reactors and cooperated in the construction of a fast breeder test reactor 
at Kalpakkam which became operational in 1985.^ The first Chinese nuclear test at Lop 
Nor on October 16, 1964 impeled India's political and scientific establishments to take 
greater interest in acquiring nuclear Weapons. China's nuclearisation in the aftermath of 
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the 1962 Sino-Indian border war dealt a fiirther blow to India's national security. Sisir 
Gupta, one of India's ablest diplomats, spelled out the concerns of most Indian strategist 
"... Without using its nuclear weapons and without unleashing the kind of war which 
would be regarded in the west as the crossing of the provocation threshold, China may 
subject a non-nuclear India to periodic blackmail, weaken its people's spirit of resistance 
and self confidence, and thus achieving without a war its major political and military 
objectives in Asia.' 
Nehru, however, remained publicly opposed to the development of nuclear 
weapons. He said that, "we are determined not to use weapons for war purposes. We do 
not make atom bombs. I do not think we will.'^ His defence Minister Y.B. Chavan, 
however, felt compelled to reaffirm India's commitment to the modernization of its 
conventional forces in the wake of the Chinese test. In September, 1965 Indo-Pak war 
broke out over Kashmir. During war China provided diplomatic support to Pakistan. Just 
before the war ended, hundred members of the Lok Sabha wrote to Prime-Minister 
calling for India to exercise the nuclear weapon, option.'' India's failure to influence the 
creation of a global regime that would address its security concern pushed the country 
further down the nuclear path. Subsequent events bolstered the Indian elite's 
commitment to acquire nuclear weapons. On May 25,1970, Vikram Sarabhai in a public 
document spelled out the key features and goals of India's nuclear programme for the 
coming decade.'^  
India carried out its first nuclear test on May 18,1974, billed as "peacefiil nuclear 
explosion", the test had a 15 Kiloton yield. The two scientists, R Chidambaram and R 
Ramaima associated with the test justified that the explosion was an effort to harness the 
peacefiil use of nuclear energy. India's explanation of the test found few adherents 
abroad, however, only France congratulated India but China and Soviet Union's reaction 
were muted. Many of the developing countries expressed vicarious pleasure at India's 
successfiil breaching of an exclusive club. It practically ended western assistance to 
India. Indian efforts to allay western fears by describing it as testing a 'nuclear device' or 
peacefiil 'nuclear explosion' did not meet with success. The US and Canada cut off all 
nuclear co-operations with India. Canada accused India of having diverted nuclear 
materials from a Canadian supplied reactor to make the bomb.'^  
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The U.S. reaction, however, was more severe, in 1976 US Congress introduced 
the Symington amendment to the foreign aid bill, thereby cutting off certain forms of 
economic and military assistance to countries that received enrichment or reprocessing 
without full scope international atomic energy agency (IAEA) Safeguard." Further 
restrictions soon followed under the Carter administration which had made 
nonproliferation one of the key elements of its foreign policy platform. Most 
importantly, the Carter administration introduced and passed nuclear non-proliferation 
Act Omnibus Legislation design to severely curb nuclear sales to recalcitrant nation.'^ 
The sharpness of international reactions and the variety of nuclear export 
restrictions that the major industrial powers placed on India came as a surprise to the 
Indian political elite. This made the Indian programme increasingly indigenous. India has 
built many power research reactors as part of its effort to satisfy its growing need for 
energy and create a research and development capability. They include atleast six heavy-
water power reactors and a breeder reactor in Kalpakkam, as well as at least three 
research reactor (Dhurva and Pximima 2 at Trombay and Kamini at Kalpakkam).'^ India 
has also built fuel fabrication plants, at Hyderabad, Tarapur and Trombay. The Trombay 
plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities give India a dual-use 
capability as they also produce plutonium for making nuclear weapons.'^ 
Aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, Indian nuclear programme got 
momentum because it had profound implications for India's security and foreign policy. 
In 1995 NPT was extended indefinitely, only India, Pakistan and Israel remained outside 
its scope. The U.S. success came as dramatic shock to the Indian secunty policy 
establishment, which now realised that, India would come under acute pressure to size 
NPT or at least to agree full scope safeguard on its nuclear power plants including those 
of indigenous origin. The extension of NPT and the passage of the Hank Brown 
amendment inevitably provided Indian Security Concern.'^ 
Additionally, the move towards the finalization of the CTBT was also underway 
at United Nations Disarmament Conference (UNDC) at Geneva. It is logical to infer that 
the Indian government believed that its window of opportunity was rapidly closing. In 
this politico-Strategic context Prime-Minister Narsimha Rao permitted the preparation 
for carrying out a nuclear test in December 1995, but it was called off. "India reportedly 
has a second and larger reprocessing facility under construction at Kalpakkam with 
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planned capacity to handle about 1,000 tones of spent fuel a year, or nearly four times 
the amount that India's three smaller facilities together can currently handle each year. 
The link between the Indian atomic power programme and the weapon option was 
established with the construction of high flux research reactor Dhurva, which provided 
weapon grade plutonium 239, essential in the plutonium rout to nuclear weapons. 
Although India's nuclear projects have been mainly peaceful, its behaviour over 
time has made its intention to join the nuclear club quite clear. This intention has 
demonstrated itself in implicit and explicit formats. In January 1996, after warning India 
about the consequences of a nuclear test, the United States accepted Indian assurances 
that no test was plarmed. However, India did not remove the monitoring equipment it 
installed at the test site and the same equipment probably was used for the May 1998 
tests. The year 1997-98 provided momentum for India in terms of its domestic politics. 
Within the span of one year three different governments ruled the country. In the 
meantime, India's nuclear energy establishment renewed its commitment to the fast-
breeder and plutoniiun reprocessing programme. In early 1997, Raja Gopal Chidambarm, 
(Chairman, lAEC) announced that the 500 MWt Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), 
then still at the proposal stage, "could be built in seven years" once given the go ahead.^' 
At the end 1997, India's DAE reported new efforts to upgrade the centrifuge Uranium-
enrichment programme ostensibly for marine reactors. 
In Parliamentary election of 1998, BJP emerged as the largest single party within 
parliament, and with the support of a niimber of regional parties, it assumed power. The 
BJP election manifesto had spoken of the perceived need to "induct" nuclear weapon 
into India's arsenal along with a strategic review of India's security envirormient. The 
BJP hawkish proclivities and the substantial scientific military and public support for the 
nuclear programme propelled the BJP to break from India's long standing policy of 
nuclear abstinence. On Aril 6, 1998 Pakistan tested its intermediate range ballistic 
missile Ghauri, which enabled Pakistan to target twenty six cities in India, reinforce 
India's prior perceptions about the deteriorating security environment. In the aftermath of 
the Ghauri test, Prime Minister A B Vajpayee informed key ministers and the high rank 
bureaucrats as well as three service chiefs of his decision to proceed with the nuclear 
tests^^. India breached the international taboo on "going nuclear on May 11 and 13,1998. 
By testing a series of nuclear explosive devices India declared it a new nuclear weapons 
state. 
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The Development of Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: 
The origin of the Pakistani nuclear programme is markedly different from those 
of India's. The post-independence Pakistani leadership had a little interest in harnessing 
the power of the atom. They were primarily concerned with the problems of law and 
order. Indeed it was not imtil after the Eisenhower's 'Atom for Peace' programme. In 
1953 Pakistani leadership sought to develop a small nuclear research programme. In 
October 1954, the Pakistani government expressed an interest in the development of 
nuclear energy. In 1957, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was 
established to train nuclear scientists and to set up a nuclear research reactor.^ ^ 
Western countries have also contributed to the development of Pakistani nuclear 
programme. In 1965, the United States supplied a research reactor to the Pakistan 
Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) in Rawalpindi.^ '' In 1958, 
Z.A. Bhutto as fuel and Power Minister had urged Ayub to begin actively exploring the 
nuclear weapon option but Ayub had rejected Bhutto's advice on the ground that, if 
Pakistan needed a nuclear weapon capability, it could buy it "off the shelf .^ ^Karanchi 
Nuclear Power Plant (KANUP) with a capacity of 137 MW was established with the 
help of Canada which came imder the IAEA safeguard. The 1965 Indo-Pak war was an 
important turning point for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. Foreign Minister 
Bhutto, rightly concluding that India was on the road to acquiring nuclear weapons 
capability, renewed his bid for a Pakistani nuclear weapon capability to coimter 
perceived Indian threat. In 1966 Bhutto declared that if India acquired a nuclear bomb, 
"even if Pakistanis have to eat grass, we will make the bomb".^ ^ After the Pakistan's 
refusal to sign NPT in 1968, her decision to develop a nuclear weapon programme 
became clear. 
After the Indo-Pak war of 1971, the United States had proven to be a singularly 
unreliable ally for failing to prevent the breakup of Pakistan, and the military use of 
nuclear power became the focal point of Pakistan's nuclear policy. Under these tiring 
circumstances the pursuit of a nuclear weapons option was seen as a possible strategic 
panacea and Pakistan secretly launched its nuclear programme in 1972.1n 1973, Z.A. 
Bhutto had opened negotiation with the France to purchase a nuclear processing plant for 
the enrichment of plutonium, ostensibly for Pakistan's civilian energy programme^ .^ 
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Canada remained the major supplier of heavy water production facilities to Pakistan till 
1974. West Germany and the U.K. provided vacuum pumps and high-frequency 
inverters, respectively for controlling centrifuge speeds of Pakistan's Kahuta Uranium 
enrichment facility. Germany also provided mechanical parts for a Pakistani plant, 
producing uranium hexafloride at Sinhala. The Kahuta and Sinhala enrichment facilities 
were allegedly built with "the materials technology and equipment obtained secretly" 
from some European countries and also the United States. Pakistan's Limited success in 
the nuclear field is quite evident in the indigenously built facilities consisting of a small 
number of facilities with low production capability. Pakistan's resolve to establish a 
nuclear infrastructure was reinforced when India detonated its nuclear device in May, 
1974.This was another turning point in which set Pakistan irrevocably on the nuclear 
weapon path. 
In the wake of India's 1974 nuclear test, many foreign countries stopped or 
limited their cooperation with Pakistan because of its more than obvious eagerness to 
catch up with India. Canada stopped supplying nuclear fuel to Pakistan in 1976, and 
France cancelled its confract with Pakistan to supply Plutonium reprocessing plant for its 
Chasma facility.^' In 1980s United States stopped supplying fiiel for the PINSTECH and 
KANUPP reactors. The only exception is China, whose nuclear relations with Pakistan 
became prominent only after the 1974 Indian nuclear test. By the mid 1970s the United 
States had become concerned about the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability by 
hostile third world states and began to rethink its approach to the transfer of nuclear 
technology. United States fears of horizontal, proliferation were reinforced by India's 
1974 nuclear explosion and by the impending sale of a French nuclear reprocessing plant 
to Pakistan.^°The father of Pakistan's nuclear programme Abdul Qadir Khan, who had 
obtained substantial knowledge of a centrifuge enrichment process during his stint with 
URENCO, a Duch Consortium, returned to Pakistan in 1975 made a series of 
Clandestine purchase of technological components to fashion a small pilot enrichment 
plant. Subsequently, a larger installation was developed at Kahuta, near Islamabad. 
Reacting to this concern, the U.S. congress in 1976 passed the Symington amendment to 
the international security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act. The amendment 
denied U.S. military and economic assistance to any country importing unsafe guarded 
enrichment or reprocessing technology. But in the wake of the Soviet invasion Zaiul-Haq 
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pursued the nuclear programme with renewed vigor. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in 1980 proved another crucial turning point for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. 
In reaction to the Soviet Military Interventions, the United States for six years suspended 
the application of the uranium enrichment under the sanctions provision of the Glen 
Symington Amendment to Pakistan and provided greatly increased military and 
economic assistance to Pakistan. 
The Afghanistan related duality in U.S. policy towards Pakistan was reflected in 
the enactment of a 1985 Pressler Amendment, which called for the imposition of 
economic and military sanctions against Pakistan unless the United States president 
could certify that Pakistan neither had nor was attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. 
In response, President Ronald Reagon warned the Ziaul Haq regime to refi-ain fi-om 
crossing the five percent Uranium enrichment mark. But even after Pakistan had 
acquired the capability to enrich Uranium beyond five percent U235, President Reagan 
certified that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapons programme. The United States 
supply of military and economic assistance to Pakistan, therefore, continued.^ ^  Pakistan 
signed a peaceful nuclear cooperation pact with China in 1986 covering areas such as the 
design, construction, and operation of reactors. Reportedly, China has also helped 
Pakistan to complete a 40 to 50 MW heavy water nuclear reactor near Khushab. China 
began to help with the enrichment of weapon grade uranium, and allegedly transferred to 
Pakistan. China helped in setting up the Kahuta ultracetifuge uranium emichment plant, 
which become operational in mid 1980. In addition, work began on a second uranium 
enrichment plant, and uranium hexafluoride plant was set up at Dera Ghazi Khan in the 
province of P^mjab. In 1987, Zia-ul-Haq acknowledged for the first time that Pakistan 
had acquu-ed nuclear weapon capability. He stated, Pakistan has the capability of 
building the bomb. You can write today that Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it 
wishes. By the mid 1980s Pakistan, secured in its belief that U S patronage would 
continue, abandoned the earlier claim that its nuclear programme was solely for peaceful 
purposes. Pakistan's official acknowledgment that it had a nuclear weapons programme 
was used with some success to legitimize the military's interventionist role as the 
guardian of Pakistan's national sovereignty. '^* 
In late 1989 and early 1990, perhaps because of the threat of war with India, 
Pakistan apparently ended this freeze and fabricated cores for several nuclear weapons 
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'^',. 
from pre-existing stocks of weapon grade uranium.^^ As a re§tili=ia J^istober 1990, the 
Bush administration decHned to make the certification required by the Pressler 
Amendment and terminated all aid and government to government military sales to 
Pakistan. As Pakistan's nuclear production capabilities grew a pace, its nuclear rhetoric 
changed. In January 1992 Foreign Secretary Shahrayar Khan declared in an interview 
with the Washington Post that Pakistan pressed "all the element which, if hooked 
together, would become a nuclear device.^^ In January 1996 Clinton signed mto law a 
bill granting Pakistan a one-time waiver on the Pressler Amendment to sell 370 million 
dollars worth of military equipment excluding the 30 F-16s which Pakistan had already 
paid for.^ ^ It subsequently returned that money to Pakistan. 
The Clinton administration for example, adopted a more flexible approach, 
emphasizing positive engagement and incentives to persuade both Pakistan and India to 
freeze their nuclear weapon programmes. The new United States emphasis on 
engagement in South Asia represented another turning point in Pakistan's nuclear 
weapons programme. Despite the eventual restrictions of the pressler amendment, the 
Afghan War, and the concomitant exigencies of United States policy priorities had 
provided a significant respite for the Pakistani nuclear programme. During this period, 
Pakistan made substantial gains in its pursuit of a fiiU-fledged nuclear weapons option. 
Aftermath of Pokhran II, the hostility towards India in Pakistan was rife and 
public opinion was manipulated in favor of testing. In spite of the looming United States 
sanctions which would hit Pakistan for harder than India, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
reluctantly gave the 'go ahead' for Pakistan to respond in kind less than two weeks later. 
The six nuclear test at Chagai Hills in the Baluchistan province on May 28 and 30, 1998 
gave the signal of Pakistan's abandonment of policy of nuclear ambiguity, which it had 
adopted in the 1980s. Following the test, Pakistan laid claim to the status of a nuclear 
weapons State, with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declaring' No matter we are 
recognized as a nuclear weapons power or not, we are nuclear power^^. 
Motivation for the Nuclearisation of States: 
Scholars over the years have advanced a variety of arguments as to why states 
acquire nuclear weapons. Firstly, state acquires nuclear weapons strictly to enhance their 
national security. Secondly, they acquire nuclear weapons as a means of earning respect 
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from other states. So the main incentive for a government to acquire nuclear weapon 
status is the political power it hopes to gain, not only the military power associated with 
the national security argument. Thirdly, they acquire nuclear weapons for a variety of 
domestic political regions. From this stand point, powerful domestic constituent like 
politician, civil servants, military officers, public opinion, scientists are the main motive 
force behind government decision to acquire nuclear force.^' 
Individual Level Motivation: The attitude and belief of Indian leader motivated to go 
nuclear. All political leaders who have ruled and guided the country, whether soft-line or 
hard line politicians have had some inclination towards the possession of nuclear 
weapons because of India's major security considerations in relation to its nuclear 
neighbour, China or nuclear capable rival, Pakistan. 
India detonated its peaceful nuclear explosion at Pokhran in 1974 when Indira 
Gandhi was the Prime Minister. She is acknowledged to be a determined leader in the 
history of Indian rulers. The test was criticized on the ground that it was her individual 
desire to demonstrate India's power to the world and to the region. In April, 1968 when 
the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was being drafted, Indira Gandhi declared in the 
Indian Parliament that, "while nuclear weapon states insist on their right to continue 
manufacturing nuclear weapons, India would be unable to accept the obligation of not 
manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons for her own defence. That India in her 
decision-making was being guided solely by her enlightened self-interests, and 
consideration of national security'*". However, all successive Indian governments have 
maintained the same position. Some scholar criticizes India's nuclear progranune as un-
Gandhian. K. Subrahmanyam argues that, while Gandhi discovered non-cooperation was 
the best answer to colonialism, non-cooperation with nuclear imperialism is the best 
strategy for India today. The Indian nuclear programme and its stand on NPT and CTBT 
are not inconsistent with Gandhian philosophy.*' Gandhi's view regarding arms 
acquisition is that "I would rather have Indian resort to arms in order to defend her 
honour than that she would, in a cowardly manner, become to remain a helpless witness 
to her own dishonour."*^ Although Gandhi intended that India be able to defend itself, he 
did not specifically indicate that he would have wanted India to acquire small 
conventional arms. It is difficult to prove. 
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Prime Minister Nehru stated that India could not foreclose the option for all time. 
He understood the dual nature of technology and the importance of nuclear weapons 
technology for military reasons. Nehru had told the Constituent Assembly of India on 
April 6, 1948 that "if we are compelled as a nation to use it (atomic energy) for other 
purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that 
way'*^ . He was talking about the peaceful intentions of India's nuclear programme and 
his term 'other purposes' denotes other than peaceful purposes. Lai Bahadur Shastri, 
India's second Prime Minister, was personally opposed to building nuclear weapons 
because it would mean sacrificing India's principles of non-violence and world peace. 
But after the Chinese explosion in 1964, he supported pursuit of the nuclear option. 
Morarji Desai was also against the nuclear weapons during his tenure as Prime 
Minister, but he had left the nuclear option open. In his speech to the first U.N. special 
session on Disarmament in June 1978, he argued that a nuclear weapon free zone would 
not provide security to non-nuclear states such as India as long as the nuclear states 
continued to have their weapons. This argument was also used in 1996 for not signing 
the CTBT. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi advocated an 'Action Plan' to eliminate nuclear 
weapons from the world, also kept open the nuclear option.'*^  When the nuclear power 
did not commit themselves to a total elimination of nuclear weapons and Pakistan's 
possession of nuclear weapons capabiHty became known in 1989, it was Rajiv Gandhi 
who agreed to continue India's nuclear weapons programme. V.P. Singh and Narsimha 
Rao have also maintained the "option open" nuclear policy, Deve Gowda publicly 
indicated that India would not sign the CTBT in its present form, I.K. Gujral who gave 
more emphasis on the relations with neighbours, clearly stated in 1997 that India would 
keep its nuclear option open to face its security threats. It is security consideration that 
had driven all governments to take similar stand on the nuclear matter"* .^Since 1968 all 
government in India have acknowledged the need for keeping India's nuclear option 
open in view of the regional security environment. All India leaders, regardless of their 
political believes, have maintained a similar approach for India's nuclear weapons 
option. 
Bureaucratic Motivation: Sometime bureaucrats play a vital role in the states nuclear 
policy especially in those states where government is heavily influenced by the military. 
India is the most populous democracy in the world and its military plays a limited role in 
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government decision-making. However, it is pertinent to determine whether any other 
bureaucratic organs have influenced the government's nuclear policy. Bhabani Sen 
Gupta has argued that the military does not influence nuclear decision in India even 
though officers at the United Services Institute meet, discuss and publish on the nuclear 
issue."^ Unlike India Pakistan's military is strong as a political institution, and plays an 
important role in decisions pertaining to nuclear policy. While in India even in 
conventional defence policy the military plays a limited role. The Indian armed forces 
disfavour a nuclear programme as it might divert resources fi-om conventional arms."*^  
Military officers support nuclear weapons after retirement. They are fully aware that 
bomb has no use for warfare, so they want their government to avoid possessing them 
and focus on conventional forces. 
Kanti Bajpai also believed that the Indian army did not want bombs because of 
budget cuts.'^ ^The military scientific lobby demanding the bomb exist in India, but 
scientists are simply researchers and whether or not nuclear weapons would be made has 
always been a political decision. K Subrahmanyam argues that the chiefs of staff have 
occasionally proposed action to further develop India's nuclear option. Their proposals 
have also been ignored.'*' K.K. Nayyar, the Vice Chief of Naval Staff asked Indira 
Gandhi to go for the bomb and she replied, "It is none of your business".^'' 
Subrahamanyam has stated in 1996 that in India, bureaucrats including top military 
officials, have not focused on the issue, though most would deny it. Secrecy has kept 
foreign secretaries, defence secretaries and Chief of staff removed fi-om the nuclear 
subject. The recently retired bureaucrats have no idea about the status of our nuclear 
option.^'The military and bureaucrats are not encoiiraged to take part in nuclear decision 
and there is minimal legislative control over the programme. The nuclear programme is 
remarkably free from the inter- executive control. Thus the bureaucratic motivation for 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons in India is not very important factor. 
The prevailing consensus within informed segments of the scientific, military and 
civilian bureaucracies and political parties in India favours retention of the nuclear 
option, even if it is no exercised to preserve the flexibility to go nuclear of circumstances 
would so dictate in future.^ ^ The general declaration regarding the nuclear option is that 
it should not be foreclosed because the cost of retaining the option are irrelevant where 
national security is concerned. 
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Scientific/Technological Motivation: India's quest for nuclear technology began, in 
earnest in 1948, when neither China nor Pakistan was factors in India's nuclear 
calculations. Moreover, the 'atom for peace' proposal of President Eisenhower in 1953 
has been the strong motivating factor responsible for the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
by non nuclear states like India and Pakistan. India's nuclear technology had its own 
civilian needs logic, many Indian believe that Homi Bhaba the founder of the Indian 
Atomic Programme (lAP) intended to build the bomb from the very beginning.^ ^ India 
has had serious disagreements with the superpower on the question of mstituting 
international controls on question of nuclear programmes of developing countries. "India 
.... Viewed international controls in atomic energy as downright dangerous and 
discriminatory, and as a form of economic and technological colonialism.^ '* 
Like every nuclear state India also started its nuclear programme with peaceful 
civilian intentions. In the early 1960s Bhaba asserted that Indian Scientists were capable 
of making a bomb within eighteen months of the government approved. Bhaba became 
nuclear weapons advocate after the Chinese nuclear test in 1964.^ ^ Bhaba organized the 
Indian nuclear effort in a way that would enable him to keep the weapons option open 
indefinitely and to sustain and develop it to the point of being able to stockpile 
unsafeguarded weapon grade material.^ ^ India's first reactor APSARA was portrayed by 
Indian Scientist, as a symbol of Self-reliance in technological development, especially in 
the nuclear sphere. On the eve of Republic Day Parade in January 1997 the indigenously 
developed Prithvi Missiles were displayed before thousands of people from rural India. 
The Indian government takes fremendous pride in displaying such homemade weapons 
to the public to demonsfrate India's technological advancement. Development and 
modernization have been a part of the nuclear programme with power vested in 'Science 
and technology' and nuclear weapons are a symbol of the power. 
There is a general consensus among scholars and bureaucrats that although 
technological capability has to be taken into consideration and the scientific community 
is consulted, nuclear decision in India like other countries are mostly political. But it 
does not mean that the scientists do not play any role in pressuring their political leaders. 
Indian Security specialist T.T. Poluse believed that although most Indian scientists have 
favoured nuclear weapons, the scientific conmiunity does not decide nuclear weapons 
policy. If scientists had a determining role, another seven or eight tests would have been 
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conducted immediately after the 1974 Pokharan test.^'' So the nuclear decision is 
ultimately political and the scientist's hawkish attitudes towards demonstrating 
technological development of nuclear weapons have a little relevance. 
K. Subrahamanyam has stated that the scientific community plays an important 
role in the peaceful nuclear energy programme. He added that Homi Bhaba supported the 
military objective, but that succeeding heads of the nuclear programme lacked his 
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influence with the government. 
The scientific - bureaucratic establishment infiised nuclear weapons with an 
almost mythical status, because they believed that nuclear weapons would enhance 
India's security. On the other hand, hey could not casually demonstrated how India's 
security would be greater through acquisition. As Peter Lavoy argues, "the identity, skill 
and political power of the proponents of the myth... also play a crucial role in shaping 
policies.^^ After Bhaba some of his successor shared his level of enthusiasm for the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, some willingly followed the directions of their political 
masters in New Delhi, others were opposed to the development of nuclear weapons. The 
scientific bureaucratic commxmity did constitute a significant pressure group. They 
protected the nuclear programme fi-om an excess of scrutiny. However, the fimdamental 
political decisions and strategic choices remain in the hands of political leader and not in 
scientific bureaucratic community. P.K. lyengan, a former Atomic Energy Commission 
Chairman, confirmed that Indira Gandhi had Okayed more nuclear test in 1982-83 and 
three shafts were also dug, but the test were called-off for some reason. In the same way 
in 1995 and 1996 P.V. Narsimha Rao, ordered the Scientists to carry out nuclear tests, 
but called them off under international pressure. On both occasions the scientists had to 
accept the government's nuclear decision. Scientists are the researcher and they do not 
have power to be the decision maker.^ ^ The nuclear tests not only made India a declared 
nuclear state, but also publicized Indian Scientific achievements. Nuclear weapons 
acquisition is not a bi-product of peacefiil nuclear energy programme but the programme 
had the basic elements required to start nuclear weapon programme. The Plutonium 
came fi-om the civilian programme. The diversion fi-om the energy programme into a 
weapons programme requires specific decision motives and involving extra expenditure. 
These are spelt over effects because the programmes are interrelated; however, a 
decision to 'go nuclear' is necessary. Thus the technological development did not 
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provoke any nuclear country to acquire nuclear weapons without their motives to acquire 
nuclear weapons. 
Public Opinion: In democracy public opinion plays a vital role and India is a democratic 
country. So public opinion is a motivating factor for the nuclearisation of India. Here two 
questions arise. First what public opinion is on the nuclear subject and whether public 
opinion matters? Second is whether or not the people of India have motivated the Indian 
government to pursue a nuclear weapon acquisition policy. 
Aftermath of Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 a majority of Indians are 
believed to have supported the development of nuclear weapons in India.^' In 1970, 
when China launched its first Satellite, a survey was carried out by the Indian Institute of 
public opinion. Two third of the respondent wanted India to develop its own nuclear 
weapons.^^ Indian public was extremely interested for India's acquisition of nuclear 
weapons even at the cost of the cut in their development expenditure. In addition to that 
many public opinion poll have been conducted in the Indian urban centers which 
revealed that a large number of the elite supported India to keep nuclear option open.^ ^ 
A survey conducted by Kroc Institute in 1996 has shown substantial support for 
the Indian government's pre 1998 nuclear policy. According to the report of the survey 
57% of the people favoured New Delhi's policy of neither confirming nor denying a de 
facto nuclear capability while supporting global nuclear disarmament 33% people 
favoured nuclear weapons capabiHty of India and only 8% people polled for renunciation 
of nuclear weapon option.^ Moreover, the factor motivatings public opinion regarding 
the acquisition or renimciation of nuclear weapons option have primarily been dependent 
upon the perception of a nuclear threat fi-om Pakistan and China and the global 
disarmament policy. 
After India's nuclear test at Pokhran, on May 1998, India Today Commissioned 
ORG-MARG to conduct opinion poll to assess the people approved of the test. In the 
report 87 percent approved the nuclear test and 86 percent favoured that India should 
develop nuclear weapons.^^ Since last two decade, the public support for India's weapon 
acquisition have been consistent. 
Some scholar do not agree with the argument that public opinio play a vital role 
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in the decision to go nuclear, if it would have been pivotal in the decision to go nuclear, 
India would have been a nuclear country long ago. The decision regarding nuclear 
programme are made in secret by a few decision makers. The government is more 
concerned about other political parties, important journalist and key former government 
officials, though others are manipulated. Government does what it feels is right o the 
nuclear issue. Very often government uses public opinion to justify its nuclear stand. The 
political elite mould the public opinion. 
Economic Motivation: The economic condition of a country play very important role in 
the formation of the foreign policy. Economy is an important motivating factor for a 
country to go nuclear. It is natural for any government to undertake a weapons 
programme if it will reduce other military expenditures. 
In India the nuclear weapons programme was never considered an expensive 
proposition by the bomb lobbyists.^ ^ Bhaba stated that a 10-KT Hiroshima type Atomic 
bomb would have cost 17.5 Lakhs rupee and a stockpile of 52 mega ton bombs, 
something of the order of 15 crore which was peanuts, keeping in view the total 
expenditure on defence establishment. '^ So the less expenditure on the nuclear weapons 
option could be motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons. 
Muchkund Dubey agrues that no country has demonstrated the capacity to reduce 
military expenditure by nuclear weapons.*^ T.T. Poulose stated that in the United States 
alone, approximately 75 percent of the defence budget went forward conventional 
weapons, though she has huge stockpile of sophisticated weapons.^ ^ Whether Indian 
government decided to acquire nuclear weapons to cut conventional defence expenditure, 
scholars agreed that it was not a calculative step from that perspective. The Indian 
defence analysts also agree that the Indian government never considered the economic 
motivation for going nuclear but their argument differ. Jasjit Singh argued that 
conventional expenditure is not reduced because a country possesses nuclear weapons. 
The conventional weapons have to be maintained since nuclear weapons are not for war 
fighting. From the military point of view the conventional expenditure never reduce 
because of possession of nuclear weapons. In India the Army would never accept a 
reduction of conventional weapons and Indian government has also been aware of that. 
After Polharan II, the India strategic analysts began to take a closer look at the 
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costs of nuclear weapons programme. Two opposing view came regarding the costs, but 
a consensus was made among the analysts that the nuclear weapons do not substitute 
conventional weapons. Jairam Ramesh, an economist, advocated that developing a 
nuclear deterrent is expected to cost India abut 750 million dollar per year for the next 
ten years.^° There is an argximent that the deployment of an overt nuclear arsenal in the 
case of India would be relatively inexpansible sets on the promise that the major 
investments needed for establishing the technological capabilities to manufacture the 
wherewithal for producing those weapons viz. facility for uranium enrichment and 
plutonium reprocessing have already been made. Only some incremental costs would be 
needed to establish an overt nuclear weapons capability. 
Some co;mtry like Japan and Germany could keep their military expenditure low 
and achieve their economic boom because they sheltered under the United States nuclear 
umbrella which provided necessary defence and incurring military expenditure. 
The contention that establishment of nuclear forces permits reduction in 
conventional forces and expenses thereon was disputable in the case of Europe itself 
during cold war era. Nuclear pacifism has not commended itself to any of the major 
political parties in India. Their general declarations on this question have stressed the 
imperative that the nuclear option should not be foreclosed and that costs of retaining the 
option are irrelevant where national security is concerned. 
Domestic Turmoil: Indian domestic problems started with its independence fi-om British 
rule and do not show any sign of improving any time soon, although some language 
conflicts have been resolved. The country comprises many states and ethnic groups, each 
with its own problems, which the India government has tried to solve by different means. 
Sometime government has succeeded, in others the governments have failed and new 
problems emerged, exacerbating the old ones. 
Sometimes, the domestic turmoil create threat for national integration particularly 
the problem between central government and the state government relating to language, 
culture etc. Paul Bras states, linguistic and cultural differences also continue to provide 
strong support for regional political parties, persistent pressures for regional cultural 
plwalism, and demands for regional autonomy in states such as Tamil Nadu, Punjab and 
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West Bengal . Indira Gandhi's term of office was most notable for India's problems of 
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internal security. There was 'All India Railway Strike' on May 1-20 in 1974 during her 
tenure. The crisis was not properly tackled by the government and as a result Indira 
Gandhi began to lose popularity. Keneth Waltz pleaded that when a state is no longer 
considered capable of maintaining external security and internal order, the legitimacy of 
the state and the loyalty of its citizens may be dissolved.''^ Since hidia experienced such 
conditions in 1974, Indira Gandhi, who was not so inclined to considers. India going 
nuclear, agree to a series of decisions that resulted in nuclear test. India's nuclear 
explosion in 1974 diverted the attention of peoples from government's failure of solving 
Railway strike to nuclear issue where government herself justified their act in terms of 
national interest. 
It is argued that the nuclear explosion of 1974 was made to reassert the strength 
of the central government and to gain some internal political support. The Indian 
explosion was motivated .. .by the need of the government to gain popular supports that 
had been lost because of internal political reason.^ '* 
India won the 1971 war with Pakistan and Indira Gandhi won the election that 
followed the conflict. She was able to state proudly that her government had helped its 
neighbour, East Pakistan, to become an independent country. She was at the height of her 
popularity when she took the decision for the test. Politicians do whatever is required to 
get what they want and Indira Gandhi was not exception. But, infact, she lost power after 
the nuclear explosion which could mean that the people did not vote for her because of 
the nuclear explosion. This is clear that the decision to have a nuclear test is not a day or 
week preparation. Scientists have to prepare for years to get to the stage before bombs 
could be exploded. It is thus unlikely that even when Indira Gandhi was losing popularity 
in 1974, she would be able to give order for the test and have them conducted quickly. 
The 1974 nuclear test took eighteen months from the time it was ordered to the time it 
was actually tested. 
When A.B. Vajpayee was in power for thirteen days in 1996, he called a meeting 
with the scientists of the atomic Energy commission and enquired about nuclear tests and 
was informed by scientists that it would take a lot of time to prepare for test.^ ^ The 
government of India was fully aware of the fact that an underground nuclear explosion 
would require considerable data on underground water stream, and all other 
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environmental impacts before it could be attempted. Therefore the domestic turmoil is 
not a more important motivation for the explosion. Though, the ruling government took 
such decision to divert the attention from certain issues where government had failed. 
The ascendancy of right-wing, nationalist fiindamentalist elements in India could 
predict its nuclearization since the rhetoric of, most vividly the BJP, stresses the need for 
India to go nuclear. L.K. Advani, has repeatedly expressed the imperative that hidia go 
nuclear and reject pressure from the United States and international connmunity to desist 
because a nuclear capability is necessary to safeguard the country's integrity, security 
and sovereignty.'^  
India's 1974 and 1998 nuclear tests were conducted to divert attention from the 
nations crippling social and economic problems and to bolster the sagging fortunes of the 
ruling party. The Indian nuclear test in May 1998 was conducted after the three month of 
BJP coming into power. BJP already mentioned the nuclearisation of India as its election 
manifesto. It emerged as a single largest party in the parliament and it wanted to increase 
its popularity by demonsfrating its ability to carryout nuclear tests. 
Prestige Motivation: Many of the argument for the bomb based on prestige came to 
prominence in India because the leadership thought India had never received the world 
recognition and status it deserved. There is a belief that China obtained its legitimate 
status and influence in the world because of its possession of atomic weapons, and that 
the United States recognized China as a powerful nation only after it had acquired 
nuclear weapons. China was not allowed to occupy its United Nations seat until after it 
had nuclear weapons and missile capability. This drive for international recognition is 
said to have made India go for a nuclear test in 1974. Prestige was also a consideration. It 
is not vanity, and as the Martin Wight pointed out 'Prestige is a halo around power.'' It 
reflects a reputation or a belief which other have about how someone is likely to act in a 
given situation. 
The availability of nuclear weapons distinguishes the most powerftil countries in 
the world. It is no coincidence that the permanent members of the Security Council are 
the five nuclear weapon states. It was widely believed that India's stature went up 
considerably after its Pokhran explosion in 1974.'* 
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The national security dimension of the Indian nuclear calculus is the issue of 
New Delhi's international status. Between the first Chinese nuclear test and the Pokharan 
I, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) entered into force. The NPT effectively 
created a club of 'Legitimate' nuclear weapons state whose membership was frozen to 
five, India found herself on the outside, and consigned to being either a nuclear 'have-
not' or an illegitimate nuclear weapon state. Soon thereafter several events enhanced 
China's international stature. The most important event was the Nixon visit to China, 
which followed the Chinese permanent seat in the Security Council. 
India wants to be treated as an important country, at least as important as China. 
The search for international respect can scarcely be disentangled from the national 
security dimension of India's nuclear posture. The military and political characteristics 
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of nuclear weapons are inseparable. They are two side of the same coin, dominated in 
the cvirrency of power. Nuclear weapons remain a key indicator of state power. 
Muchkund Dubey argued that even though prestige motivation has a perverse 
logic, it nonetheless has been in the mind of the policy makers, especially with regard to 
the Sino-Indian problem. He stated: 
"On the border issue, China have a vested interest in maintaining the status- quo 
because, it is sitting on an advantage. It has no intention to open negotiations to solve the 
border dispute. If India becomes a nuclear weapon power, the entire Chinese perspective 
or bargaining on the border issue might change. China might think it worthwhile to start 
negotiations with India". ^ ° 
When countries have nuclear weapons, they tend to gain status and taken 
seriously by other states, especially their adversaries. Moreover, under such 
circumstances, these state whether or not they are developing or developed states - are 
then consulted in most important security issue of the world. There has not been a single 
nation-state not concerned about prestige. India also relates security consideration to 
prestige. State may wish to increase their power through nuclear weapons possession. In 
case of India, what role nuclear weapon might have played, and whether only nuclear 
capability would provide prestige or other elements are necessary to acquire it. Some 
scholar argued that if prestige was the triggering factors, India would have gone for 
nuclear weapons prior to the China. Before Pokhran II Jasjit Singh said 'prestige 
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motivation would have made India go nuclear openly. Although the Indian government 
believes that the Pokhran of NW cannot increase prestige.^' Prestige becomes 
motivational only when immediate adversaries are nuclear states with increased 
international status due to their military powers. In some ways nationalism and the quest 
for international respect and prestige can be invisibly connected with the problems and 
challenges of nationhood. 
Bargaining Advantage: Have Indian decision-makers been convinced that nuclear 
weapons could effectively increase their level of power that would enable them to 
bargain better with great power states? With the end of the cold war, the United States is 
the only dominant power in the world and a state needs bargaining tools or it is likely to 
be exploited by the U.S. It is believed that nuclear weapons can be used as a currency of 
power by states possessing them. Despite being a great civilization India has experienced 
two himdred years of political and economic domination by the west. India does not have 
hard power resoxirce with which to negotiate with the west. Japan and Germany are 
economic powers, so they do not need nuclear weapons to bargain. China can bargain 
with the Western powers because of its nuclear weapons and missiles capability. Nuclear 
weapons are a symbol of power in modem era and this aura is difficult to overcome. 
K. Subrahamanyam stated that "Nuclear weapons are not for fighting a war. They 
are to intimidate, to dominate, to blackmail. They are there as a currency of power. They 
could be used to dominate or resist domination".*^ He considered the overall utility of the 
nuclear weapons in the international system. Although security is the main motivating 
factor, sovereignty is also important, since the ability to defend India will give it the 
ability to bargain with other major powers. Bargaining power is a spill-over effect fi-om 
the possession of nuclear weapons rather than a motivation for the nuclearization. Some 
Indian strategist viewed that if China can use chip, India can do so too. Thus, nuclear 
weapons are acquired for security pxirposes but one of the benefits is that the bargaining 
position of the country improves with their rivals or hostile country. So the bargaining 
advantages also act as a motivating factor for nuclearisation of a country. 
Security Motivation: The strongest motive force behind the nuclearization of India is 
the security threat perceives firom Pakistan and China. India's important strategic concern 
in South Asia region has been Pakistan. India, a dominant power in South Asian region. 
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has been attacked by Pakistan, a conventionally inferior power in the region, on three 
different occasions - in 1948, 1965, and 1971. The three attacks make it convenient for 
India to believe that Pakistan could launch a military attack at any time, especially in 
periods of political disturbances within India. Though, India won the 1971 war, but a 
country can not invite wars hoping to eventually win, and a country cannot be sure of 
winning, especially when powerful allies are there to assist the challenger. 
The Sino-Indian border situation deteriorated and endangered a major border 
conflict between the two countries as occurred in 1962, with India needing to 
contemplate a nuclearisation of its option to stem a massive onslaught by Chma across 
Tibet. It is significant that the strategic direction of India's ballistic missile programme, 
visibly revealed by the agritechnology demonstrator, is clearly directed against China. 
From 1974 until 1998, the Indian government policy was that India had not 
acquired nuclear weapons, and that it wanted to keep the nuclear weapon option open for 
security reasons. Pakistan has always been a security threat to India, and continues to be 
one because territorial conflict states are highly war-prone. When Pakistan showed a 
tendency to consider war as the best mechanism to win strategic territory. So the 
possession of a deterrent capability was required to avoid future wars with Pakistan. 
Kashmir has always been a strategically important territory to India. It is clear from 
Jawaharlal Nehru views. In 1948 Nehru sent a cable to the British Prime Minister and the 
U.S. President explaining the Kashmir issue: Kashmir's Northern frontiers ... run in 
common with those of three countries, Afghanistan, the USSR, and the China. Security 
of Kashmir ... is vital to security of India. In the post Nehruvian period, the Indian 
national interest was India-centric and directed towards defending Kashmir.^ ** Countries 
make the decision to 'go nuclear' when motivations converge with capabilities and 
incentives outweigh disincentives. 
Another motivation behind the nuclerization of India is the lack of security 
guarantees from the major nuclear power. In 1965 Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri 
went to the west to let them know about the India's security position and its standing on 
the nuclear issue. Most of the leaders, including the British Prime Minister, wanted India 
to support the world non-proliferation efforts then underway. India knew exactly that 
none were willing to provide nuclear security assurance to it. 
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There was no question of India seeking a nuclear guarantee again from the same 
countries when Pakistan began developing its own nuclear weapons in 1970s. The 1962 
war with China and the 1965 war with Pakistan were proof that neither U.S. nor USSR 
did anything to help India in a war that it did not initiate. The U.S. aircraft Enterprise in 
the Indian Ocean in 1971 confirmed that India had to depend on itself for its security 
needs and nuclear weapons were required. Brahma Chellaney said that "US-Pakistani 
relations and the US intentions in the South Asian region were demonstrated from 1971 
onwards in a manner that India could not ignore".^^ U.S. supported Pakistan because she 
considered it a front-line country against Soviet Communism. This enabled Pakistan to 
receive million dollars as financial and military aid from the US, and to avoid strong US 
pressure to give up its nuclear weapons programme. 
Pakistan and China formed an anti-status-quo alliance against India by 1962.*^ 
The perception of security threats and the absence of security guarantees from fiiendly 
nuclear states repeatedly accelerated the Indian nuclear programme. Yet ample evidence 
suggests that India's security misgiving did play an important role in the evolution of the 
nuclear programme as well as in precipitating the Pokhran II of May 1998. The primary 
motivation behind India's nuclerisation has been to ward off threats to its security, 
including the immediate threat to its security from Pakistan. 
Indian Compulsion: What compelled India to go nuclear in May 1998 against the 
'International frend' that favoured nuclear non-proliferation? It was China's growing 
assertion of power in South Asia and South - East Asia that was the principal reason for 
India to go nuclear. What China claims was the international environment in which it 
faced a two prolonged threat to its national security in the 1960s, was similar to the 
national security envirormient in the 1990s faced by India. China has been a potential 
security threat ever since its aggression against India in October 1962. But this threat 
perception has sharpened since the end of the cold war. China's ambition to emerge as 
the Asian Super Power has made it to assert in Asia. Its double standards are evident, 
when it accuses India of being hegemonic power. How could China then accuse India of 
trying to 'obtain the hegemony in South Asia' when it pursues the status of super power 
globally as well as regionally? 
October 16, 1964, was one of the defining moments in the history of Indian 
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nuclear policy, until that date India only thought of developing a capability which could 
be converted into a nuclear weapon option, if it became necessary. The Chinese test at 
Lop Nor compelled Indian policy makers to give serious consideration for the country 
acquiring nuclear weapons. China's ambition to emerge as the Asian superpower has 
made it assert itself in Asia. Arrogance of power on the part of Chinese leader was 
indicated by their utterances. Thus, for instance, in 1994, Chinese Defence Minister 
publicly asserted that the "Indian Ocean is not India's Ocean". In response to a 
correspondents query on Chinese naval activities in the Indian Ocean. There was no 
security guarantee for India in the wake of Chinese threat which impels India to think 
about nuclear option. 
Pakistan has been a perennial threat to Indian security under its goal of 
completing the partition process on the basis of religions identity. It had launched war 
thrice against India but its defeat in 1971 war made it think in terms of revenge. In 
pursuit of this strategy, Pakistan had moved in the direction of a search for a nuclear 
weapon status. By 1984, Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons capability; Pakistan's 
nuclear capability has always been India-specific. All its decisions in international 
relations regarding the nuclear bomb have been related to India. If India signs the NPT, it 
will sign, or if India signs the CTBT, it too will sign". For the first time in 1994 Pakistan 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto admitted Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons. 
The indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT left India with no option 
but to go in for overt nuclearisation. The Sino-Pak nuclear collaboration continued in 
violation of the NPT and it was obvious that the NPT regime in India's neighborhood 
had collapsed, and grave deterioration in the security environment of India in the last 
three years along with legitimization of nuclear weapons compelled India to 'go 
nuclear'.*' 
The global police US did very little since 1993 to ensure that Pakistan and China 
adhere to the NPT and its own creation Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In 
1990, US President George Bush had refused to certify that Pakistan is not actively 
engaged in nuclear weapons development. Bill Clinton, through the Hank Brown 
Amendment to the Pressler Amendment, saw to it that Pakistan was provided with $ 368 
million worth of military aid. The United States under Clinton since January 1993, has 
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been very accommodative of China and Pakistan It not only lifted partial sanctions 
imposed by it against china for the supply of M-11 missiles but looked the other way 
when CIA reported about the collaboration between china and Pakistan o\'er missile 
production. Robert Einhom, Assistant Secretary of State, said before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee that in spite of our best effort to end Chinese assistance to Pakistan 
in the missile area, it may still be supplying missile component to Islamabad. Ironically, 
the U.S. instead of enforcing NPT provisions and the MTCR, itself cooperated with 
China by providing Satellite and missile technology to it.'*^  
The U.S. nuclear weapons in their Indian Ocean Base in Diego Garcia are also a 
serious threat to Indian security alluding to threats to Indian security in 1996. Former PM 
I.K. Gujral elaborated security environment around India in his talk at the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs in London. In the east, there is China, a full-fledged nuclear 
power. In the South, there is Diego Garcia, a major American naval base for its nuclear 
submarines as well as aircraft carriers. In the west, the Gulf region is nuclearised by the 
United States. Is it possible for any government in India to remain indifferent to the 
gigantic array of nuclear arm across its eastern, southern and western borders? 
There was the need to extricate India firom the muddled waters of past rhetoric 
over the CTBT. The Indian insistence fi-om the begiiming was nuclear disarmament. In 
November, 1995 The Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) John Holum has made very clear that the aim of the CTBT is to prevent India 
fi"om acquiring unclear weapons". India's domestic compulsion found expression in the 
fear voiced by several non-proliferation experts that India would become nuclear weapon 
power of a right wing BJP, if it came to power. A categorical declaration had been made 
by one of the leaders that India would go nuclear soon his party come to power because 
We have no option in this regard. Pakistan having become nuclear, China having 
been nuclear for many years now India simply to have its dealing with these two 
neighbours on a level ground, must be nuclear. The ascendancy of right wing, nationalist 
fundamentalist element in India predicted its nuclearisation since the rhetoric of, most 
vividly the BJP stresses the need for India to go nuclear because a nuclear capability is 
necessary to safeguard the country's integrity, safety and severity. Thus domestic 
compulsion forced India to go nuclear. Prime Minister Vajpayee on May 27, 1998 stated 
in the Parliament the compulsion which led India to test nuclear device at Pokhran that is 
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India's continuation of national policy on the path of self reliance and independence of 
thought of action of a sovereign India. The deterioration of security environment around 
India since 1980s. India is victim of externally aided and abetted terrorism and 
clandestine war.'^ 
India is not a banana republic which can be moulded to suit international needs as 
the big powers perceive it. India has its own strength of history and culture and almost a 
billion people cannot be ordered to forego their nuclear option, particularly when 
surrounded by powerful nuclear weapon states. As P.M. A.B. Vajpayee Said, A country 
of 100 crores cannot be left to the mercy of others ...nuclear waponisation is in self-
defence. Our enemies should know that we have nuclear weapons so that they will not 
attack us. However, like other nuclear country India too pursues the path of nuclerisation 
for its secunty purpose. 
India's interests in the military applications of nuclear energy gained coherence 
after China's first nuclear test in October 1964. This caused great alarm in India, which 
requires appreciation in the light of the hvimiliating defeat it had suffered in the Sino-
Indian border conflict of 1962. China's emergence as a nuclear state and the fear of 
American Soviet accommodation with communist China compelled India to think about 
its national security guarantee which pushed India to 'go nuclear'. 
Motives for Pakistan's Nuclearisation: There are so many motive forces which compel 
a country to go nuclear. Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons also motivated by the 
following: 
Individual Motivation: The attitude and belief of all Pakistani leaders regarding the 
nuclearisation of Pakistan was same. Their personal interest attitude motivated strongly 
to go nuclear. Z.A. Bhutto was undoubtedly the progenitor of Pakistan's nuclear 
programme. Apart fi-om being a Foreign Minister he was also minister for atomic energy 
in the Ayub Khan regime and was responsible for laying the nuclear infrastructure in 
Pakistan: 
In 1972, after taking office, Bhutto held a meeting with a group of Pakistan's top 
Scientists and engineers at Multan. He stated, "Look we are going to have a bomb ... can 
you give it to me? ... I shall find you the resource, and I shall find you the facilities''^^ It 
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has been argued that after Bhutto became the leader, the time was right for him and he 
had the power to 'put into practice what had lobbied for so many years for acquiring the 
weapon capability'. Mr. Bhutto restored Pakistan's nuclear establishment and authorized 
research and development activities. Many writers have stated that the chief architect of 
Pakistan's nuclear policy was Bhutto, who gave new direction to the nuclear programme 
of the country^ .^ Ashok Kapur has argued that Bhutto had very little power of role in 
Pakistan atomic decision making. He believes I.H. Usmani, Chairman of Pakistan 
Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was most important in this respect. However, with 
regard to the 1972-77, period the Bhutto era was unique. Here Bhutto was the main 
player whose actions, beginning in 1972 with the decision to make the bomb, broke with 
the peaceful Orientation of Pakistani nuclear activities during 1956-71. Bhutto era was 
unique not because of his success of getting bomb, but because the pattern of nuclear 
activities which occurred during his period had a clear anti-India directions.^  Bhutto's 
statement, 'If India developed an atomic bomb, we too will develop one' 'even if we 
have to eat grass or leaves or to remain hungry' because there are no conventional 
alternative to the atomic bomb,^ * indicates that he did consider Pakistan's security 
interest. Acknowledging Bhutto's contribution to the Pakistan's nuclear programme. 
General Aslam Beg stated that, "Bhutto rightly decided that Pakistan needs a 
capability... a major strategic decision ... and Pakistan started working on it after 
1975".^ ^ Pakistan's key nuclear scientists continued to direct the uranium enrichment 
facility at Kahuta from 1975 to 1998, although he was originally assigned by Bhutto to 
take on the responsibility in 1975. None of the subsequent political leader removed him 
from his position and in fact. Khan was the top scientist who tested Pakistan's nuclear 
weapons in 1998. 
There is no denying that Bhutto played a critical role in Pakistan nuclear 
programme, but his successor also seriously continued the programme. Thus individual 
motivation is not solely responsible but to some extent it motivated for the nuclearisation 
of Pakistan and sfrategic decision. However, he also maintained that Pakistan's nuclear 
research programme had a dual purpose only after India's nuclear explosion in 1974, 
even though the research programme started as a peacefiil one during the 1960s. The 
nuclear programme received importance after 1972 when Bhutto was not Prime Minister 
and why Pakistan became interested in the weapons programme after Bhutto regime. 
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All successive leaders with their different attitude and belief kept the option open 
for their country's security consideration. Many time they had to face the world pressure 
to join the nuclear arms control. Although, Zia-ul-Haque, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz 
Sharif have had their differences, but on the nuclear issue they all opted to continue the 
nuclear build-up. It is interesting to note that Bhutto was not alone in making 
controversial statements and that even Zia-ul-Haque stated 'we shall eat crumbs but will 
not allow our national interest to compromise in any manner whatsoever. In the same, 
Benazir Bhutto maintained that she was not well informed about Pakistan's nuclear 
weapons programme'^". She refused to unilaterally abandon the nuclear weapons 
programme in 1993. Her refusal became more adamant when the Clinton administration 
tried to negotiate with Benazir's government on nuclear matters in 1995. 
Bureaucratic Motivation: Pakistan has been ruled by military dictators for most of the 
time since its independence. Military's influence in the overall administrative 
development and decision-making has always been enormous. Military rulers from Ayub 
Khan to Ziaul Haq have had various agenda for the development of countr>, but they 
have had one thing common that is not to dissatisfy the country's military. Even civilian 
government always paid special attention to the demands of the military, whenever a 
government has taken a measure unpopular with the army, it has had to face negative 
consequences. Pakistan's constitution was designed so that the president under the eight 
amendments has had the right to overthrow any government when he believed to be 
corrupt'"'. It is possible to assume that it was military-bureaucratic politics which 
motivated the country to go nuclear. 
There is also a possibility that Z.A. Bhutto believed that acquisition of nuclear 
weapons, would reduce the power and influence of the military in the power structure of 
Pakistan. Somettiing the military had enjoyed all along'"^. The political situation in 
Pakistan in the years preceding Bhutto's ascendance to power had been governed by 
military leaders. He gave importance to the development of the nuclear programme as a 
means of strengthening his position as a leader in the domestic context. He hoped it 
would effect and diminish the importance of Pakistani Army Generals and causes a shift 
in power which would favour the civilization ruler. But very soon Bhutto lost power and 
military took charge of the nuclear weapons programme. 
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There has been a view among senior military leaders in Pakistan that once 
Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons, this would neutralize Indian conventional military 
superiority. "A Pakistani nuclear capability would paralyse not only the Indian nuclear 
decision, but also Indian conventional forces, and a bold Pakistani strike to liberate 
Kashmir might go unchallenged if Indian leadership was indecisive"'°^Although the 
military is the strongest bureaucratic institution in the country, Pakistan's nuclear 
decisions have always been made in a coordinated fashion with the military, civil 
bureaucracy, the President and Prime Minister, all being involved.'"'* 
Stephen Cohen says "the military in Pakistan does not like nuclear weapons - no 
soldier really like them. A few active and retired Generals have spoken and written in 
opposition to a Pakistani nuclear programme; most have come to accept with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm the idea of a nuclear weapon. The possession of nuclear weapons 
brings them no benefit and most of them believe that large chunk of the defence budget 
going towards the nuclear programme is unacceptable to the army. Nor are they happy 
with the possession of such expensive weapons which they cannot use. The importance 
of budget and the associated reluctance to possess nuclear weapons because of the 
expense is more evident in Shirin Mazari's statement. She stated that most army chief 
support nuclear weapons while in power, and only when they retire that their government 
should openly go nuclear. This is true for Pakistani military chiefs.'"' 
Earlier Gen. Jehangir Karamat was not inclined to endorse retaliatory test for all 
the reasons outlined earlier. It was only after visiting Pak to assess military morale that 
he was persuaded to change his mind. He discovered not only that morale was low after 
the Indian test but that sentiment among the officer corps was strongly in favour of an 
equivalent Pakistani response to the Indian action. He then advised the Nawaz Sharif 
government to go for nuclear explosion. Thus the bureaucratic motivation has role in the 
nuclearisation of Pakistan. The political leaders of Pakistan have positioned the nuclear 
option as a sovereign issue. In Pakistan the military nuclear programme is firmly 
controlled by the military and remains outside the jurisdiction of control of the civilian 
government. 
Technological Motivation: Pakistan has been a rather slow and reluctant starter in the 
field of nuclear development Pakistan quests for nuclear technology began in 1953 with 
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the establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. Pakistan's nuclear 
programme moved at a snail's pace, it was not until 1954, when the American exhibition 
on 'Atom for Peace' toured Pakistan, some interest was aroused in the potential of this 
new technology for national development. Consequently, twelve-member atomic energy 
committed was appointed by the government to prepare blueprints for the promotion of 
atomic energy. Pakistan's progress on the route to the bomb using enriched uranium 
began with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission's (PAEC) Chairman Abdul Qadir 
Khan's taking charge of the programme. He would do anything for his country to obtain 
nuclear weapons and it is stated that A.Q. Khan returned to Pakistan with a blueprint of 
an ultracentrifuge plant from Holland'"^. During an interview with Urdu Daily Nawa-i-
Waqt said that 'Pakistan has broken the Western Countries' monopoly on the enrichment 
of uranium' and in the interest of the country's solidarity the President of Pakistan was 
in extreme need and gave the team of scientists green signal to go nuclear'°^. This 
reflects his keen interest in weapon development. The components used at Kahuta were 
actually brought from Europe through the deals arranged by A.Q. Khan. 
Others have argued that I.H. Usmani, as the Chairman of the PAEC, laid the 
foundation for Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure and his role in the programme cannot be 
denied. Ashok Kapur contends that more than any other person, he set the direction of 
Pakistan's peaceful nuclear programme. Pakistan's nuclear power production programme 
today is what Usmani developed in the 1960.Not only did Pakistan's nuclear power 
programme got off the ground during this period but this was the high point in the 
development of nuclear energy in Pakistan'"^. He was a man who believed in the great 
potential of atomic energy for usefiil and harmful purposes. 
Scientists are important for the production of nuclear capability and in Pakistan's 
case they may have more importance, but the political decisions have always been vital. 
It is not the scientists who make nuclear decisions, although they play a central role in 
terms of technological aspect. Pakistan has combination of civilian and military leaders 
who were all involved in its nuclear choice. Scientists continued to hold an important 
position because of his technical expertise irrespective of military or civilian 
government. Like other nuclear country Pakistan's nuclear programme started with prior 
intention of resolving country's nuclear need and it remained a peacefiil one until the 
early 1976,when it was changed to a dual purpose programme to build nuclear weapons. 
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Although scientist Hke A.Q.Khan has always been in favour oTnb'eiear'^eapons, specific 
decisions had to be made to make the bomb. So the technological spill-over to scientist's 
interests in demonstrating their achievements are important, but the most crucial element 
is having a co-ordinate decision to go nuclear and even Pakistan requires that. 
Although Pakistani scientists wanted to demonstrate how technologically 
developed their country was, and in 1987 they proclaimed that their country was far 
ahead of India in uranium enrichment capability, they also mentioned that only if the 
government decided to make the bomb, would they do so. 
Pakistan has been an opaque nuclear state for many years, and the demonstration 
of nuclear technological development is not possible with conducting nuclear test, 
Pakistan did not conduct nuclear tests until 1998. The scientists aspirations may have 
succeeded to a certain point, but ultimately, the decision to keep the 'option open', 
which scientist never want, was made for the security interest of the country. 
Since 1990, Pakistani scientists were ready to test nuclear weapon. On April 14, 
1998 A.Q. Khan armounced on national news broadcast that all he was waiting for the 
government order to develop a nuclear bomb, when India tested in nuclear weapons on 
May 11 and 13, 1998 Khan wanted Pakistan to immediately conduct nuclear weapon test 
to match India's tests"", but the government took two weeks to divide, taking its other 
major interest into account. Thus we cannot undermine the technological motivation for 
nuclearisation of Pakistan. 
Public Opinion: Due to transition in democracy and dictatorship, Pakistan has not 
accorded much weight to public opinion for most of its major decisions, nuclear choice 
being no exception. Since Zulifikar Ali Bhutto's day to the present, Pakistan's nuclear 
decisions have been made in 'hush hush' environment and public opinion hardly 
mattered to the decision makers whenever global nuclear arms control treaty negotiations 
were underway, public opinion surveys were conducted and they showed that the popular 
demand was for the country to go nuclear rather than for signing nuclear arms control 
treaties. 
An understanding of the relationship between public opinion and nuclear 
weapons acquisition requires that two important points be considered the first is whether 
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Pakistan's nuclear policy has been consistent with public opinion and second is to what 
extent public opinion has been considered by decision makers in making decision 
regarding Pakistan's nuclearisation. 
Domestic support for nuclear weapons has grown considerably in the cross-
sections of the Pakistan polity in the 1980s. The public opinions have gradually shifted 
more in favour of security related explanations. Domestic public opinion has sharply 
reacted to pressures from outside. In 1994 when an American official came to Pakistan 
with a proposal containing a deal to read as F-16s in exchange for a verifiable capping of 
its nuclear programme, an opinion poll was conducted to assess the public response to 
the American proposal, which indicated that an overwhelming of those who participated 
in the poll gave a resounding 'No' to the proposal.'" Many in Pakistan believe that the 
application of the country specific Pressler Amendment to Pakistan has pushed the 
Pakistanis towards the brink of nuclearisation. 
Li 1996, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies survey reported that 61 
percent of the Pakistani supported Pakistan's 'open option' nuclear policy and .32 percent 
supported Pakistan going openly nuclear while only 6 percent wanted Pakistan to 
renoxmce its weapon programme. The majority of respondents believed that Pakistan 
should renoimce its nuclear weapon programme after the settlement of Kashmir dispute 
and India's renvinciation of nuclear weapons programme, as early as 1984. Stephen P. 
Cohen stated that a Pakistani nuclear weapon would be greeted with widespread support 
at home and this is the only issue support at home and this is the only issue on which 
Pakistani agreed imanimously' '^ . 
As far as Political Parties are concerned, in 1997 Pakistan's former Foreign 
Secretary stated that the 'nuclear decision is a sensitive matter. Pakistan's Public wants 
nuclear weapons ... No political party wants to give up nuclear weapons xmilaterally. He 
believed that some political parties including Jamat-e-Islami Party wanted the country to 
go nuclear, but they were not given much importance."^ These positions were held by 
the poUtical parties before the 1995 nuclear tests. 
The nuclear decision-making shared between the President, Prime Minister, 
Army Chief and the Director of the Kahuta Research Laboratory, who provided military 
and technical information' '"*. No public opinion is taken before test only some survey has 
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been conducted by some institution to justify the government decision. Nuclear decisions 
have been made in secret, and authoritarian and democratic rulers alike tended to ignore 
public opinion in Pakistan. 
Economic Motivation: It is one of the several motivations that might drive states to 
acquire nuclear weapons. Every country wants security at little defence expenditure. It 
has been argued that nuclear weapons are cost-effective defence, and are useful 
especially in coimtries needing to align budgets with pressing issue of poverty, illiteracy 
or overall national development. Pakistan is best suited case, needing to invest more for 
overall development of the country. Was the trigger to the weapons programme based on 
economic motivations? 
P.B. Sinha, an Indian analyst, argued that in 1965 Z.A. Bhutto asked the 
President Ayub Khan to sanction a sum of 300 million Pakistani rupees to purchase 
nuclear reprocessing plan from France, the request was turned down due to the reason 
that Pakistan's economy was not in a state to bear this heavy financial burden. 
Since 1970, the government of Pakistan has never seriously thought about 
economic factor of nuclear weapon programme. Like other, Pakistan had been convinced 
that no association could be made between the possession of nuclear weapons and the 
reduction of conventional expenditures. Agha Sahi Stated, Conventional capability 
expenditures caimot be reduced even if you have nuclear weapons, and he added, given 
the geographical configuration of India and Pakistan, forces are needed on the borders."^ 
Infact Pakistan's defence expenditures have increased since the time of Z.A. Bhutto, 
even though the nuclear weapons programme started then. Niaz A. Naik says the 
Pakistan army has always been of the opinion that nuclear weapons do not mean a 
reduction of the standing army expenditure. In fact, even Z.A. Bhutto wanted defence 
expenditures to be increased. Some scholar in Pakistan views going nuclear will lead a 
cut in the budget of conventional force but the bomb will make nuclear deterrence more 
viable. General Aslam Beg provided a description of the cost of Pakistan's nuclear 
progranmie. He stated that the balance sheet for the last 15 years up to 1990 shows that 
Pakistan had spent $ 250 million on the nuclear programme while a French Submarine 
purchased by Pakistan cost $ 300 million. The annual expenditure of the arm force is $ 
800 million.''^ He indicated that both expenditures were being made simultaneously. 
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There is no conventional expenditure reduction in Pakistan, because Pakistan never 
considered economic aspect during its nuclear decision-making. 
Domestic Turmoil: The political system of Pakistan is one of the most unstable political 
systems in the world. Its security problems and hunting sense of insecurity of the 
country's rulers are inherent in the nature of the Pakistani state and the relationship 
between the rulers and ruled. 
The dismemberment of Pakistan was simply unacceptable to the Pakistan's, when 
ethnic problems in the provinces started to surface, the political climate had drastically 
changed. The rulers, instead of acconmiodating these ethnic groups, have neglected them 
or restore to coercive method to crush them, exacerbating the country's internal violence. 
The 1971 hido- Pak war and Pakistan defeat to the India, accompanied by the 
breakup of the country into parts was simply unacceptable to the Pakistan. The pre-
disposing internal factors are more powerful in Pakistan than India. The panacea for all 
its dilemmas is perceived to be the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which is national 
objective that enjoys widespread popular support.''^ It is also believed that "nuclear 
weapons provide a symbolic equalizer with India and Shield behind which Pakistan 
might feel secure"."' 
The nuclear issue occupies a position of centrality in their national consciousness 
as a sovereign issue. Hence, any attempt to constrain their nuclear option by the 
application of what is perceived as extemal pressure would be suicidal for the 
government of the day. The party in power and the party in opposition both eat the 
nuclear issue as the touchstone of national sovereignty. Benazir Bhutto's candid 
admission that her agreement to intrusive verification of Pakistan's nuclear weapons 
programme would raise such an uncontrollable public outcry in the country that it could 
destabilise her government. 
Raising the spectra of an Indian threat and questioning the domestic political 
opponent's patriotism adjudged by the virulence of anti-Indian rhetoric is a long 
established tradition of Pakistani politics. Any perceived softness towards India or 
suspected compromise of the nuclear option has been used in this political parlance to 
denigrate the political adversary. Since 1988, the nuclear issue has been used as a stick 
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by both the ruUng and opposition poUtical party to beat each other with. Each has sought 
to estabHsh its patriotic credentials by accusing the other of trying to damage Pakistan's 
security shield by seeking accommodation on the nuclear issue.'^ '^  It is clear from the 
counter accusations between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto on the question who 
capped Pakistan's nuclear programme. The political leader in Pakistan positioned the 
nuclear options as a sovereign issue. Pakistan's domestic politics had more influence on 
the timing of the decision to test nuclear weapons, then on the underlying motivation for 
doing so. In the aftermath of the Indian tests of May 11 and 13, 1998.Pakistani Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif was visibly discomfited by the choices he faced. Contrary to most 
Western media accounts, his decision to proceed with the May 28 and 30, 1998 nuclear 
test was not inevitable. But it is clear that the decision to go nuclear could not stop 
domestic turmoil or unrest. The government has used as to divert the attention of the 
people from major domestic issues. 
Gaining International Prestige: Today nuclear weapons are important tools for 
drawing attention of the states. The country which does not have prestige regionally and 
globally want to gain international prestige through the possession of nuclear weapons. 
Pakistan is a country lacking in international prestige, not only because of its domestic 
political situation. Upgrading of the international status of Pakistan is another major 
motivational factor to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan has had military 
rule since independence and a very fragile democracy since the late 1980s. The 1971 
war, which ended the prestige of Pakistan, saw her being disintegrated because of her 
political failures. 
When Pakistan attempted to acquire nuclear weapon after 1972 a natural thought 
was that the country must have been motivated to enhance its international prestige, that 
was not the case because it was more concerned about its security than prestige. Agha 
Sahi stated that the nuclear programme of Pakistan was not for prestige reasons. Prestige 
does not play any role in Pakistan's nuclear choice.'^' Nationalism is an intense force 
behind the Pakistan's nuclear programme. This is evident from the national consensus in 
Pakistan on nuclear policy. The rapid technological advancement in Pakistan is the 
symbol of pride. Pakistan set an example that how a country with limited technological 
resources and narrow industrial base can get nuclear weapons. 
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It is to be noted that there are no independent factors, such as Pakistan's search 
for prestige in the Islamic World that affected its nuclear policies. The decisive factor, 
however, was India and its preparations. This provides the foundation and key 
motivation for Pakistan's deliberations has never been encumbered by moral doubt. 
There is no available evidence to suggest that Pakistan ever seriously considered not 
moving towards a threshold status once India had achieved it. 
Status considerations also play a role in Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, but less of 
one than is suggested by media acco\ints of 'the Islamic bomb'.'^^ There will always be 
westerners who see the Islamic world conspiring to revolt against the west, but they 
wildly overstate the degree of intra-Islamic unity today. Pakistan's bomb is a Pakistani 
bomb, not an Islamic bomb. Of coiirse, Pakistani scientists and the people at large take 
great pride in the fact that their was the first Islamic country to master nuclear weapon 
technology, all the more so considering how resource constrained. Pakistan is relative to 
the oil-producing states of the Middle East. 
The people who strongly believe in United States intentions against Islamic 
countries do not accept the proposition that Pakistan wanted to obtain nuclear weapons to 
enhance the prestige of the Muslim Countries. If the enhancement of national prestige 
were the goal of Pakistan it would have gone nuclear long ago. Aftermath of Pokhran II 
and Chagai tests the nuclear states imposed sanctions rather than accepting India and 
Pakistan as nuclear states. 
Regional Hegemony: India has been a dominant power in the South Asian region since 
its independence and continues to have a dominating role in the region regardless of 
whether or not smaller co\mtries approve. This hegemonic character of India is matter of 
concern for Pakistan since 1947 and no Pakistani government could change it. No 
amount of development will enable Pakistan to match India in geographic or 
demographic terms. Scholars and politicians in Pakistan believe that the Indian 
domination in the region is intolerable. One thing that might reduce the dominance is 
nuclear weapons parity. Pakistan's motivation to acquire nuclear weapons was not 
related to trying to dominate the region, but to avoid domination and to secure itself fi-om 
Indian hegemony. 
As Agha Shahi stated, hegemonism cannot be tolerated by Pakistan unless we 
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have a defensive capability, we can be overrun. Pakistan has always only been 
concerned about security. Therefore, western support was sought. If domination was the 
motivation, western support could not have been crucial for Pakistan. Some scholars 
have viewed that if west had guaranteed the security of Pakistan against India, Pakistan 
would not have felt the need to go nuclear. Pakistan did not intend to dominate South 
Asia with nuclear weapons, but aimed to make sure that India could no longer dominate 
it. The nuclear weapon would provide the umbrella imder which Pakistan could reopen 
the Kashmir issue. Especially since the late 1970s, Pakistan has been trying to establish a 
sphere of influence in its surrounding regions to turn itself into a leading force in the 
Islamic world.'^ "^ The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent Afghan Civil 
War gave the Pakistan the opportxmity to seek domination over Afghanistan. The 
Western objective of containing the Soviet Southward expansion with the assistance of 
Pakistan facilitated this Pakistani design. Pakistan does not have a general or universal 
policy that is independent of India. Islamabad's declarations after 1971 that India is 
clearly the dominant power in the region have not prevented Pakistan from seeking 
military-political parity with India, whether this quest was motivated by prestige or 
defensive considerations or by ambitions over Kashmir. 
Security Motivation: Pakistan faces a major security threat from India, a giant 
neighbour along its border with which it has been involved in a half century old 
profracted conflict. Pakistan's foreign policy and security concerns have been 
overwhelmingly India-Centric. Its nuclear weapons programme was a response to the 
Indian nuclear programme. It fought three wars with India and did not win in any of 
them. The last war was most painful for Pakistan because India interfered in the internal 
affairs of Pakistan and helped to dismember Bangladesh from Pakistan.In 1995 a Former 
Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Munir Ahmad Khan Stated that for 
Pakistan the security dilemma is very complex. It is a small country which has fought 
three wars with its larger neighbour. Rightly or wrongly, it feels that it is not still 
accepted by India. There is a continuing strife in Kashmir dispute. If it is not resolved, 
there can be no real peace in the region .... It is unable to sustain an adequate military 
buildup against a much larger unfriendly neighbour with a better military hardware in 
quality and quantity. In this situation Pakistan regards the nuclear option as vital for its 
secunty. 
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Kashmir has always been at the center of foreign policy of all incumbent 
governments of Pakistan. Its relentless efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability has 
been motivated by its quest for security. The India-Pakistan territorial conflict over 
Kashmir and higher probability of war between the two adversaries has always been a 
salient security threat to Pakistan. Agha Shahi stated that security has been the central 
motivation for Pakistan's nuclearisation. Further he added that it (the programme) was 
done when I was the ambassador in the U.N. India had a reprocessing plant from France, 
and Canada had helped it too; India never allowed inspection. It had the capability, so I 
advised the government that India was a concern for us. Military balances were heavily 
in favour of India. Nuclear monopoly was something with which India could use its 
hegemonic ambitions.'^ ^ On a more general note, Shirini Mazari stated that war has not 
been outlawed in the world and the UN Charter itself has legitimized war and the use of 
military means. As long as wars are possible, nuclear weapons are important.'^ ^ 
As neither China nor the United States assisted Pakistan in its aim in 1965 or 
prevented India from breaking up Pakistan in 1971, nuclear weapons came to be seen as 
the best available means to ensure that such an Indian policy would never become real. 
When India conducted its nuclear test in 1974, Pakistan's determination to arms itself 
with nuclear weapons was powerfiilly reinforced. India's detonation if a nuclear device 
in 1974 accelerated Pakistan's programme. 
Pakistan's security environment continues to be characterized by the Kashmir 
issue and the fear that India will try to divide Pakistan further. Fearing that outside 
assistance, whether from United Nations, the United States and China will be inadequate. 
Pakistan nuclear programme has become by no mean a substitute for a security policy, 
standing as a powerful symbol of Pakistani independence for Pakistan's view, nuclear 
weapons are the only guarantee that India will not attack again and 'finish the job' begun 
in 1971, either through overt means or by exploiting Pakistan's chronic domestic 
disputes. In comparison to India, the motivation for Pakistan nuclearisation is more 
strictly security oriented. 
Pakistani Compulsion: Pakistan's nuclear compulsions are simple to comprehend and 
are directed quite unequivocally upon the security threats it perceives from India. India's 
nuclear programme has always been sfrongly influenced by the China factor and 
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Pakistani strategists have come to see broader gains from a Pakistani nuclear programme 
that were deterrence of an Indian conventional or nuclear attack'^ *. 
Regional factors, especially Pakistan's relations with India, which continue to 
play a major role in determining Islamabad's nuclear course. Since its inception, 
Pakistan nuclear Policy has been India-Centric, revolving around perceptions of threat 
from and hostility toward India. The issue of prestige, evident in Pakistan's desire to 
equal standing with India in nuclear weapons development, also loom large. Pakistan 
belongs to that class of nations whose survival is debated, whose legitimacy is doubted 
and whose conventional security apparatus may be inadequate to cope with the pressure 
of hostile neighbours. This in itself compels Pakistan to think about nuclerisation for 
national secxirity*^ .^ Since its independence Pakistan fought three wars with India and 
Pakistan was defeated in all. The 1971 India-Pakistan war and Pakistan defeat to the 
Indians, accompanied by the breakup of the country into two parts, was simply 
unacceptable to the Pakistanis. This was not only a loss against India, but also 
economically and politically unacceptable. Former Foreign Minister Agha Shahi has 
stated that Pakistan's nuclear programme is linked to the sovereignty independence and 
security of the Pakistan. It is grounded on the security imperatives of Pakistan. It made 
her to think in terms of revenge for its defeat in 1971'^ °. In pursuit of this strategy, 
Pakistan had moved in the direction of a search for nuclear weapons status. Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto had to equalize the military imbalance that hangs like the sword of Domicles over 
the head of the state which partitioned Pakistani territory, cuts its population almost half 
pushed for an Islamic bomb. Bhutto, though hanged by Zia-ul-Haq, left his dream of 
building an Islamic Bomb intact and it was pursued vigorously by the military dictator 
particularly since 1980, under the cover of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. 
This perception impels Pakistan to nuclear pursuit .It is apparent that Pakistani beliefs, 
that nuclear weapons can provide Pakistan with a defensive deterrent, and a last resort' 
option, are actuating its military thinking. 
As the main architect of Pakistan's programme, Bhutto's actions were clearly 
directed against India. Not unexpectedly the Pokhran test greatly alarmed Pakistan. It 
was perceived as India possessing nuclear weapon or capacity to go nuclear. India's 
nuclear forces were primarily directed against Pakistan, not China. India would pursue 
its political goals of seizing the rest of Kashmir. So Pakistani nuclear programme is 
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essential to deter India's nuclear forces. Pakistan had to possess nuclear weapons to deter 
Indian at the nuclear and lamentional levels. The CIA report of December \9S4, about 
India's plan to launch a strike at the Pakistani nuclear installations particularly at Kahuta 
compelled Pakistan to accelerate its nuclear programme'^'. 
India's nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974 near Pakistan's bordering state proved 
to be a mixed blessing for Pakistan. It acted as a spur and a convenient excuse for 
Pakistan to move fast on its track of nuclearisation and justify it to its own people'^ • .^ 
Bhutto's political reaction to India's nuclear explosion was uncompromising and defiant. 
He told a press conference 'Pakistan would never succumb to nuclear blackmail by India. 
The people of Pakistan would never accept Indian hegemony in the subcontinent; neither 
would it compromise its position on the right of the people of Kashmir to decide their 
own future'^^. Nuclear weapons might be deemed necessary for Pakistan to balance the 
weight of India in sub continental polity. Despite India being its primary concern, 
subsidiary reasons are identifiable for Pakistan which compel Pakistan on the path of 
nuclearisation, seeking nuclear status like enhancing its prestige in the Islamic world, 
establishing a deterrent posture against Soviet forces in Afghanistan and bargaining 
position in international political system'^ '*. The strategic location of Pakistan provides 
enough bargaining advantage vis-a-vis the West. Nazir Kamal, however, stated that 
people have thought of it as a bargaining chip, particularly in case of overall settlement 
with India. Pakistan's domestic politics had more influence on the timing of the decision 
to go nuclear. In the aftermath of the Indian tests of 11 and 13 May 1998, Pakistani 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was visibly discomforted by the choices he faced. During 
this period, Sharif was buffeted by an unrelenting cacophony of voices urging him to 
match India's test for test. Opposition leader Benazir Bhutto's comment was 
representative: Rogue nation that defy world opinion ought to be taught lesson. A pre-
emptive military strike is possible to neutralize India's nuclear capability that seems to 
be necessary response. 
Sharif was also pressured by the hawkish Islamic right wing and an army whose 
views were mired but which was demonstrably unsettled by the prospect of Indian 
expanding the Kashmir war under its newly refurbished nuclear umbrella. 
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Chapter III 
Implications of Nuclear Weapons 
Chapter-Ill 
Implications of Nuclear Weapons 
The nuclearisation of South Asia is logical in terms of national interests, as well 
as international precedent. UK and France went for nuclear weapons despite having a 
guaranteed nuclear security umbrella provided by the US and also by NATO. Israel's 
non-declared nuclear weapons status has occurred despite security guarantees from the 
US. The UK, France and Israel became nuclear weapons powers with encouragement 
from the US. For China it was the Logic of Cold War that led to the imperative for self-
reliance. Security implication is the sole reason for acquiring nuclear weapons. 
Overt nuclearisation of India and Pakistan brought South Asia for a short while to 
the main focus of international stormy and sometimes heated discussion in international 
polities, academia, media and in the public opinion created an impression that South Asia 
has suddenly become the hot spot of international tension and India and Pakistan would 
be at the brink of nuclear war'. Nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May, 
1998 seemingly made a bid at weaponisation, in the process of which almost a quarter 
century of nuclear ambiguity was brought to an end. 
The period between 1994 to 1997 saw the finalization of the CTBT, despite India's 
reservation about its discriminatory nature. In May, 1998 India conducted its nuclear 
tests and affirmed its status of a full fledged nuclear weapon state. The tests also 
confirmed the sophisticated level of Indian technological capabilities in high energy 
physics and nuclear engineering with facilities for computer simulation and sub critical 
tests in fiiture. India acquired a sfrategic position as a balancing factor both in regional 
and international power equation. Regardless of the infransigence of the five nuclear 
weapons power, objective terms of reference for fiiture arms confrol and disarmament 
processes stood changed with the principles of discriminatory restrictions facing a 
question mark^. 
The economic sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan aftermath of nuclear tests 
created problems for India in the short run. International reactions to the radical politico-
strategic initiative taken by India were varied. Most were overwhelmingly negative. The 
first and foremost concern of New Delhi was to convince the international community 
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that India's only purpose in overtly declaring its nuclear Weapons capacity, and 
confirming it by operational experiments, was to meet India's security requirements and, 
this capacity would be managed with restraint and responsibility, posing no threat to 
peace and stability. Pakistan too explained that its nuclear tests were conducted to restore 
the strategic and military balance in the region and 'were essentially a defensive act', 
was a 'security response and a carefully considered one . 
The acquisition of nuclear capability provided Pakistan a sense of psychological 
security against the perceived threat fi-om India which has haunted it ever since its birth 
and also let it get over the trauma of the dismemberment it suffered in 1971'*. More 
importantly, the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan has given certain features which are 
peculiar to it and which have no precedence in the past nuclear international system may 
have graver implications for regional and even global security system. The five 
established nuclear power refused and still refuse to acknowledge Delhi and Islamabad's 
'joining the club' and both governments have been repeatedly pushed towards obeying 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime.^ 
Nuclear Realities and South Asia: 
The nuclear explosion beneath the deserts of Rajasthan and deep mside the 
Chagai Hills brought South Asia for a short while to the main focus of international 
attention. The international reaction on Indian and subsequent Pakistani nuclear tests 
appeared as an attempt to single out the region for destroying the established and 
accepted non-proliferation regime. The discourse tended to identify the nuclear issue in 
Asia regions as a new conflict dimension. Regarding India and Pakistan it was perceived 
as a nuclear crises with grave repercussions on the regional security and development. 
However, conceding the serious implications for the subcontinent itself as an 
important subject, it should not be forgotten that the developments in South Asia are part 
of a larger international setting and historical dimensions. According to Stephen Philip 
Cohen, in South Asia, a peculiar regional system has evolved. There are five major 
components of this system that is India, Pakistan, China, Soviet Union and the United 
State.^ India and Pakistan are bona-fide members of the region; China and Soviet Union 
being the immediate neighbours. The US has a wide range of interests and capabilities to 
influence the region. All the members of this pentagonal system are now nuclear states 
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but none are in close alignment with any of the others, and each, in varying degrees 
suspicious of the others. India and Pakistan form the matrix of South Asian nuclear 
quagmire. The actions and strategies are not limited to South Asia but are clearly global 
in scope. Taking into consideration the threshold states, again it becomes quite clear that 
the quest for nuclear weapons was not caused by regional implication alone but extra 
regional influences on existing bilateral or regional conflict as well, which indicates 
highly ideological and isolated state with conflicting relations to the US as well as to the 
type of Western Oriented Country with extra regional ambitions like Israel and Japan. 
Initiative for proliferation and its prevention have always been and are still global 
or the regional setting. Nuclear ambitions in Asia thus have to be evaluated in a reactive 
context. The actual use as well as the threat to use nuclear weapons in Asia has been the 
questionable privilege of the U.S. so far. Apart from that, by utilizing Asia as a part of its 
global strategies to roll back and contain the erstwhile Soviet Union, it was Washington 
that introduced the deployment of nuclear weapons in the continent.^  China opted for a 
nuclear device only after the deterioration of its relations with the Soviet Union, thus 
providing the perceived deterrent for a development between the lines of the super power 
confrontation. China rewarded with a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and the 
expulsion of Taiwan from the UN, set an example for others to follow, and also it 
established the perceived political bargaining status of nukes. India, also under the 
traumatic experience of the 1962 Indo-China War, followed suit with the launching of a 
weapon oriented programme, leading to the first test of a nuclear device on May 18, 
1974 at Pokhran. Pakistan's initiative to develop nuclear weapons was also based on 
bringing alternation in the power balance in south Asia. The breakaway of Bangladesh in 
1971 established India's preeminence and conventional military dominance leaving 
Pakistan without strategic depth. The Afghan war, the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the Gulf war influenced the Pakistani strategists to think about the necessity of going 
Q 
nuclear .With India, being a strong contender for a permanent seat in a security council, 
keeping the nuclear 'uncertainty' in strategically important regions, as in the case of 
India and Pakistan, was widely considered as the most threatening challenge... of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.' 
Therefore, any application of experiences of nuclear deterrence in the East-West 
Conflict constellation on non-European setting was strongly denied. However, if India 
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considers the international regime as discriminatory against India, then the practical 
importance of this argument is nil. India's Minister for Extemal Affairs Jasw ant Singh 
raised justifiable questions, "If the permanent five continue to employ nuclear weapons 
as an international currency of force and power, why should India voluntarily devalue its 
own state power and national security? If deterrence works in the West as it so obviously 
appears, since Western nations insist on continuing to possess nuclear weapons... by 
what reasoning will it not work in India'°. 
Pokhran I and its Aftermath: 
On May 11, 1974, India made its first nuclear underground test at Pokhran in 
Rajashtan. India had not exploded a complete nuclear bomb but had only made peacefiil 
nuclear explosion (PNE) experiment that was, of course, also a step necessary for the 
making of nuclear bomb. This was the starting step for dual nuclear peaceful and military 
purposes".The repeated failure of the great powers to address India's security concerns 
and the emergence of a different brand of leadership within India caused important, if 
subtle, shift in its nuclear politics. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, while repeating the 
platitudes of nonalignment, reoriented India's foreign policy, basing it less on moral 
principles and more on the imperative of statecraft. In place of her predecessor, she 
carefully forged equidistance fi-om the superpowers, steadily tilted in a pro-Soviet 
direction, especially after the difference arose between India and United States in 1967 
on the issue of trade, investment and foreign aid . Inl971 during Indo-Pak war the West 
and United States had adopted a "hands off' policy in favour of Pakistan. The released 
old classified state documents of US now reveal the diplomatic hostile encirclement of 
India, "Nixon instructed: 'Dout Squeeze Yahya' at this time'... since US was using 
Pakistan as a 'Secret Conduct' to open diplomatic channels with China"'^. Some Indian 
analysts agree that US pressure on India during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war also 
convinced Indira Gandhi of the single importance of developing India's military nuclear 
capabilities.''* 
After the 1971, Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan had continued military support of 
China and US and was expected to recompense the losses suffered in war early. 
Economic packages from US to Pakistan had improved. US had some sympathies for 
India after its defeat in October, 1962 war with China fi-om 'Cold war' angle. But these 
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had come to a naught after the rapprochement brought about by Pakistan. US had new 
ahered priorities and visions in South Asia, 15 
US intimidation, China factor and India's failure to influence the creation of a 
global regime that would address its security concerns pushed the country further down 
the nuclear path and subsequent events bolstered the Indian elite's commitment to 
acquire nuclear weapons. 
India carried out its first nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974. The test had a 15 
Kiloton yield.'* Subsequently, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram argued that the test had 
few or no military implications and was simply part of India's ongoing attempts to 
harness the peaceful uses of nuclear energy'^. India's explanation of the test found few 
adherents abroad, however, of the great powers only France congratulated the Indians on 
their success'^. Many countries of the Third World rejoiced that the nuclear hegemony of 
the advanced coxmtries had been broken by a poor fellow developing country. In South 
Asia region only Pakistan bitterly criticised. Pakistan even approached all the major 
countries for supports and sent delegation to all major capitals and the international 
forum to build up public opinion against anti-proliferation action by India but drew a 
blank. Pakistan also brought this matter up before the board of governors of IAEA on 
Jime 8, 1974, but faced some difficulties because most industrialized coimtries were 
reluctant to discuss it''. 
The Chinese and Soviet reaction was muted but critical. The political fall out 
fi-om US and Canada was very quick. Sanctions were imposed and supply of critical 
goods was harmed; and access to information for nuclear technology was denied. The US 
and Canada immediately called off all nuclear cooperation with India. Canada accused 
India of having diverted nuclear materials fi-om a Canadian supplier reactor to make the 
bomb^". 
The US reaction, however, was the most severe, for in 1976 American Congress 
introduced the Symington amendment to the foreign aid bill, thereby cutting of certain 
forms of economic and military assistance to countries that received materials or 
technology without full scope International Atomic Energy Safeguard.'^' Further 
restrictions soon followed under the Carter administration which had made non-
proliferation one of the key elements of its foreign policy platform. Most importantly, the 
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Carter administration introduced and passed the 'Nuclear Non-proliferation Act; 
Omnibus Legislation designed soberly to curb nuclear sales to recalcitrant states ". 
The United States of America also undertook significant efforts to limit 
proliferation of the multilateral level, taking the lead in the formation of the London 
Suppliers Group (LSG), which sought to coordinate and limit the sales of sensitive and 
dual use technologies to countries outside the ambit of the non-proliferation treaty 
(NPT). The draft of Legislation that the US Congress passed after the Indian nuclear test 
significantly hobbled India's ability to fiirther its nuclear weapon programme. The 
sharpness of international reactions and the variety of nuclear export restrictions that the 
major industrial powers placed on India came as a surprise to the Indian political elite. 
This body of restrictive Legislation also had a perverse and unintended consequence. 
However, it made the India's nuclear programme increasingly indigenous.^^ India has no 
black records of nuclear proliferation and on the other hand its acquisition of nuclear 
technology is strictly for self-defence set against more than one probable aggressor. India 
progressed to nuclear weapon technology in the pre-NPT era by way of enrichment and 
recycling of spent uranium fiiel waste of its nuclear power reactors. 
Implication for Global Non-proliferation: 
The nuclear tests have pushed both India and Pakistan into a non relationship, the 
outlines of which are still evolving. Beyond the regional effects, the May, 1998 events 
set off alarms around the World over the damage they may have done to the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. However, George Perkovich argues against such alarm, saying that 
the tests only demonstrated what the world already knew that India and Pakistan are 
exceptions to the rule'^ '*. Those two nations are not indifferent to international norms, but 
they do not consider the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) to be the most effective means to 
ensure international seciirity, much less their own strategic needs. It must, therefore, be 
borne in mind that the tests were conducted by two countries that had never officially 
participated in the international non-proliferation regime. 
Therefore, concerns expressed that the tests were a challenge to the non-
proliferation regime fell to some degree on deaf ears in New Delhi and Islamabad. The 
tests had little to do with nonproliferation - that is India and Pakistan did not conduct 
nuclear tests to thumb their nose at the NPT or The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
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(CTBT) and more to do with India Pakistan's views of their own needs. Uday Bhaskar, 
an Indian Strategist, says "the May, 1998 tests....have questioned the diktat of the 
nuclear weapon power and the dominant narrative on the subject. Prior to this 
development, the US led prescription on the subject was taken as gospel and any 
suggestions that the nuclear weapon states were literally having their cake and eating it 
too by way of enjoying special right and privileges with little tangible commitment to a 
global betterment by way of commitment to disarmament was ruthlessly stifled^^. In fact, 
India's unwillingness to sign NPT for three decades in spite of immense pressure brought 
to bear on it and a declared policy of keeping the nuclear option open was a clear 
indication that it had reserved the right to acquire nuclear weapons if its security interests 
required it. The reasons behind the May 1998 nuclear tests are two folds. Firstly, the tests 
were necessary for technological and operational reasons, the objective being to lay the 
foundation for India to develop a deployable deterrent capacity against potential threats. 
India had already delayed this process that had effects on its security, secondly, any 
further delay would have entailed a trait-jacket of punitive and discriminatory 
stipulations, which would have become operational under the CTBT by the end of 1999, 
further compoimded the Fissile Material Cut-off treaty (FMCT) coming up for 
discussion in the conference of disarmament^^. 
However, the international community has refused to grant both India and 
Pakistan the state of nuclear powers. As far as the NPT is concerned, a nuclear weapon 
state is one which has manufactured and exploded nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 
1967. But many states of world regarded India a de-facto member of the world to take it 
seriously and has strengthened its diplomatic position. For this, Pakistan is the main 
cause. Pakistan's retaliatory response, however, increased international concern about the 
dangers posed by an overt nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. 
On June 6, 1998 the United Nations Security Council passed a U.S. sponsored 
resolution deploring the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. The foreign ministers of the 
permanent five members of the Security Council in Geneva Unanimously Condemned 
the nuclear tests and urged both states to exercise restraint and refrain from assembling 
and deploying their nuclear weapons and ftirther developing their missile delivery 
systems^^. An international pressure was mounted for signing NPT and CTBT 
immediately and this would have compelled both countries to roll back their nuclear 
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technology, while some states led by US proceeded to place wider economic sanctions in 
addition. The US Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 bound the administration 
to impose stiff penalties on any non-nuclear weapon state that detonated a nuclear device 
at anytime henceforth. 
On June 12, 1998, the P-5, the G-8 and the European Union met in London and 
issued a communique after considering the serious global challenge posed by the nuclear 
tests conductor by India and Pakistan. They asked India and Pakistan to take immediate 
step already endorsed by the UN Security Council to stop all further nuclear tests and 
adhere to the NPT and CTBT immediately and unconditionally, thereby facilitating its 
early entry into force. Both countries should refrain from weaponisation and deployment 
of nuclear weapons and enter into firm commitments not to weaponise in nuclear weapon 
or missiles. In addition, both countries should build confidence and encourage peaceful 
resolution of their differences through dialogue^*. The recent nuclear tests by India and 
Pakistan do not change the definition of a nuclear weapon state in NPT and therefore, 
India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear weapon states in accordance with the 
NPT. 
The US persuaded China, a major supplier of nuclear materials and know-how to 
Pakistan to terminate such assistance. According to James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to 
the US President for National Security Affairs, "We believe China must increasingly 
come to see that it is in China's own interest not to aid the spread of dangerous weapons 
or to fuel instability in its own neighbourhood^'. 
In September 1998, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tang Jiaxun, 
reiterated before the 53"* session of UN General Assembly. He asserted that, "Last May 
India conducted nuclear test against the tide of the times, thus adversely effecting peace 
and stability in South Asia. After that Pakistan too conducted nuclear tests. Their nuclear 
tests not only led to an escalation of the tension between the two countries, but also dealt 
a heavy blow to international nuclear disarmament and the medians for the prevention of 
nuclear proliferation"^^. US Secretary to the state, Madeleine Albright stated that, 
"nonproliferation does not just happen. Nations must be quick to detect and share 
information about illicit activity. They must apply real pressure to countries violating 
nonproliferation standards or helping others to do so".^'Currently, the US official goal is 
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to encourage India and Pakistan to negotiate their differences, and to freeze and 
eventually eliminate their nuclear and missile arsenals, and ensuring their adherence to 
the NPT as non-nuclear states. To merely suggest that if India and Pakistan were allowed 
to join the NPT as nuclear weapon states, they would abide by its rules and behave 
responsibly, is insufficient. Whether their adherence to the NPT under the above 
condition would prevent further proliferation remain important. As far as nuclear 
weapons are concerned, less may be better and safer-elegantly articulated theories 
notwithstanding. 
International Response: 
The Pokhran II and Chagai nuclear explosion sent political Shockwaves around 
the globe which were more powerful and lasting than the explosion itself The tests 
conducted by India and Pakistan were condemned by the international community but 
their response was muted, and declared condenmation was followed by limited sanctions. 
The US championing the cause of nuclear nonproliferation took the lead. The US, 
Western nations and their allies were very critical of India. The US state Department 
Spokesman, James Rubin, accused India of lying and conducting a "campaign of 
duplicity" during nearly 20 high level meeting between the US and India on their nuclear 
intentions^^. British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, stated that the nuclear tests have not, 
in fact, helped to enhance Indian security^^. 
On May 12,1998, American President Bill Clinton condemned the Indian tests as 
not only threatening the stability of the region, but also directly challenging the firm 
international conserves to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As a 
sign of displeasure, the U.S. ambassador to India was recalled. The next day Clinton 
imposed sanctions against India under the 'Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994. 
Incorporating the Amendment which authorized sanctions against states detonating 
nuclear devices, the Act enabled the U.S. government to terminate all assistance under 
the foreign assistance and the 'Arms Export Control Acts'^ '*. The U.S. also imposed 
economic sanctions with the intention to harm the Indian economy and withheld $143 
million aid. The punitive intentions are clear fi-om the testimony of a US official. 
Assistant Secretary of State, Karl Inderfiirth said, "More than $1 billion worth of loans 
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have been postponed... having a ripple in effect in the Indian economy and is resulting in 
decreased investor confidence . 
Australia and New Zealand recalled their Ambassadors. Germany also froze all 
development aid to India but allovt'ed aid to projects in the pipeline to be continued. The 
US with incoherent results prompted other states, particularly of the G-8 club, the 
Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and the European Union States for taking steps against 
India. The Indian nuclear tests gave a reason for doubts in several states on the worth and 
usefulness of NPT as such while the condenmation of the new nuclear tests syndrome 
was universal and India was urged strongly to sign NPT and CTBT, there was no 
uniformity in the extent of sanctions to be apphed, since this depended on the India and 
Individual state trade collaboration. Only Japan and Canada responded to the U.S. call 
substantially. 
Following India's May 1998 tests, the US sent Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe 
Talbott, to ask the Pakistan government to exercise restraint. In negotiations with 
Islamabad, Washington offered a series of economic and military incentive, including 
repeal of the Pressler Amendment. At the same time U.S. officials warned Pakistan that 
economic sanctions would be imposed if it tested a nuclear device. In a telephonic 
conversation with President Bill Clinton, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stressed that 
given the extreme pressure he was under, his options were limited. According to Nawaz 
Sharif, the decision was out of my hands. Implying that the final decision lay with the 
military high conmiand.^^ on May 25, Pakistan army Chief Karamat met in an urgent 
session with Sharif stating that if Pakistan did not respond quickly with a nuclear 
explosion of its own, he believed India could attempt a military solution of the Kashmir 
crisis as early as Fall, according to civilian and military leaders familiar with the 
meeting.^^ The only way Sharif could have successfiiUy lobbied the armed forces against 
overt nuclearisation would have been to provide tangible proof that testing would 
gravely harm Pakistan's interests. The muted international reaction and absence of strong 
sanction against Indian tests, however, undermined Sharif s stand. 
The absence of a concerted international response tilted the internal balance in 
Pakistan in favour of a retaliatory test. Pakistan's Policy makers believed that the costs of 
testing would be bearable in both political and economic terms. Furthermore, they feared 
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that a failure to test could undermine other vital interests. In the wake of the Indian tests, 
Home Minister L.K. Advani warned Pakistan that 'it would be costly and futile if 
Pakistan did not end its intervention in Kashmir, adding that India's nuclear tests had 
brought about a qualitatively new stage in India-Pakistan relations^*. Following the tests, 
Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee called upon the international community to admit India 
into the exclusive nuclear weapons club. For Pakistani policy makers, particularly the 
military, a nuclear stature less than India's was unacceptable. Thus hostility toward India 
was rife in Pakistan, and public opinion was manipulated in faovur of testing. On May 28 
and 30, Pakistan tested its nuclear devices at Chagai and later declared that the success of 
the tests demonstrated its nuclear weapon capabiUty. Addressing jubilant Pakistan's 
people, Nawaz Sharif announced, "Today we have settled scores with India by 
detonating nuclear devices of our own". He adds, "We have paid them back"^^. 
After Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests on May, 28, 1998, the Chairman of the 
Security Coxmcil issued a statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/1998/17 and 
strongly deplored the underground nuclear tests that Pakistan had conducted and strongly 
warned from any further tests. The Security Council in its resolution 1172 expressed its 
great concern at the danger to peace and stability in the region, it condemned the tests 
conducted by both the countries. It urged India and Pakistan to resume dialogue on 
conflicting issues and encourage them to find mutually acceptable solutions that address 
the root cause of tension including Kashmir issue. It also recognized that the tests 
conducted by India and Pakistan constituted a serious threat to global efforts towards 
nuclear disarmament. 
The G-8 countries expressed their anger in such a way that the tests have affected 
both coimtries' relationship with each of us, worsened rather than improved their security 
environment, damaged their prospects of achieving their goals of sustainable economic 
development, and run contrary to global disarmament. The negative impact of these tests 
on the international standing and ambitions of both countries will be serious and lasting. 
The will also have a serious negative impact on investor confidence. Both India and 
Pakistan face enormous challenges in developing their economies and building 
prosperity. However, the recent nuclear tests have created an atmosphere of regional 
instability to both foreign and domestic investment, damaging business confidence and 
the prospect for economic growth. The diversion of their resources for nuclear and other 
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weapons programmes displaces more productive investment and weakens their ability to 
pursue sound economic policies'*". 
Pakistan dismissed the international condemnation as discriminatory and unfair. 
Nonetheless, it faced a formidable challenge in the form of economic sanctions that were 
imposed in response to its tests. The immediate goal of Pakistani policy makers, 
therefore, was to contain the negative impact of sanctions on their weak economy in a 
way that would not jeopardize Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. Pakistan's 
decision to test had been made in the belief that U.S. bilateral sanctions would have little 
adverse effect on the Pakistani economy in the absence of an international consensus for 
punitive action*'. It had also been assumed that Pakistan would withstand diplomatic 
isolation and economic pressure. Sanctions, however, seriously destabilised the fragile 
Pakistani economy, already in dire straits as a result of decades of mismanagement and 
political instability. According to Pakistan's finance minister, Ishaq Dar, sanctions would 
cost 1.5 billion annually in preferential loans and aid, and $ 2.5 billion in foreign 
investment and remittance. The jfreezing of foreign currency accounts to prevent capital 
outflow has further eroded market confidence, resulting in a sharp decline in foreign 
remittances'* .^ 
In May and June 1998, the World Bank halted approximately $ 1 billion 
economic development and infrastructure related loans to India although it cleared 
approximately $ Ibillion worth of social development loans'*^ . In addition Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) lending to India fell from $ 560 million in 1997 to $ 250 
million in 1998. World Bank lending to Pakistan also declined sharply down to $ 440 
million in 1998-99 from $ 800 million the previous year. Since Pakistan was more 
dependent on foreign aid, international sanctions had a significantly greater impact on its 
economy"**. 
On June 12, 1998, G-8 decided to defer other than humanitarian loans from 
financial institutions like World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Asian 
Development Bank to both India and Pakistan. In addition, European Union foreign 
ministers recommended a delay of non-humanitarian loans to India and Pakistan, 
warning that an even harsher punitive approach could be adopted if India and Pakistan 
failed to demonsfrate progress toward resfraining their nuclear arms competition. Japan, 
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the largest aid donor to Pakistan and major trade porter of both India and Pakistan 
remained reluctant to prohibit private companies to deal with India and Pakistan. 
Russia, France and Britain come out against sanctions to India for specific 
reasons and took independent positions. However, as against US and Canadian Sanctions 
India was not much concerned, because these restrictions were already continuing since 
1974. The US sponsored sanctions had made the economic development in India and 
Pakistan slow and more difficult. But at the same time the situation in India gave 
incentive to innovations. Most of the developed states wanted to enter fast growing 
market for India. Canada revised its attitude towards India in 2001 to limited extent and 
in 2005 further changed its position and decided to resume supplies for civilian nuclear 
facilities, dual use equipment and technology included under IAEA safeguard'*' The US-
India joint statement or accord of July 2005, is limited to Indian voluntary recognition of 
IAEA guidelines to civilian nuclear reactors and does not in anyway curtail or regulate 
military segment of nuclear reactor'* .^ 
India's declaration of herself as a nuclear weapon state was seen by the Western 
powers as an effort on its part to emerge as a major power. The American policy makers 
were particularly sharp in advising India that there is no linkage between major power 
status and the possession of nuclear weapons. Bill Clinton said that with India's 
democratic traditions, the nuclear path is not a way to greatness'* .^ It is often cited that 
Japan and Germany non-nuclear coimtries with dominant economic power are also 
important players in world polities'*^. But these two countries have been protected by the 
US nuclear umbrella since World War II. Some observers pointed out that it is non-
possession of nuclear weapon which is responsible for the secondary status of Japan and 
Germany. As a matter of fact, it is the American fear of the likely nuclearisation by 
Germany and Japan that made the US in the first instance react strongly against the 
Indian nuclear tests. 
China too has been boisterous in advising India to forget about its pursuit of great 
power status. The state run Chinese media commented soon after the Indian nuclear tests. 
"A review of Indian history makes two facts clear India was once a world power. It is 
obsessed with a desire to be regional and world power again"^'. Further more, it added 
that "India has a strong armed force, which was out of line with its status as a developing 
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country". However, China never tired of proclaiming itself as a developing country, and 
shows herself as the regional heavyweight'. On Clinton visit to China on June 20, 1998 it 
was advised to the US that to maintain regional and global security interest Clinton 
administration needs to work with China in safeguarding stability and security on the 
Western side of the Pacific rim^°. China also took upon itself the responsibility to 
mention a need to improve the economic condition of the Indian people rather than 
expend scarce resources on nuclear weapons. Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, Deng 
Jie, for instance, considered the Indian test a blow to non-proliferation. Asked why China 
gave itself the right of nuclear weaponisation while denying it to India, he stated that 
Beijing's nuclear tests were conducted in an international environment that was different 
fi"om the current one in which India has conducted its own test^'. 
After the initial enthusiasm and euphoria, both India and Pakistan are trying 
seriously to manage properly their newly gained nuclear status. India has already 
expressed its commitment to the 'no-first-use' option and both countries have declared a 
moratorium on fiirther tests. Sanction on India and Pakistan could not cause any major 
collapse of the economies of the two, especially of India and United States ha\'e already 
shown indications of their realization that these are not cost-effective fi-om their point of 
view either. The US Senate authorised the president to waive some of these sanctions 
and Japan also gradually moved away firom its initial position of positive sanction to 
constructive dialogues. A powerfiil lobby in Japan has started gaining more support 
against the sanctions. 
Implication for Stability and Security: 
China had acquired nuclear weapons in 1964. Pakistan had acquired a credible 
nuclear deterrent by 1987. India's peacefiil nuclear explosion in 1974 had demonstrated 
its ability to make nuclear weapons at short notice. The overt moderation of India and 
Pakistan cleared the situation by removing ambiguity that had come to symbolize the 
nuclear policy and posture of India and Pakistan. It is also possible to argue that greater 
clarity in the nuclear weapon states enhances stability and security. There are greater 
chances of miscalculation in deterrence based on approach and it bases security policy on 
that assmnption, in turn lingering on action-reaction phenomenon. The temptation to 
undertake a pre-emptive nuclear strike would also be greater in an ambiguous situation. 
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The rationale for acquiring nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan is not similar 
and hence the factors affecting stability and security are different. Pakistan has sought 
nuclear weapons essentially to neutralize India's conventional military superiority which 
hangs over Pakistan like a permanent sword of Damocles^^. Many Pakistanis view that 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons since 1987 has kept the peace in South Asia in spite 
of serious tensions between the two countries. India, on the other hand, sees its necessity 
for nuclear weapons in relation to the larger question of the nature of an inequitable 
international order made more unequal by the perpetuation of nuclear weapons in the 
possession of a few where the answer really lies in global abolition of nuclear weapons 
The need for strategic stability in Asia involving all the nuclear weapons states 
remains an important objective. India has adopted a doctrine of minimal credible 
deterrence and declared its no-first use but Pakistan adheres herself with first use. 
Greater clarity in the India and Pakistan's nuclear posture would make it possible to 
institute measures for reducing the risks of accidents or miscalculation. It is thus possible 
to argue that after adopting an overt nuclear posture Pakistan may feel more self-
confident of ensuring its security relation to the much bigger and stronger India. This 
should enhance stability and security in the subcontinent in the short and long term. 
Similarly, India's acquisition of nuclear weapons is likely to have an influence in Sino-
Indian relations when these are seen beyond the current hiccups. The risk of war between 
China and India has been very low since India acquired adequate conventional military 
capability across the Himalayan fi-ontiers. 
There is another view that any nuclearisation of modem missile technologies 
could prompt the creation, as well as accidental or inadvertent escalation considerably^^. 
One result could be a regional arms race with China, India and Pakistan each engaging in 
a series of build ups aimed at countering one another's capabilities to ensure the 
invulnerability of their respective nuclear deterrents. Still another could be growing 
regional tensions and heightened risks of a conflict which might well escalate to the 
nuclear level^ "*. However, it is not clear whether New Delhi and Islamabad even possess 
the capacity or the willingness to develop and implement systems capable of effectively 
reducing the risks which development and maintenance of nuclear arsenals would 
require".^^ 
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In the overall assessment, it is clear that the prospects of peace in Southern Asia 
have increased more overt nuclear posture. Countries would be less compelled to 
respond to each and every acquisition of a neighbor. India and Pakistan have also agreed 
to take risk reduction measures in order to eliminate potential dangers of accident loss of 
control over the nuclear arsenal and any miscalculation. This would be built upon the 
significant confidence building measures which have been put into place among the two 
coimtries over the year. Similarly, such measures are likely to be introduced between 
India and China. Both countries should seriously consider a bilateral no-first-use treaty 
between China and India to strengthen restraint and to ensure that no ambiguity exists in 
relation to territories under dispute. A trilateral agreement among China, Russia and 
India would also go a long way in enhancing stability. In Asia itself, the mutual 
understanding of how regional great power relations might develop, is seen with much 
greater reluctance. Manoj Joshi views the normalization of bilateral relations between 
India and China as a possible alternative to the polity of non-alignment, besides all 
economic, military and political factors while alliance would be too strong a word for the 
present, coordinated and cooperative action would benefit not just two nations, but the 
developing nations of the world^^. 
India's nuclear doctrine and Command and Control arrangements are likely to 
contribute to strategic stability in the region. India's nuclear force posture will reflect 
India's belief in the use of nuclear weapons primarily to deter its adversaries and 
retribution, in the case of defence failure, thereby reassuring its neighbours and the larger 
international conmnmity. The situation involving India and Pakistan is precarious, but 
nonetheless offers hope for continued stability. The Indo-Pak rivalry involves dynamic 
security competition entailing a high degree of routine violence that is manifested 
through the active struggle over the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan is 
highly concerned about Indian threats to its security. Nonetheless, the prospect that India 
will pursue any military option that places Pakistan in a situation where it has no 
alternative but to use its nuclear weapons in anger is unlikely. However, under the 
assumption of rational decision-making in Pakistan, the security of India in relation to 
Pakistan depends not on the quality of the Indian nuclear force or the rationality of the 
Indian decision-making system, but the integrity of Pakistan's chain of Command. If 
Pakistan is not able to hold itself up as a stable state and degenerates into 'failed' state. 
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then the problem of nuclear terrorism and rogue nuclear operations from Pakistan might 
become even more difficult for India to handle. So the issue of the safety and security of 
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal has remained a source of concern not only to India but also to 
the international community.^ ^ 
As far as competition between China and India is concerned, both states have 
more or less strong commitment to NFU policies, and both states are strongly committed 
to use their nuclear weapons as instruments of retribution in case of deterrence failure. 
China, meanwhile, enjoys a robust nuclear deterrent capability. Though, India might 
eventually achieve a deterrent capability vis-a-vis China. Thus, we can say that a robust 
and secure nuclear arsenal is insufficient for stability in the subcontinent. It is an 
atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence that is a prerequisite for nuclear stability and 
peace. 
It is necessary for India to look beyond the nuclear issue presently 
overshadowing all discussion on India's security compulsions. The development of a 
comprehensive nuclear doctrine and an adequate command and control structure are 
undoubtedly important preconditions for fiiture crisis management in South Asia. 
Intra-Regional impact: 
Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan is bound to have significant impact on the 
countries in Asia, particularly those adjoining the subcontinent. In order to justify its 
action India pointed out China as a national security threat while Pakistan used the 
excuse of an eminent nuclear threat to her security firom India. Ashley Tellis said that the 
structural shift firom bipolarity to amorality has only been complemented by a second 
external reality that is changes in the regional environment and the rise of a new power, 
China. He observed that the growth of China's economic power, its continued nuclear 
and conventional military modernization, and its increasing influence in various areas of 
strategic reverence to South Asia, all combine to forebode serious Indo-Chinese military 
strategic competition down the line....It places increased pressure on India to revitalize 
its economy and modernize its defense capability in order to avoid becoming 
disadvantageous in an age when external superpower assistance is no longer 
automatically available^*. 
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The impact of the Indian and Pakistani tests on the neighboring countnes cannot 
be underestimated. It is obvious that Iran is now surrounded by nuclear states on three 
sides, in the west by Israel, in the north by Russia and in the east by India and Pakistan. 
Although, Iran is a signatory to the NPT, it cannot ignore the so called emerging nuclear 
encirclement and could justify considering acquiring nuclear capability to protect its 
security and national interests. If Iran at some stage decides to exercise its right and 
withdraw from the NPT, as is permissible under its Article X (1), it could pose a serious 
threat to peace and security in south Asia^ .^ 
Japan has expressed particular concern about the nuclearisation of south Asia. 
The recent nuclear tests set off by India and Pakistan have profoundly and adversely 
affected international security situation particularly that of Asia." The status of Indo-
Pakistani relationship is inherently unstable given such intractable issue as the 
conflicting territorial claims of the two parties in Kashmir^^. 
In the meeting of the ASEAN countries held in 1998, in which US, Japan, China 
and India were invited to review the situation arising from the nuclearisation of south 
Asia, it sfrongly deplored the nuclear tests and pointed out that the ASEAN countries 
were mindftil of the security implications of acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and 
Pakistan. The fact that India is reportedly building a nuclear submarine using the help it 
has been receiving from the former Soviet Union and later from Russia is a matter of 
concern to all the nations in the Far East including Korea, Japan, Ausfralia and New 
Zealand. These countries are heavily dependent on the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean for 
frades and supply of the much needed oil. If the Indian submarines begin pafrolling these 
sea lanes, it could be viewed as a potential threat to the vital economic and security 
interests of all these countries. The development of Indian and Pakistani nuclear delivery 
capability system would constitute a major threat to the countries of Middle East and 
South East Asia. 
Regional Implications: 
The Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosions were aimed at demonsfrating their 
respective strength and power but ironically they revealed their inherent weakness and 
vulnerabilities. With the nuclearisation of South Asia, the relations between India and 
Pakistan become even more complicated. New Delhi and Islamabad instead of becoming 
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independent have discovered that they are susceptible to international pressures. The 
economies of the two countries have suffered a setback and will be put under greater 
pressure if the two states begin weaponisation and deployment and building missile 
delivery system against each other. The low cost deterrent of ambiguity and non-
weaponisation has disappeared. The cost of restoring this deterrent through overt 
weaponisation will be much higher. It appears that both countries have come out bruised 
by their nuclear explosions. Japan and the US were quick to slap sanctions on India and 
Pakistan. With the two countries going nuclear, stark reality downed on the people of the 
non-nuclear weapon states of South Asia. Under the changed circumstances, it is 
important to know the reactions and responses of the non-nuclear weapon states of the 
region? After all any possible nuclear exchange in South Asia is not just a bilateral 
matter between India and Pakistan; it would destabilize the entire region as well. The 
non-nuclear weapon States of South Asia like Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and 
Maldives are worried about the escalating tensions and arms race in the region? 
Although the capability of having a nuclear weapon does not necessarily imply 
that it will be used, nevertheless, the capability does imply that it may be used. As such 
the NNWS are fearful by the very presence of nuclear weapons and their deployment in 
the region. Also their fear erupts from the fact that even if the nuclear war is limited to 
India and Pakistan, the physical consequences of the nuclear radiation could be equally 
disastrous to all of them. Moreover, they face a physical threat in a nuclear environment 
that may occur out of miscalculation or misperception of threat. As such almost all non-
nuclear countries not only in South Asia but also throughout the world want a cessation 
of nuclear arm race and they want to stop both the horizontal and vertical proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. 
The first response of Bangladesh came on May 13, 1998, the foreign Minister of 
Bangladesh Abdus Samad Azad Said that "Bangladesh hopes that all South Asian 
countries will refrain from fiirther escalation of nuclear arms race. Bangladeshi Prime 
Minister express her views, it is the sovereign right of every country to decide on its own 
security perceptions and takes measures accordingly^' After the Pakistan's nuclear test, 
Foreign Minister of Bangladesh reacted in such way, "we have signed CTBT and 
sincerely hope for peace which is required for every country." while on the other hand 
the opposition political party (BNP) expressed her concern that "The tests had erected an 
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environment which would encourage arms race in South Asia and intensify tension.^' 
Bangladesh is the only other country in South Asia to possess a nuclear research reactor, 
which is under IAEA safeguard and Sri Lanka expressed her deep concern at the 
nuclearisation of South Asia. Sri Lanka wants the entire international community with no 
exception to the total elimination of nuclear weapons without which peace and 
international sec\mty will continue to be in constant jeopardy^^. subsequently, however, 
Foreign Minister Laxman Kadirgamar in a statement said, "Sri Lanka is not opposed to 
India being a nuclear power and is opposed to sanction being adopted against that 
country^ According to reports, some nationalist and anti western elements within Sri 
Lanka have openly acclaimed India for bringing forth a South Asian bomb. There has 
hardly been any Indian bashing in the media either, "perhaps reflecting a general Sri 
Lankan perception that if the western power can have the bomb, so also can a great third 
world power like India^ .^ 
Nepal as a party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and signatory to the 
comprehensive test ban treaty, views with concern nuclear tests by any country; Nepal 
urged to both India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to create an 
atmosphere of trust and confidence necessary for global nuclear disarmament. Maldives 
remains committed to a nuclear weapon free world as neighbor. Maldives is naturally 
concerned with India and Pakistan. And she wants peace with each other by acting as 
stabiliser for the region. Newly added nuclear dimension has forever changed the 
security environment in South Asia. Five non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) of the 
region are concerned. about whether India Pakistan, with a history of deep rooted 
hostility and recurrent wars would be able to properly manage their relationship in a 
nuclearised security environment. The impact of the action by India and Pakistan is 
being felt on the politico diplomatic as well as economic spheres of inter state relations 
in the region. All the NNWS of the region are signatories of the NPT and CTBT, hence 
committed not to develop or process nuclear weapons. The adverse politico-economic 
consequences of nuclearisation are major hurdles for a peaceful and prosperous future of 
NNWS of South Asia. The danger of the nuclear arms race, renewed hostility in India 
Pakistan relations and their impact on South Asia, Western sanctions against India and 
Pakistan withdrawal of Japanese aids fi-om the region and the risk of diversion of world 
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attention from South Asia in terms of trade and investment and lot of other adverse 
developments arise from the nuclearsation of South Asia. 
Despite the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan there has not been any significant 
qualitative change in the sfrategic scenario of South Asia. This may be because of the 
fact that both the countries were known to have passed nuclear capability for some time 
now and have lived with this reality so long without engaging in nuclear encounter^ .^ 
some strategic analysts viewed that the India and Pakistan should not be given nuclear 
status because there is little likelihood of stabiUzing relations between the two countries 
.It would drain scarce resources away from economic development, and would lead to a 
sense of insecurity among the smaller neighboring states, which would become victims 
of any nuclear exchange between the two regional adversaries. Jaswant Singh claimed 
that India's nuclear programme was gradually becoming acceptable to the outside world 
and it had reserved the right to maintain minimum deterrence what exactly was meant by 
that expression became a matter of conjecture, but that was interpreted by Pakistan to 
have threatening implications for her security '^ 
The idea gained strength from a short and limited war which has already been 
fought between the two in Kargil. And even super powers had not used their nuclear 
option to resolve their disputes during the height of the cold War. 
Bilateral relations between India and Pakistan have deteriorated after May, 1998 
because the headers of both coiintries engaged in hot statement regarding Kashmir and 
other issues. 
The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan have neither changed the 
character of war in South Asia, nor given any of the adversaries an added advantage in 
the war front. Instead, both the countries are now destined to face increased tension and 
expenditure on defense budget. Moreover, consequent to the nuclear explosions, several 
developed countries led by the US and Japan have imposed economic sanctions of 
varying degrees against India and Pakistan. Though, imposition of economic sanctions 
on India and Pakistan did adversely effect their economies, but the fact remains that 
while sanctions may have exacerbated regional economic problems, they did not cause as 
much damage as they had expected. Because it was basically of domestic provenance. 
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India maintains that her nuclear programme is essentially a shield against Chinese 
nuclear arsenal, for nuclear weapon is a countervailing equalizer against India. Strategic 
consideration of both India and Pakistan gave the policy planners much needed rationale 
to spend millions of dollars on nuclear weapons programme . 
After the first test in Pokhran, India sternly warned Pakistan not to interfere in 
Kashmir any longer, but soon Pakistan's Chagai test followed and her support of the 
Kashmir gained momentum. If we examine the political and strategic fall-outs fi^om 
nuclear weapons in South Asia, we would find that little has changed for the better, so 
far as the real security blanket of the countries is concerned. The impact of international 
sanctions was felt not only by the hosts to the nuclear blasts, but also by other regional 
countries. 
South Asia is a twilight zone of security in the aftermath of the nuclear tests by 
the two regional powers. SAARC has flourished in many fields of co-operation and spill 
over fi-om the original interaction is being slowly felt in Asia. The ensuing challenges to 
SAARC in the post nuclear South Asia may even generate forces that could help to 
strengthen the organization in the long run by overcoming its present limitations based 
on the initial charter. 
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Chapter IV 
Nuclear Weapons and Security in 
South Asia 
Chapter-IV 
Nuclear Weapons and Security in South Asia 
Concept of definition: The security of the nation is a very old concept. It is even older 
than the concept of the Nation-State. The problems and perceptions of national security 
vary from state to state. It depends upon the nature of state such as developed or 
developing, nuclear or non-nuclear, small power or big power, democratic or 
authoritarian, ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous, and the capabilities of states to 
deal with threats like military or non-military. 
Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 defines a nation as a country encompassing a fixed 
territory and inhabited by people who share common vision of their collective destiny. In 
this dispensation increasing national territory led to larger resources for the country and 
increased population, which made national security competitive, something to achieve at 
another's expense. One state's security increased in proportional to the decrease of its 
adversary's security and was expressed through the idea of the "concept of interest 
defined as power".' This idea precipitated in the writings of prominent intellectuals of 
that era, particularly, Machiavelli and Hobbes. They saw society and nations perpetually 
in conflict in an anarchical system. National security then referred mainly to defence and 
strategic issues. It was related almost exclusively to the ability of a state to defend its 
national interests and sometimes core values, against external threats. 
However, a serious discussion about security problems of nations started after the 
World War II. The scope of national security has widened with the emergence of newly 
independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. During the Cold War period, 
national security meant the defence of the nations territory and state sovereignty. But 
after the end of the Cold War the architecture of the security environment has been 
subjected to a fimdamental change, and it became very impredictable and complex. It has 
put many question marks before strategists and policy markers. What constitutes security 
of a state? What is the object and goal of national security? How is national security to 
be preserved and enhanced? A need has always been felt to define a fresh the concept of 
national security in regard to developing states, particularly diverse and plural societies 
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like India possessing limited capabilities to deal with the threats to their national 
security. 
Though, Western Literature on national security deals with the external threat 
scenario, it does not adequately comprehend the problem of the management of security 
in the developing countries. The lexical meaning of security refers to protection from 
feeling of danger, safety and freedom from doubt. The term national security has been 
used widely, still it has retained the element of ambiguity. National security is both a 
rhetorical phrase and a policy objective. It generally means the ability of a nation to 
protect its core values from external as well as internal threats. The field of study, 
therefore, extends to the analysis of the manner in which nations plan, make and evaluate 
the decision and policies designed to increase this ability. 
Traditionally, national security has been defined as protection of territorial 
integrity from external attack. This view is based on the concept of maximizing national 
power in conflicting situations and had led to the assumption that a nation can be secure 
only if it increases its own power at the expense of another nation. John Herz, who 
infroduced the idea of security dilemma, pointed that the self-help attempts of the nations 
to look after their security add to the rising insecurity to other nations.'* In Hans J. 
Morgenthau's view, national security presupposes the nation-state as a corporate entity 
whose permanent interests are embodied in its own self preservation.^  In such a view, the 
state can become objectified and its security interests elevated above any partisan 
perspective. The state's claim are prior to all others because if sovereignty is lost, none 
of the founding principles or constituent interests of the community can be preserved. No 
matter how important it may be. 
Defining national security, Walter Lippman noted, "A nation has security when it 
does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, 
to maintain them by war".** This kind of understanding of national security suited stable 
nation-states of the industrialised West but inappropriately explained the problem of 
security faced by a heterogeneous and developing nation-state like South Asian States. 
To Michael Lauw, national security is "the condition of freedom from external physical 
threat".'' According to Michael Louw, although moral and ideological threats should be 
included, it is really physical violence which is generally perceived as the ultimate 
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leverage against a state and therefore, as the real and tangible danger to its survival. But 
if nations were not concerned with the protection of their values other than their survival 
as independent states, most of them, most of the time would not have to be seriously 
concerned about their security. 
Frank Traeger and Frank N. Simonic define security in these words, "National 
Security is that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national 
and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital 
national values against existing potential adversaries".^ The vital national values are 
related with those of fundamental principles of a nation, on which it's social, political 
and physical existence is based. All these definitions, however, assume that threats to a 
nation's security emerge only out of the external environment. As Morton Berkovitz and 
Brookes define national security is, "the ability of a nation to protect its internal values 
firom external threat.'" It is well accepted that military power is very important 
component of security. But it is only one facet. History is replete with examples of arms 
race and military buildup which resulted in less rather than more, of security. So a 
broader definition of national security is needed as security is not just the absence of war 
or preparedness for war. The concept of national security has been made broad based by 
the inclusion of non-military and internal threats to security. It has non military 
dimension at economic, diplomatic, environmental and social- political levels. 
India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was far ahead of his times in 
perceiving broad based definition of security. He highlighted the importance of non-
military aspects of security both at the national and international levels at a time when 
the leadership of the great powers was defining national security in terms of military 
power based on Morgenthau's theory of realism. Nehru followed a development oriented 
political economy and hence sought to do away with internal socio economic causes of 
insecurity. First, India sought to defend its national security through building internal 
strengths. Second, it highlighted the transnational threats or aspects of security and 
overcoming them through non-military and collective efforts of nations. Finally, India 
has consistently believed in the efficacy of political approach to manage or resolve inter-
state or intra-state threats to its national security. 
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Arnold Wolfers defines national security as security in an objective sense, 
measures the absence of threats to acquire values, in a subjective sense the absence of 
fear that such values will be attacked." Robert S. Mac. Namara, ex secretary of Defence, 
U.S.A. and Later President of the World Bank, said, "it is increasingly being realized that 
it is poverty, not the lack of military hardware that is responsible for insecurity across the 
southern half of the planet." On the defence versus development dichotomy in the 
developing countries he asserted that, "Security means development. Security is not 
military hardware though it may include it, security is not military force, though it may 
involve it, security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. 
Security is development and without development there can be no security".'^ This 
developmental perspective on national security was recognized by the United Nations in 
its 25* session in 1970s and a resolution was passed for eliminating the gap existing 
between developed and developing coimtries, which is closely and essentially co-related 
to the strengthening of the security of all nations and the establishing international 
peace.""* 
Barry Buzan says about the broadened concept of security that we should have 
"more concern about the sources of threat, rather than just ways to fend off the threats 
themselves and more awareness of the role of one's own state in generating threats. On 
this level ... the national security problems defines itself as much in economic, political 
and social terms as in military ones. Domestic as well as foreign factors loom large in 
this matter, and the military aspect of security is seen to be merely part of a bigger 
picture.'^ K. Subrahmanyam defines that, "national security does not merely mean 
safeguarding territorial integrity, it means also ensuring that the country is industrialised 
rapidly and has a cohesive egalitarian and technological society. Anything which comes 
in the way of this development internally or externally is a threat to national security. '^  
Today there is strong view that the security of individuals, groups and states has 
an interdependent nature.'^ Attack on any of these requires collective mechanism of 
safety. Moreover, insecurity associated with instability and disorders have transitional 
dimensions. Insecurity of individuals and of groups is determinantal for the stability of a 
state, and the instability of a state creates a latent danger for the security of other states or 
international security. Thus the concept of national secvirity is very complex and 
comprehensive. It is difficult to define and diagnose the internal threats in the manner in 
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which external mihtary threats are defined and identified. National security has two 
dimensions. One is external and the other is internal. The external security is required to 
counter threats or challenges form outside, it could be territorial or threat to the country's 
power, influence and position. It involves relations with friends as well as real or 
perceived enemies, diplomatic efforts to prevent a conflict or to prepare for mobalisation 
of external resources, determining objective and properly handling uncertainties and 
unexpected setbacks. 
As far as internal diamension is concerned it includes socio-economic and 
industrial capacity, scientific and technological development, proper mobalisation, 
allocation and development of resources and a high degree of political solidarity over 
national objectives and domestic peace. The internal threats assume the form of 
terrorism, ethnic assertion, communalism, casteism and socio-economic unrest It can be 
concluded that greater security cannot be achieved by military power alone, but along 
with doing away with the causes of conflicts, and the methods of rescuing non-military 
dangers to security. 
Security Problems of Big and Small Powers: 
The survival of a nation as a territorial, political, socio-economic and cultural 
entity is the primary aim of big and small nations, but their national security problems 
are different in their nature and intensity. Big powers specially nuclear haves, seldom 
face the danger of violation of their territorial integrity. Their security problems are 
generally as follows.'^  
• Threats to the position of domination and hegemony they enjoy in the 
international system. 
• Threats to the control and influence they wield, over the decision-making 
process of regional powers and small powers. 
• Threats to the ideology or value system they believe in and want to spread 
among nation in the international domain. 
• Threats to their technological offence and standards of living, and 
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• The security problems of their allies and alliance partners are also taken as 
threats to their own security, as it was in cold war period. 
On the other hand the small nations generally face problems of survival as 
independent entities in the international system. Their shortcomings are size, political 
instability, economic dependence on big powers, linguistic and ethno cultural 
diversities.'^ Those nation which got independence after the World War II, faced security 
threats which were mostly internal, whereas the security thinking prevailing in the 
western world ignores the internal diamension. However, the third word nations follow a 
security policy which is dominated by the security thinking of the western world and 
emphasis on securing themselves against external enemies. Thus most of the third world 
countries are seen bent on developing and modernizing their war machines on western 
pattern of security by avoiding and ignoring the domestic dimension of security. As 
Mohammad Ayoob observers, "despite the rhetoric of many third world leaders the sense 
of insecurity from which these states and more particularly their regimes suffer are 
mostly within their boundaries rather than from outside". Although, he does not rule 
out the existence of external threats, he maintains that "the internal and external sources 
of threats to third world state-structures, and particularly to their regimes, is quite often 
heavily weighted in favour of internal soruces. However, third world countries may be 
able to defend themselves more or less from external threats but almost all of them 
remain vulnerable to internal threats. External threats mostly help in augmenting the 
problems of insecurity that exists within the state boundaries. Hence, the military 
hardware based security system is not applicable to the third world countries. It has come 
under vehement attack from different quarters.^ ^ 
So the greater problems of the security of the third world nations are politico-
economic and social in character. The economic insecvirities get manifested in draconian 
poverty, rising curve of unemployment, massive external debt, endemic sense of 
economic deprivation among the competing groups. The political and social problems 
are not less significant than the economic ones. This is entirely different from the 
security concern of the developed west. For south Asian nations the non-nuclear threat is 
more serious than nuclear security. 
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Nuclear Weapons and National Security: 
The issue of nuclear proliferation in the south Asian continent has grown in 
importance since the end of the Cold War. Technology has played an important role in 
the development and production of nuclear weapons. The emergence of multipolarity in 
the international political system contributes to the search for security within the regional 
areas of the globe. 
When India got independence, the nuclear age had already dawned. India rejected 
the Cold War paradigm and instead of alignment with either block, chose the more 
difficult path of non-alignment. Development of nuclear technology had already by then 
transformed the nature of global security. India advocated for a nuclear free world, that 
would enhance not only India's security but also the security of all nations.^ ^ During the 
decade of 60's a major development took place, and the reality of nuclear age arrived in 
India's neighbourhood which deepened India's security concern. Firstly, on October 16, 
1964 China tested its nuclear weapon, which compelled Indian policy makers to give 
serious consideration to the country acquiring nuclear weapons which is vital to India's 
national security.^ '' 
Secondly, On April 5, 1968, the issue of Non-proliferation treaty was debated in 
the Indian Parliament. The Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi assured the House that 
"We shall be guided entirely by self-internets and consideration of national security".^ ^ 
Thirdly, the period during the Bangladesh war and post war period were really 
eye-opener to those who were charged with Indian national security policy making. 
Despite the grave provocation of a security threat arising from the Chinese nuclear test of 
October 16, 1964, India resisted the temptation for going nuclear. But the Nixon-
Kissinger approach to Indian during the Bangladesh war demonstrated that India needed 
to be self-reliant in the matters of its national security, which led Indira Gandhi to 
conduct first Pokhran test in May 1974. 
The position of possessor and manufacturer of nuclear arms also entails prestige. 
"National Security concern and threat perceptions of nations are no doubt key factors in 
the process of proliferation. But a major motivating force can also be a desire to seek or 
enhance international prestige".^ ^ 
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The fundamental attraction of nuclear weapons is that unilateral proliferation 
promises a dramatic shift in the balance of power. Unilateral possession opens the door 
to direct threats against non-nuclear states. It also limits the risks for aggressively 
minded states making conventional attacks on their neighbours because in the event of a 
decisive reversal, the intended victim can be expected to be very reluctant to press for a 
total victory that would put the aggressor in a position of having nothing to lose. In 
India's case, Pakistan does not represent the only threat. China is also a regional power 
to be reckoned. With the use of nuclear weapons in any put the most extraordinary 
situation is unlikely because of several international and regional factors. For India, the 
main regional constraint is the China factor. Any use of nuclear weapons against 
Pakistan would have to take into consideration the impact on Sino-Indian relations. Even 
if China were to stand by and do nothing such an attack would likely lead to nuclear 
arms race with China.^' Many analysts presents their view that China is an important 
factor in South Asian proliferation. The Indian drive towards nuclear weapons capability 
has not been fueled by any necessity to check Pakistan because India with superior 
conventional strength does not need nuclear weapons to counter a non-nuclear Pakistan. 
Infact, Pakistan was almost peripheral to Indian nuclear plaiming in the 1960's 
and most of the 1970s. Conversely, however, nuclear weapons can play a key role in 
Pakistan security plan to counter the growing military dominance of India in the region. 
The acquisitions of nuclear weapons could be seen by Islamabad as providing a deterrent 
against an Indian invasion or a further Indian supported breaking of Pakistan. 
In addition to national security and survival, nationalism is also an important 
factor in policy determination. Pakistan has shown the world as China did in 60s how a 
country with limited technical resource and a narrow industrial base can acquire nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile capabilities by riding a wave of nationalism. 
In the decade of 80s the nuclear weapons increased and more sophisticated 
delivery system were inducted in South Asia. The clandestine acquiring of nuclear 
materials came into existence. With the demise of Soviet Union there was an end of 
Cold War but, the conflict between India and Pakistan continued, and so did the Sino-
Pakistan cooperation in the national security arena. The Indian Parliamentary Committee 
Report on Defence of 1995 states, "China has also continued to be the main sources of 
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major weapons, including missiles and allied technology, to Pakistan, a very hostile 
neighbour, causing disquiet to India. Despite warming relations with China. China is 
likely to remain the primary security challenge to India in the medium and long terms. Its 
enhancement of missile capabilities and her immense help to Pakistan in the missile 
programme, are serious security concerns to India. 
While India is perceived as single most important threat to the security and even 
survival of Pakistan as a national state and the view was only accentuated by the three 
wars fought between them and particularly the war of 1971 which led to dismemberment 
of the Pakistan. The policy makers formulated their policy of national security in 
militaristic terms as "Security" building up a military deterrent force with adequate 
offensive and defensive power, enough at least, to neutralize the Indian army.^° 
India has sought global disarmament and international guarantees, both of which 
were not acceded to by the great powers. Hence, India distanced itself from the NPT and 
later took on a similar principled stand on the CTBT. After the Pokhran II, the security 
matrix underwent a change. Both, India and Pakistan have successfully tested various 
ballistic missiles and delivery systems. The costs involved are tremendous. Since 
operationalising nuclear forces through some system is unique to each country, the extent 
to which it exists in these two countries is difficult to ascertain. So an important 
consideration in formulating national security policy requires consideration of core 
nuclear warfare issue. Pakistan has shown some consistency in its nuclear policy. Many 
Pakistani commentators have simply stated that "its nuclear weapon programme is not 
only to deter the threat of India's nuclear weapons but also to counter the conventional 
military superiority of Indian arms forces.^' Pakistan President General Parvez 
Musharraf opined that "nuclear weapons had restored that strategic balance between the 
two coiintries and reduced the possibilities of a ftiU scale war. He stressed the need for 
Pakistan to develop into a responsible nuclear power, ensure nuclear non-proliferation 
and devise a fail-safe nuclear conrmiand structure". ^ ^ 
The Pakistan factor has loomed large in the security concern, threat perceptions 
and strategic planning of hidia. Indo-Pak rivalry and their being a factor in each other's 
national security concern can be somewhat comprehended with reference to what Barry 
Buzan and Gowher Rizvi called 'Security Complex'.^^ 
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Today most of the nations are also the beneficiaries of a nuclear security 
pradigm. Only South Africa and South Asia remain outside the exclusivity of this new 
international nuclear paradigm, where nuclear weapons and their currency in 
international conduct are paradoxically, legitimized. So this differentiated standards of 
national security is challenge not simply to India but to the inequality of the entire non-
proliferation regime. 
India's policies towards its neighbours and other coimtries have not changed. The 
country remains fully committed to the promotion of peace, stability and resolution of all 
outstanding disputes through bilateral dialogue and negotiations. So the tests of May 11 
and 13,1998 were not directed against any coimtry. India is now a nuclear weapon state, 
as is Pakistan. India has reiterated its understanding of 'no first use' agreement with any 
covmtry. 
Since nuclear weapons are not really usable, paradoxically the dilemma lies in 
their continuing deterrent value and this paradox further deepens the concern of decision 
makers. It is the human instinct for self preservation that prevents use of nuclear systems 
by any nation. The defenselessness against nuclear system and the speed with which they 
cause destruction is indicative of a new situation. It has set the tradition that total war can 
serve no useful purpose. 
Nuclear Neighbourhood: 
The extra-regional threats emanate fi-om several factors like the emergence of 
China as a nuclear power state, presence of military bases in Indian Ocean and the fall 
out of a possible nuclear conflict at the regional level with three nuclear players facing 
one another in the region that is India, Pakistan and China. The interventionary activities 
of developed countries in the internal affairs of South Asian countries are more 
prominent. 
The future of nuclear deterrence constitutes a crucial facet of India's security. 
India has for long lived under the shadow of China's nuclear weapons. China is rapidly 
modernizing its nuclear tipped ballistic missiles and is "Quite openly proud of its 
Multiple, Independently targeted re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) capability for which it has 
coined the slogan 'one arrow, three stars'.^'* Most of the China's nuclear weapons are 
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known to be short range, battle field or tactical nuclear weapons, and large number of 
them are deployed in Tibet. ^  
Since China has already sighed de-targeting agreement with Russia and the 
United States, the nuclear weapon in Tibet, particularly the short range ones, constitute a 
threat-in-being to India. It would be in India's interests to offer its mutual 'no first use' 
agreement to China as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM). 
The South Asian countries like other third world countries are economically, 
socially and politically backward, and this backwardness has become a source of 
exploitation in the hand of strong powers, particularly the developed countries of the 
West. The US fi-om the very beginning, after the decolonization of the region, used its 
economic assistance programme as an instrument of coercion to effect changes in the 
policies of South Asian Countries as per its foreign policy objectives Nuclear 
capabilities of Pakistan and China and the collaborative relationship between Pakistan 
and China on the nuclear and missile related issues, and the US arms supplies to Pakistan 
have further contributed to India's high priority to military threats in its national security 
concem.^^ 
China's arms deals and training facilities to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri 
Lanka have created a sense of insecurity in India. In the field of nuclear weapons, China 
has actively supported Pakistan developing various types of missiles so as to neutralise 
India's advancement in the defence field. 
Ever since the first Prithvi missile test by India in 1988, China has been quick in 
response to help Pakistan to balance Indian advance in the field of missile technology 
and weapons delivery system. For example, the transfer of M-lls to Islamabad began 
barely two years after the Prithvi test, the delivery of readymade missile was followed by 
Chinese aid in the domestic production of Hatf-2 and Hatf-3, Pakistani name of M-lls 
and M-9s. Now comes the Ghauri II test just after one year of Ghauri I test. As 
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) the Ghauri can help Islamabad to strike 
deep into India.^ ^ 
After US President Bill Clinton's visit to India in March 2000, the relations 
between the two countries became relatively warmer than during the Cold War period 
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when the US had seen India as leaning towards the Soviet Union and had itself leaned 
towards Pakistan. However, the US still sees India's nuclear weapons as an unacceptable 
violation of its non-proliferation agenda. Many Indian analyst have expressed the view 
that the continued presence of nuclear weapons at Diego Garacia, an Indian Ocean island 
only about 1,800 Km from Kanayakumari, and on board ship and submarines of the US 
Navy's Indian Ocean Fleet, constitutes a threat-in-being to India. 
In November, 1997 US Secretary of Defence William Cohen said that the threat 
perceptions posed by two nuclear power India and Pakistan was great. It refers to their 
potential to use chemical and biological weapons if their 50 year old rivalry flares for the 
fourth time.^ ^ US Think Tank, Rand Corporation predicted a nuclear conflagration over 
Kashmir in 2006 after the insurgency in Indian Kashmir had become 'unmanageable'. 
The Rand Report was intended to serve the long range planning needs of the US Air 
Force and has visualized an inescapable role for it in a future Indo-Pak nuclear war'*^ . 
After Pokhram II, Jim Rayan, a Republican Congressman clubbed India, Pakistan 
and China, and called them rough states."*' Ashley J. Tellis has written that "It is unlikely 
that the United States will intervene militarily in South Asia in the foreseeable future 
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The Indian defence analysts always go the extra mile to accommodate US 
security interests, even though the US analysts always have difficultly in comprehending 
Indian security concerns. What concerns them even more is that the US might 
miscalculate and that it may launch a cruise missile and even a nuclear attack occasioned 
entirely by misperception. K. Subrahmanyam said "... The weapons are a threat and that 
needs to be countered by India accruing similar system... There is also a need for India 
to acquire sea denial capabilities, both conventional and nuclear powered submarines 
which will be deterrent against navies with unfriendly intention coming close enough to 
Indian coast to pose threats to our cities and infrastructure.^ ^ The US nuclear weapons 
and laimch platforms in Indian Ocean is a threat to the security of South Asia. 
The transition of India and Pakistan to the status of states with nuclear weapons 
has led to many misgivings. In particular, the bogey of Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint 
has been raised by vested western interest and Southern Asia has been classified as an 
unstable region. The termination of the Kargil Conflict of 1999 through mutual 
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agreement has conclusively proved that such views are merely hype and have little 
substances. India's interests lie in actively pursuing universal disarmament even while 
developing a credible minimum nuclear deterrent to meet the threat to India's national 
security. 
Nuclear Force Development in South Asia: 
India: It is difficult to determine the size and composition of India's nuclear arsenal. 
From various sources, it is estimated that India has a stockpile of approximately 30-35 
nuclear warheads'*^, which it is sought to be expanding. Some of these may be stored in 
unassembled form, with the plutonium core kept separately from the non-nuclear ignition 
components. 
There is considerable uncertainty in published estimates of the total amount of 
weapon-grade plutonium that India has produced and, hence, in estimates of the number 
of nuclear weapons that it could have built. A number of factors contribute to the 
uncertainty in estimating India's fissile materials. There is difference in assessment of 
operating capacity of CIRUS and Dhurva plutonium production reactors. In 1990s 
World's Nuclear Association estimated that India's nuclear power reactors had world's 
lowest operating capacity.''^ It is not clear that India has used all of its available weapon-
grade plutonium to fabricate nuclear weapons. 
The Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) stated that the series of five 
nuclear test explosions in May 11,1998 involved both fission and fiision design, the first 
three tests achieved yields of 43 Kilotons (Thermonuclear device), 12 Kilotons (a fission 
device) and 200 tons (a low yield device). It is often suggested that one of the nuclear 
explosive tests carried out by India at Pokhran in 1998 used non-weapon grade 
plutonium. If the tests gave confidence that this material could be used for weapons then 
India may see the large holdings of plutonium associated with its civilian unsafeguard 
reactor as being a potential part of its military nuclear programme. 
According to A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, then Director General of the Defence 
Research and Development Organization (DRDO), India possesses both fiision 
(thermonuclear) and fission nuclear weapons. Many western experts have questioned 
whether, India in fact has achieved a 'thermonuclear device' capability. They point to 
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seismic data which suggest that India's test of a thermonuclear device had a smaller yield 
than was claimed and probably was not successful.'*^ 
India established the National Security Council in April 1999 to implement 
nuclear policy, but its progress in setting up a nuclear command and control system is 
unknown. On August 17, 1999 Indian National Security Advisory Board released a draft 
Indian Nuclear Doctrine (dIND). This called for a strategic trial characterized by nuclear 
weapons on aircraft, mobile land based missiels, and at the sea, with an emphasis on 
multiple redundancy, mobility, dispersion and deception, and the ability to make the 
transition from peacetime deployment to a war footing in the shortest possible time."*^  
Indian has extensive large indigenous development and production infrastructures 
for both short and medium-range ballistic missiles. Several of these missiles could be 
used to deliver nuclear weapons, but considering range, payload, and speed, the most 
likely aircrafts are MIG-27 and the Jaguar. The MIG-27 single seat aircraft weights 
almost 18,000 kilograms when fiilly equipped and has a range of 800 kilometers. It can 
carry up to 4,000 kilograms of bombs on external hard points. The Jaguar IS/IB, known 
as the Shamsher was nuclear capable. It has gross weight of 15,450 kilograms and a 
range of 1,6000 kilometers with a maximum external load of 4,775 kilograms. Other 
aircraft, like the SU-30K and Mirage 2000H, could be equipped to deliver nuclear bombs 
but are more likely to be used for air defence missions. 
India has tested Prithvi, a short range ballistic missile with a range of 150-250 
kilometers that it claims can carry a nuclear warhead. The first list launch of a shorter 
range version of the Agni II missile took place on January 25, 2002. The Agni SR is 
single stage solid fuel missile that uses the first stage engine of the Agni II. It was 
reportedly developed to meet a perceived need for a missile with a range between the 
short-range Prithvi II (250 km) and the long range Agni II (2500 km) missile.'*^ 
In addition to air and land based nuclear capable forces, India is workmg on at 
least two naval system, the Sagarika and the Dhanush which may be equipped to carry 
nuclear armed, sea launched cruise missile.'*' The Sagarika (Submarine-launched 
ballistic missile will be deployed after 2010). The Dhanush (sea launched ballistic 
missile) has been developed during the tense standoff between India and Pakistan in 
January 2002. Naval Chief Admiral Madhvendra Sin^ made some ambiguous 
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comments about naval nuclear weapons during a press conference. He said, "We have a 
triad of weapons for a second strike and one of the triad is at sea. The most powerful of 
the triad is in the navy and is hidden underwater and moving". 
Pakistan: It is extremely difficult to estimate the number and types of nuclear weapons 
in Pakistan's arsenal. Outside experts estimate the country has 24 to 48 nuclear weapons. 
The weapons are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched 
uranium, requiring an estimated 15-20 kilograms per warhead. Pakistan has tested six 
nuclear devices on May, 1998. Independent expert estimated that the total yield may also 
have been significantly smaller than Pakistani officials claimed. After the Chagi test 
Pakistan has maintained that it seeks only a 'minimum credible deterrence' capability but 
has refused to specify what that means. It is however clear that Pakistan sees this 
minimum in relative terms and has tied it to India's arsenal. 
There has been less public debate about the possible size and composition of 
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Soon after the tests, Samar Mubarikmand proposed that 
arsenal of 60 to 70 nuclear weapons should be sufficient.^ ' The most reliable estimate is 
that Pakistan has produced enough fissile material for 30-50 nuclear weapons. Some of 
these weapons are probably stored in unassembled form at dispersed locations. In 
February 2000, Pakistan's military government aimounced the establishment of a 
National Command Authority to manage the coimtry's nuclear forces.^ "^  Pakistan is 
working to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has also begun to operate a 
nuclear reactor for producing plutoniiim for nuclear weapons, although, it is not believed 
to have tested a thermonuclear weapons or device in its May 1998 tests. However, 
Mubarikmand has claimed that Pakistani scientists can produce thermonuclear weapons 
"Technically we can definitely make it but it will require a mandate and needs move 
funds for carrying out test firing of thermonuclear device".^ ^ 
Like other nations that have developed nuclear weapons, Pakistan does not seem 
content with a first generation nuclear weapon and may be pursuing other designs and 
refinements. Pakistan's US manufactured F-16 and Chinese manufactured A-5 are most 
likely to be used by the Pakistani Air Force to deliver nuclear weapons. In 2002 Pakistan 
conducted fight tests of three types of nuclear capable ballistic missiles. Pakistani 
defence sources indicate that the Ghauri I/II entered into serial production in late 2002. It 
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was formally handed over to the Pakistani Anny for 'fiiU operational use' on January 12, 
2003. Pakistan has announced that both versions can carry a nuclear warhead Pakistan 
has tested Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) and Shaheen I (Hatf-4), Shaheen I has been declared 
nuclear capable. Although, Pakistan is believed to rely on its air force and will pursue its 
land based mobile missiles to deliver its nuclear weapons, its navy has followed India's 
lead acquiring an interest in a nuclear role. 
Moreover, India and Pakistan continue to increase the size of their respective 
arsenals and move towards increased reliance on mobile missiles and eventually seek to 
follow the other nuclear weapons states in putting nuclear weapons at sea, their problems 
of command and control will grow more complex. The risk of an accident may increase 
through the action of numerous, often unpredictable factors. After going nuclear, both 
India and Pakistan are now struggling to operationalise their nuclear weapon capability. 
The nuclear arsenals are growing, delivery systems are under development and structure 
of command and control are being setup. The geographical condition of South Asia 
imposes an additional limitation since a nuclear catastrophe inflicted by one on the other 
cannot be expected to remain confined in space to only the adversary's side of the 
border. Maintaining command over nuclear weapons brings its own problems. Pakistan 
and India have both sought technology from the other nuclear weapon states to ensure 
only the highest political and military authorities. The critical first steps are for hidia and 
Pakistan to not assemble and deploy their nuclear weapons. Even in peacetime, assembly 
and deployment bring increased risk of accident. There is long record of accidents and 
near miss involving aircrafts and missiles carrying nuclear weapons belonging to other 
nuclear weapons states. 
Hence, we can conclude that the threat of nuclear weapons bemg used 
inadvertently in South Asia is in no way more or less than as it exists elsewhere in the 
world. However, it must be conceded that there are two kinds of nuclear dangers that 
may be seen as being more pronounced in the case of India-Pakistan. Firstly, the loss of 
possession of weapons or materials, due to a nuclear accident because of inadequate 
safety measures. Secondly, due to inadequate safety measures these is possibility of 
unwarranted or unintended nuclear detonation. It is on these accounts that the world 
needs to be concerned about nuclear weapons in South Asia. 
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Indo-Pak Rivalry and South Asian Security: 
There is hardly any region in the world whose countries enjoy harmonious 
relations with each other at all times. It is due to fundamental differences in ideas, 
outlook, attitude, perception and capacity. South- Asian countries are linked together in 
terms of religion, language, culture tradition and racial ties. India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh share historical experience and memories arising out of the Colonial period. 
All these factors constitute as input in the generation of intraregional conflicts and 
tensions.^ The inter-state problems arise due to differences over demarcations of 
boundaries and distributions of assets and liabilities. The control axis of conflict in South 
Asia is between India and Pakistan. However, territory, ideology, ethnicity, religion and 
resource sharing remain issues of tension between India and Pakistan. 
Undoubtedly the major problems of South Asian security emanates from the 
continuing antagonistic relationship between India and Pakistan disputes over territory 
and ideology have locked the two in regional Cold War which has thrice broken out into 
a full scale interstate war. Insisting that nothing less than the territorial integrity of India 
was at stake, India nevertheless, did not hesitate to sever East Bengal from Pakistan in 
1971. Each successive Indo-Pak war proved to be more violent and destructive than the 
one preceding it. And the fear that a fourth, far more deadly, contest was in the offing, 
aroused considerable international attention.^^ 
The two subcontinental neighbours have made menacing gesture towards each 
other since 1986. Each time it was Pakistan rather than the India which assumed the 
initiative in defusing the situation. But in the immediate past the two governments have 
appeared more stable and hence more capable of managing tensions between their 
countries. No other issue has generated so much ill between the two covmtries as the 
Kashmir dispute. Even the end of Cold War and the subsequent change in world order 
have not been able to dampen the issue. 
Acquisition of nuclear weapons in South Asia is part of a long reactive process in 
which the two rival states have developed nuclear programme in response to each other's 
deployment of nuclear weapons. India's nuclear programme got incentive from China's 
nuclear explosive tests of 1964, following on the heels of latter's victory over former in 
the 1962 border dispute. In May, 1974, India tested its own nuclear explosive device at 
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Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert close to the Pakistan's border. This was an evidence that 
India has developed all the required expertise and technology needed to be a nuclear 
power. A decade latter, Pakistan in response to India's PNE, developed a programme of 
its own which was made public by General Zia-ul-Haq in March 1987. He disclosed that 
Pakistan has developed the requisite technology but had not chosen to exercise the 
weapons option. This was also pronounced by A.Q. Khan, the brain behind Pakistan's 
nuclear programme that Pakistan has mastered the technology for making nuclear 
weapons.^ ^ Although, both India and Pakistan claim their nuclear programmes are for 
peaceful purposes only, the worrisome aspect of South Asian nuclear proliferation threat 
in the 1990s remains the same India - Pakistan security dilemma. '^ 
Besides wars, limited armed conflict and military intervention, Indo-Pak relations 
have also been marked by the issue of force for political intimidation as for example, 
India's 'Brasstacks' military exercise of 1987, which brought the two sides very close to 
major military clash. Pakistan's concerns are aggravated by the growing power disparity 
and compounded by its lack of territorial depth for defence by conventional means. ^ * The 
dichotomy between India's and Pakistan's security perception is inherited in their 
perceived threat to their territorial integrity. India in its security articulation has clearly 
defined its concern regarding China's growing power and the question of unsettled 
border dispute between the two countries while Pakistan security perception concerns 
India as security threat with which it has already fought three major war and territorial 
dispute of Kashmir is continuing. So the dichotomy in the security perceptions based on 
the military capabilities on India and Pakistan has created problems for any bilateral 
arrangement in South Asia. 
The overt nuclearisation of India and Pakistan in 1998 has given a new dimension 
to the Kashmir issue in South Asia.'' It is feared that the nuclear tests have made the 
region more dangerous and insecure as both the countries have a long-standing conflict 
on Kashmir and are still locked in a antagonistic relationship trying to contain each 
other's threat by opting for high military expenditure and more sophisticated arsenals. 
Though, open war, has not taken place between India and Pakistan. Since 1999, the 
constant war rhetoric and war like situation continues to alarm the international 
community that Kashmir will be nuclear flashpoint.^ Not only have the conventional 
war proved quite expensive but also the chances of achieving political objectives through 
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wars have dismissed due to the development of nuclear weapons. The three wars 
between India and Pakistan although ended without settlement of the dispute. Indian 
conventional superiority convinced Pakistan that it could never achieve its mission in 
Kashmir through conventional warfare. Pakistan resorted to the strategy of proxy war. 
Kargil Conflict, just a year after Pokhran II and Chagai explosion brought the question of 
political and military utility of war to the forefront of Indo-Pak politics. The 
development of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan has given a new outlook to the 
security problems of South Asia. Never before has there been so much of sabre rattling 
and war hysteria about India - Pakistan conflicting situation as at the time of Kargil 
Conflict. It was considered to be the most serious conflict between the nuclearised 
nations in the last 35 years. In the beginning of the conflict, war between India and 
Pakistan appeared to be quite imminent, which could bring entire South Asia an the brink 
of nuclear disasters.^' The entire world community sharply reacted upon the 
nuclearisation of India and Pakistan as quite dangerous in the subcontinent due to 
protracted conflict on Kashmir.^^ Pakistan's misadventure in Kargil after acquiring 
nuclear capability is indicative of its renewed confidence of achieving its long term 
objectives in Kashmir. Though, Kargil conflict was terminated before it could escalate 
into an all-out war between India and Pakistan, it raised the spectre of nuclear war 
between India and Pakistan. The Kargil crisis has painfully revealed that while 
nuclearisation had added a more dangerous dimension to Indo-Pak security relationship 
that the two countries have to deal with, it has not changed the traditional security 
relationship for better, but left a deep imprint on Indo-Pak relations. 
India's objective as stated in nuclear doctrine reads, "The fimdamental purpose of 
Indian nuclear weapon is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any 
state or entity against India and its forces, India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear 
strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail".^^ Nuclear 
weapon in Indian military doctrine is for the purpose of deterrence and is to be used as a 
weapon of last resort only when its national security is at stake. Though Pakistan is yet to 
unveil a concrete nuclear doctrine, its arguments for nuclear weapon provide some 
insight into the Pakistani thinking on the subject.^ The Indian threat is described as a 
single most pervading factor that has dominated the Pakistani security landscape. ^ ^ 
Explaining the importance of nuclear capability and its significance to Paksitan's 
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national security Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg says, "To give up the nuclear Capability would 
tantamount to committing a national suicide".^^ Pakistan's nuclear deterrence philosophy 
is based on two incident of 1987 and 1990. Security analysts believe that it is the 
Pakistan's nuclear factor which prevented conventional war in both 1987 and 1990 
crises. Interestingly the nuclear weapon in the Pakistani context has a political role. The 
issue of South Asia as a nuclear flash point is raked up to draw greater attention of the 
world community to the Kashmir issue and the need for their involvement to find a 
solution. So, apart from providing a strategic deterrent against India's superiority in 
conventional forces and sizeable nuclear capability, it will also act as potential equalizer 
in political parleys with India. 
The arguments in favour of a nuclear option for Pakistan are interlinked with the 
India's nuclear capability as well as providing protection to Pakistan's covert operation 
in Kashmir. K.M. Arif and Munir Ahmad expressed their view that "India's nuclear 
capability is a threat to Pakistan's security and Pakistan nuclear option is for defence 
purpose to forestall hegemony of India".^* Mirza Aslam Beg also said that in spite of 
having superiority in conventional weapon India cannot attack Pakistan because of fear 
of a nuclear retaliation.*^ 
With the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, Indian 
army was deployed along the Pakistan border to counter the anti-Indian terror attack; 
latter on the tension between the two countries eased. 
Threshold Factor: 
The seciirity concept and nuclear deterrence is linked to the perceived threshold 
factor of India and Pakistan. Pakistan's political personalities indicate that if Pakistan's 
security were at stake it would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons against the aggressor. 
This in effect attests to the fact that Pakistan's nuclear deterrence is to deter a 
conventional war. According to the General Pervaz Musharaf, Pakistan would use the 
nuclear weapon if Pakistan's security were jeopardized. The lack of clear nuclear 
doctrine indicating the usage, command and control are necessary to initiate any 
verifiable nuclear risk reduction measure, though it is not clear at what stage Pakistan 
would use nuclear weapon. Nuclear deterrence would be more viable if the threshold of 
their use is increased by strengthening conventional war capability. This would require 
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more defence spending in the case of Pakistan, which feels threatened by Indian 
conventional, superiority. Thus the logic of Pakistani analysts nuclear weapon would 
least to less defence spending does not hold unless Pakistan uses its nuclear weapon at a 
very early stage. Since Pakistan lacks strategic depth the No-First-Use (NFU) policy is 
not in favour of Pakistan. Tanwir Ahmad Khan wrote that ambiguity has contributed to 
the avoidance of major war between the two countries since 1971 .^ ^ 
India and Pakistan have a credible nuclear deterrence and now it is responsibility 
of both countries to work towards peace and friendly neighbourliness. Both the countries 
should work hard on Confidence Building Measures. Both the coimtries need to evolve a 
conmion strategy based on mutuality of stake involve in any decision to reduce the risk 
of conventional war graduating to a nuclear conflagration. Unless mutual trust and 
confidence is built, any Asian countries issue and particularly India Pakistan is unlikely 
to get resolved. 
Military conflict between India and her neighbour except Pakistan is highly 
unlikely now or in fiiture, because of the power asymmetry between India and smaller 
states of South Asia. India could achieve its objectives in respect of these states without 
restoring war. India enjoys an overwhelming superiority in the diplomatic arena that 
resorting to war will be imnecessary. India's maritime boundary with Sri Lanka, 
Maldives, and land boundary with Nepal and Bhutan are demarcated, except a short 
stretches of border with Bangladesh. India and Pakistan should go for no-first use, non 
aggression pact with non-interference pledge and a guarantee not to use force both 
overtly and covertly to change the territorial status. Nuclear security carmot be achieved 
in isolation from other non-nuclear components of security. To conclude by quoting an 
Indian analyst, "Deterrence stability requires a modicum of political stability and control. 
Political turmoil and economic chaos can create conditions in which stability in South 
Asia could be seriously threatened". 
India's Security Concern in Relation to Other Neighbours: 
The term South Asia is used for the countries lying South of the Himalayas and 
Hindukush mountains and surrounded by the Indian Ocean from three side. It comprises 
India (second most populous democracy on the earth) linked with Pakistan in the North 
West, Bhutan and Nepal in the north, Bangladesh in the east and the island temtories of 
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Sri Lanka and Maldives in the South. It is fact of geography that India is much bigger 
than all the other six nations combined. No South Asian Country borders one another, 
but all share borders with India. All the countries of South Asia possess common feature 
like, most of the countries of the region are economically very poor, religion is a 
predominant factor, inter religious differences are overplayed in the political sphere 
leading to violent conflict, agricultural economy, industrial backwardness, 
unemployment, illiteracy, over population and secessionism. 
Despite the presence of these common features, South Asian countries have not 
been able to evolve co-operative relations and their relations are restrained due to 
numerous conflict. The security of South Asia has over the years been adversely affected 
by the Indo-Pak wars and Indo-China war. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan also 
affected the security scenario of the South Asia badly. On the other hand US military 
bases in the Indian ocean and Chinese control of Tibet have had their impact on the 
security of South Asia. As far as national security is concerned, it is more complicated 
because of the border dispute between the countries of South Asia. The nuclear 
capability of India and Pakistan has dramatically changed the security scenario, and 
made the issue of national security of South Asian coimtries more complex and 
complicated. 
South Asia is an Indo-Centric region, implying that India is the dominant power. 
India not only dominates itself but also prevents the external power involvement in the 
region. Apart from Pakistan, India has been successful in limiting outsider's involvement 
in the region. In fact, India has brought almost all South Asian countries except Pakistan 
within the matrix of its informal regional security system.^ '* The key to India's attempt to 
keep outsiders away from South Asia is her adherence to 'bilateralism'. In 1970s Indira 
Gandhi stated that "India will neither intervene in the domestic affairs of any state in the 
region, xmless requested to do so, nor tolerate such intervention by an external power. If 
external assistance is required to meet an external crisis, state should first look within the 
region for help.'^ Former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral tried to improve relations with the 
smaller states of South Asia. He stated that 'India would not insist on reciprocity and 
would be prepared to go more them half way to improve its relations with its smaller 
neighbours'. 
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Moreover, Gujral Doctrine reflected the recognition that India's poHcies toward 
its smaller neighbours show greater concern for their security perceptions, instead of 
sticking to hard-line attitudes that have created tensions in the past. In a report of 
Ministry of Defense to the standing committee on defence clearly emphasized that 
'government repeatedly made it clear that it is not our objective to influence, interfere 
and dominate the region on the basis of military strength/^ Like Pakistan, the other 
neighbours, Sri Lanka and Nepal too, have invited extra regional powers to counter 
Indian power. Nepal sought to play off China against India. In Sri Lanka, the 
Jayawardene government flirted with the US, China and even Israel. The smaller 
neighbour in the region also assisted each other with Sri Lanka granting transit facilities 
to Pakistan during the 1971 war.^ ^ As for the role of the smaller states in South Asia, 
they have played a buffer or intermediary role from time to time, but not consistently or 
substantially. Within New Delhi's sphere of influence, Bhutan and Nepal have long 
served as buffers between India and China. In the 1962 India-China war, Sri Lanka 
played the role of an intermediary along with six other Asian and African States, it 
sponsored a set of proposal intended to resolve the conflict. 
Moreover, Bangladesh has exploited India's vulnerability in the border areas by 
providing sanctuary to North East militants operating India. Thus with respect to the 
smaller states of South Asia, India does indeed enjoy a military and economically 
hegemonic position. Except Pakistan, no other country has the military capability to 
challenge Indian ambitions. 
Bangladesh: Bangladesh's security perspective has largely been Indo-Centric. The long 
list of irritants between the two countries demonsfrated the level of mutual relations. 
Each of the irritants is perceived in the Bangladesh's official mind as example of big 
power hegemony over smaller power. But how much qualitative improvement in 
bilateral relations can be brought about by the big power initiative has been amply 
demonsfrated by the handling over the Tin Bigha Corridor and Chakma repatriation.^* 
The relations between the two countries deteriorated mainly after the military 
coup in Dhaka in August, 1975. The military rulers nurtured anti Indian and pro-China 
policies to gain support of the religious right and Marxist left. Meanwhile India 
responded with the commissioning of the Faraka barrage on the Ganga river. Unilateral 
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withdrawal of Ganga water posed an ecological disaster and threatened the economic 
viability of Bangladesh. Another issue was the alleged Indian support for the insurgents 
in Chittagaon Hill Tracts. The major issue of tension between the two countries is the 
inter-state migration. What makes it an even more incendiary issue is that it has got 
caught up in the fundamentalist political discourse in India. Due to the economic 
insecurity in Bangladesh, there is continued infiltration of migrants into Indian territory, 
which becomes inevitable. Moreover, India must share some of the responsibility for the 
making of environmental refuge in Bangladesh as a result of the degradation caused by 
the Indo-Bagladesh Faraka agreement. Fencing the porous border is no response. It will 
not work. 
What could make a difference is the integrated economic development of the sub 
region. There is the discovery of rich deposits of natural gas in Bangladesh which could 
transform the economy of the region. Foreign investors are eyeing India as the natural 
market for piped natural gas firom Bangladesh. But that would mean overcoming the 
history of distrust and suspicion which has stymied cooperation.^' Anti-Indian feeling is 
the motif of the Bangladesh political elite but it has limited role only in electoral politics. 
The Farraka dam agreement is seen as the symbol of India's 'hegemonic bilateralism', its 
lack fairness, generously towards a smaller and poor neighbour. The revised 1997 Ganga 
waters agreement reflects an approach more responsive to sensitivities of a smaller 
neighbour. The Chittagaon Hill Tracts Peace Accord in 1998 has put the bilateral 
relationship between the two countries on high note again.*" For both India and 
Bangladesh, the security dividends of a less suspicious and better relationship include the 
denial of sanctuary to militants across the border. 
Nepal: The tone of India's relationship with Nepal was set when India established its 
embassy in former British Residency in Kathmandu. Bhabani Sen Gupta describes how 
in 1951, after the Chinese communist liberation of Tibet, Nehru Unilaterally placed 
Nepal within India's security orbit.*' Nepal's security got interwined with that of India in 
1950 when the Indo-Nepalalese Treaty of Peace and Friendhsip was signed, (t was laid 
down that "neither Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a 
foreign aggressor".*^ Alongside such a security tie-up Nepal's vulnerability is increased 
by its heavy economic dependence on India, and very soon on the sharp and wide 
divergence of views of on security divided the two countries. 
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As Nepal was seen as a buffer state between India and China, its overtures to 
China were seen as threatening and punished. In other words Nepal's China policy 
appears to be an expression of its uneasiness regarding the Indo-Nepalese Treaty. As one 
Nepali bureaucrat voiced the widespread sentiment, "why should we be tied to the paron 
strings of India and not have the liberty to get into collaborations with other states".^^ 
But Nepal's obvious policy of tilt towards China for achieving equidistance between its 
two powerful neighbours did not find favour with India. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
showed his displeasure at an arms agreement between Nepal and China by closing the 
transit points and thus bottling up and landlocked Nepal. The treaty was signed in 1990 
when the new Nepali Congress Government had agreed to India's condition. Nepal has 
since then recognised the Indian security concerns. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had 
refused to endorse Nepal's proposals to get international recognition as a 'Zone of 
Peace'. Bhabani Sen Gupta express his view that "India's acceptance of the zone of 
peace concept would not have impinged on the Nepalese elite if would have been 
electric. It would not make the least change in the geo-political realities of the Himalayas 
or in Nepal's relations with India and China".*"* After the two decades, on the wake of 
Gujral Doctrine's new responsiveness towards the sensitivities of neighbours, India has 
agreed to put on the bilateral agenda, a review of the Indo-Nepal treaty. But it is evident 
that the passionate demand in Nepal to overturn the 1950 agreement has had to surrender 
to the hard reality of geopolitics. 
India with the size and resources will have to walk that extra mile. There is the 
legacy in Nepal of public emotionalism over what have been politically projected as 
unequal agreements on the sharing of the water of the river Gandhak and the Kosi. For 
too long has Indian bilaterism, been seen by the smaller neighbour as a euphemism for 
hegemonic diplomacy. The 1996 Agreement on Mahakali River epitomizes both the 
problem of suspicious and mistrust and the promise of cooperation. At stake is the 
development of whole North East, political unrest and destablising population 
movements across the border. 
The 1950 treaty established the unique open border between India and Nepal; it 
has come xmder xenophobic pressures on both sides of the border. In Indian security 
circle, the thesis of Greater Nepal across the trans Himalayan region has again been 
revived, especially in the wake of the politico demographic shifts in the states of Assam 
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and Sikkim. Indeed the Greater Nepal thesis is being insidiously manipulated to give 
political legitimacy to the people of Nepali origin from Bhutan. Nepal has been seekmg 
to involve India to get it to put pressure on Bhutan to take back the Lhotsamps. 
Increasingly the management of the challenge of population movements, refiagees, 
migrants which pose threats to national security in India requires a co-operative regional 
response. 
Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka is situated in a sensitive strategic area, the geographical location of 
Sri Lanka compelled her to have mostly indocentric security perception. Moreover, the 
strategic harbour at Trincomalee with its apparent attraction for extra regional powers in 
their Indian Ocean sfrategic configuration has made Sri Lanka look for survival options 
in a number of ways. But following independence, the immediate concern was India. 
Nehru envisaged a Sri Lanka soon to be drawn into the Indian political and security 
orbit.*^ Gradually Sri Lanka was led to believe in the Indian assumption that "Sri 
Lanka's policies must be prescribed by the demands of Indian national interest". Thus 
under the circumstances, immediately after independence Sri Lanka crafted a regional 
security policy on the assumption that the most likely threat would come from India.^* 
The minority Tamil uprising for a separate state, which started in the early 1980s was a 
backlash to the majority Sinhalese Budhist nationalism. Sri Lanka often accused India of 
harboring and assisting the insurgents. 
Sri Lanka security postures in the regional context involved warming up towards 
Pakistan and China. In July 1963, Sri Lanka and China entered into a maritime 
agreement with a conmiercial purpose. In 1971, Sri Lanka allowed air and fransit-
facilities to Pakistan, and facilitated naval base to the US in Trincomalee along with the 
Tamil imbroglio in 1983, evoked sharp Indian reaction. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
asserted in Lok Sabha in August 1983 that 'India can not be regarded as just any coxmtry. 
Sri Lanka and India are the two countries who are directly concerned. Any extraneous 
involvement will complicate matters for both our countries.*' Until 1983 Sri Lanka had 
remained outside the Indian security network and maintained security ties with countries 
outside the South Asian region despite Indian objection. But the eruption of ethnic strife 
compelled the Sri Lanka government to sign the India - Sri Lanka agreement in 1987 
which not only enabled the Indian forces to go into Sri Lanka with specific objective of 
maintaining peace and order in areas of confrontation but also forbade Sri Lanka to make 
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its port Trincomalee available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to 
India's interests.^ *^ Tamil insurgency is the principal security concern for Sri Lanka. 
Peace overtures by successive governments in Colombo have failed to arrive at an 
understanding with the rebels. The economic and political future of Sri Lanka is closely 
connected to permanent solution of the Tamil Problems. 
Maldives: Conscious of its strategic location and resources, Maldives has constraints to 
maintain a low-key profile. Despite this Maldives demonstrated a commendable balance 
in handling issues relating to foreign and security policies. Strategic factors impinging on 
the Maldives's foreign relations can be illustrated by the dilemma Male faces sheltering 
its Gan island fromteh Covetous eyes of external powers with stakes in the region.^' 
Gan's potentials for a naval base are highlighted by its deep water anchorage for US it 
has considerable strategic importance because it is 640 km away fi-om Diego Gracia. 
Maldives is the smallest country in South Asia. Despite its economic dependence 
on India, it has not signed any bilateral treaty with India. By late 1988, the exposed 
vulnerability of security brought her within the security perimeter of India. 
If South Asia is to break away fi-om a situation where all the South Asian states 
feel threatened and vulnerable, India has to take the lead in working towards a security 
framework which takes into account the security sensitivities of its neighbours and even 
adversaries to provide for its own seciirity concerns. The vision of security for the 
democratic politics in South Asia has to take into account not only military threats to 
national security but also cultural, political, economic and environmental security 
because these non-military threats to national security demand a regional response. 
Non-nuclear Dimension of South Asian Security: 
In the past, the primary focus was on the threat of military aggression from across 
borders and on military means to defend oneself against such threats, but no more so. 
Today, there is increasing volume of literature being focused on the non-military threat 
to security. Many more people die from preventable diseases, domestic conflicts and 
avoidable natural calamities. However, a military threat must not be underestimated. 
Threats to security are mainly classified on the basis of source i.e., internal and 
external. The classification based on military or non-military aspects of security are 
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based on the object of the danger.^^ If the object is war or threat of war then it is termed 
as military threat and if the object is danger to economic welling, environment, human 
rights and survival, then it is termed nuclear or non-military aspect of security including 
the threats to the development of the state and society. 
The concept of 'Security' has undergone significant change in recent years, 
particularly after the end of Cold War. The traditional approaches to national security 
emanate from the external operational environment, and therefore, the best way to 
counter the same is to increase the capabilities of a state through acquisition of arms and 
buildings of alliance was challenged. A broad consensus emerged that the narrow 
military definitions of security are inadequate to deal with the comprehensive range of 
questions that arise before nation today. What primarily threatens a state now are indeed 
a whole range of new issues that are no longer narrow state centric or a strictly sovereign 
issue for a single nation. They are quite often non-military in nature. 
Arnold Wolfers was one of the earliest among the international relations theorists 
to draw attention towards the multidimensional complexities of the concept of national 
security. He characterized it as an 'ambiguous symbol' to guide state policy.^^ Hedley 
Bull had also cautioned against too narrow view of security that was influenced by an 
excessive concern for national self-interest.'^ International conference on the 
'Relationship between Disarmament and Development', convened by United Nations 
General Assembly in New York fi-om August 24 to September 11, 1987 adopted a broad 
based definition of national security which states that: 
"Secxmty is an overriding priority for all nations. It is also fiandamental for both 
disarmament and development. Security consists of not only military, but also political, 
economic, social, humanitarian and ecological aspects. Enhanced security can; on the 
one hand, create conditions conducive to disarmament and confidence for the successfiil 
pursuit of development A process of disarmament that provides for vmdiminished 
security and progressively lower level of armaments could allow additional resources to 
be developed to addressing non-military challenges to security, and thus result in 
enhanced overall security".'^ UNDP B is credited for having captured the essentials and 
salience of the new turn-around the security discourse and emerging with a 
Comprehensive "human security" concept as against the conventional state-centric 
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military security. As the Human Development Report of 1994 states that the concept of 
security has for too long been interpreted narrowly as security of territory from external 
aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security 
from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to 
people... Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought secunty 
in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of 
disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and 
environmental hazards.'^ South Asian region is marked by wide spread never ending and 
violent conflict. The conflict in the region of non-nuclear or non-military threats to 
security. The other dynamic is that of endemic poverty. Large segments of the 
populations live at levels of poverty where the existential concern of most citizens is not 
about the next paycheck but of the next meal. The combination of poverty and insecurity 
is the cenfral challenges of South Asia. 
The refocusing of attention on the nuclear and conventional aspects of conflict in 
South Asia has deflected attention from the more insidious threats to national security in 
the region. The Pokhran and Chagai tests have also deflected attention from the non-
military threats to national security in South Asia, they are steadily becoming more 
significant over the years and quite often possess a bilateral and regional character. It is 
common groimd that national security need to dwell less on the military dimension of 
national security, but lay more emphasis on its non-military dimensions. This must 
extend to a consideration of the problems confronting the governance processes 
democratic norms, impinges directly upon internal non-military challenges to national 
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secunty. 
National Security as a concept has thus fraveled far and wide from the earlier 
notion of physical preservation of a state to a multidimensional concern involving 
military, economic, ecological, ethnic and political concepts aspects of a nation state's 
Hfe.^ « 
The reconceptualizing of security thus appear to be a double edged sword in 
addressing problems of third world. The major non-military challenges to national 
security in South Asia revolved around ethnic violence, economic insecurity drug 
trafficking, spread of small arms, interstate migration and environmental degradation. 
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1. Ethnic problem as threat to national security in South Asia: South Asian countries 
ridden with internal conflicts in the past, seem very likely to continue that conflicts 
derive from ethno-political causes. There is no dearth of cultural differences that have 
become the source of ongoing conflict, that have led to violence, and that challenge, the 
territorial integrity of South Asian Countries. In Bangladesh, the Chakma tribals reject 
Bengali culture dominance and have taken refuge in northeast bidia. Bangladeshi Hindus 
are increasingly uneasy in what they see as an Islamic Bangladeshi. Indian West 
Bangalis and Bangladesi East Bangalis see not only similarity but also cultural 
differences going beyond the fact the former are mostly Hindu and the letter mostly 
Muslim. 
The demolition of Babri Mosque in December, 1992 in Ayodhya (India) led to 
counter violence in Bangladesh and Pakistan, thus South Asian countries are interwoven 
ethnically. The Nepal government and so called Terai Indians of Nepal are in some 
tension, which has complicated relations with India. Nepal has become involved in the 
problems of Nepalese population of Bhutan. In Pakistan too, various substantial conflicts 
have consequences for the region like the Sindhi separatists movements, the disaffection 
of Muhajirs and the restiveness of Baluch. Still continuing Sinhala-Tamil fight in Sri 
Lanka over a separate Tamil Ealam that has pilled over into India^^ and continued 
differences in others. 
In India cultural quarrels are everywhere to be noticed Gorkhas in northwest 
Bengal region want greater autonomy as recognition of their cultural difference fi-om 
Bengalis. Kashmiris in India are increasingly divided culturally among Muslim and 
Hindu. Muslim Kashmiri see themselves as substantially different in cultural sense fi-om 
other Indians.'"" South Asia appears to be moving towards affinity in certain dimensions 
and continued difference in others. Politically and economically South Asians have made 
changes that indicate a certain degree of convergence. If there has been political and 
economic convergence in South Asia, culture has become more contentious area. 
Cultural differences within states have sharpened and spilled over into neighbouring 
spaces. 
The linguistic and regional challenges to national integrity are also straining 
India's national Security. The cross cutting societal divisions have of course blunted the 
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edge of these divides. Religious consciousnesses among followers of a particular religion 
reduce their regional and caste identities loyalties reduce religious and regional division 
among followers of particular caste. So communal and ethnic tensions have strained 
India's security in the most part of the land, which is a challenge before national 
security.'°' India has faced non-military threats of very serious nature to its security from 
Pakistan. They include, aiding and abetting the terrorism in India, creating hostile 
regional environment, the proxy war in Kashmir which posses major threat to India's 
case value of territorial integrity. Misperception case value of territorial integrity. 
Misperception and overstatement of threat have adversely affected the security of both 
India and Pakistan. 
The management of internal security problems have emerged as the major 
concern of South Asian countries. Such threats in the form of ethnocentric nationalism 
and religious fundamentalism. All the major states in South Asia are formed by ethnic 
turmoil and separatist movements. Even Nepal and Bhutan are not free from ethnic 
tensions, although, the problems in these countries may not have acquired the same 
dimensions as in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
Inter-State Migration: People have migrated throughout history from densely 
populated to sparsely populated areas owing to natural calamities, upheavals, economic 
compulsion and ejection by conquerer.'"^ The interstate migration in the South Asian 
region has its colonial legacy. The region was under British colonial rule and, thus, free 
movement of people was possible curing the colonial rule. The need of their regisfration 
was not emphasized because they all are regarded as British subjects, since Nepal was 
also conmiitted to act in harmony with British Colonial interest. 
With the emergence of independent states, migration has created both internal 
and interstate problems. When the Indian Tamils who have contributed a lot in the 
development of Sri Lanka since colonial period were deprived of citizenship nghts in by 
Sinhalese leaders in Sri Lanka created bitterness in India-Sri Lanka relations both during 
colonial period and after independence.'"^ 
The infiltration of people from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal to India is also 
due to the deteriorating economic conditions and acute problem of unemployment in 
their respective country.'°'' The infiltration from Pakistan and Bangladesh, initially 
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started due to economic reasons such as desire to indulge in illegal economic activities, 
including smuggling, but ultimately these economic offence turned into political offences 
which became a serious threat to Indian national security.' ^  
Insecurity has remained the main cause of migration in South Asia. The first 
large scale migration was caused by the partition of the subcontinent on religious ground 
in 1947. The second great migration often million people fi"om Bangladesh took place 
during Indo-Pak war of 1971, which led emergence of Bangladesh. Thereafter, the 
problem of migration has continued due to disturbances in South Asian countries. For 
instance, thousand of Tamil from north Sri Lanka and Chakmas from Bangladesh have 
crossed the Indian border as refugee. It has also been reported that some of them are 
guerrillas of the country which might create problems of public order and security, which 
will ultimately pose threat to Indian national security.'°^ 
There is large scale migration, both legal and illegal from various South Asian 
countries to India, which cause serious security problems because some of the migrants 
are indulging in espionage and smuggling activities on the Indian soil. The process of 
migration has also adversely affected the socio-economic stratification and political 
relations in these countries. The grievance of native citizen in the north-east took violent 
migration and their settlement in northeast began during late 70s. 
Migration due to insecurity, however, causes greater disturbance to the economy 
and society of the state where migrants settled down. Therefore, the governments of 
South Asian countries should settle the problem by sitting together. There is need to win 
the confidence and trust of the citizen by the government. Otherwise, the security of 
South Asia as a whole would be in peril. India must play a constructive role to project 
the idea of multi-state nationalism through South Asian Association of Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC). 
Economic Security: Herald Brown and Stephen Krasner included economic well being 
as a core value of national security objective to be protected and enhanced. Harold 
Brown believes that the ability of the state to "maintain its economic relations with the 
rest of the world on reasonable terms" is a vital objective of its national security.'*'^  In a 
modem Welfare state, economic well being of the people is a fundamental objective, 
because it neuti-alizes many countiy les vulnerable to external pressure and interference 
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and it also makes possible the allocation of resources to counter internal and external 
threat. Since the early 1970s national security began to be redefined in the context of the 
third world or developing countries. It was realized that the abstract concepts of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot have enduring appeal for hungry masses and 
it is poverty or lack of resources to meet the needs of the population and not the lack of 
military hardware that is responsible for insecurity across the southern half of the planet. 
Globalisation and liberalisation, which are the new mantras of the post- Cold War age, 
do possess discrete security implications, which have not yet been fully understood. 
However, the economic security dilemma has in fact been one of relative 
economic growth, as a determinant of state power. Certainly, in South Asia, the major 
dilemma currently is of coping with the impact of globalisation on one hand and of 
ensuring the economic security of the poor. Economic activity always triggers of survival 
issue in other sectors.'"* Even economic success can lead to security crisis in some parts 
of the societal sector. The security of economic resources and supply, fears of economic 
losers in the global markets, the security dimensions of drugs and weapons linkages form 
part of both economics of security and security of economics. Like Kashmir the situation 
in northeast too is alarming. The problem is further complicated by the regions poverty, 
its strategic location surrounded by Bangladesh in the West, Myaimiar in the east and 
China in the north, the cultural diversity ethnic dispute ad economic degradation 
accentuate the problems of national security. South Asia being fifth in terms of world 
population is among the poorest regions of the world. The economic disparities between 
the rich and the poor make each coimtry in the region politically vulnerable. National 
security is inextricably linked up with other things, its social, economic, political and 
ecological balance. Declining reserves of strategic resoxirces, oil and ecological balances 
now threaten the security of nations everywhere. So, national security cannot be 
maintained unless national economics are sustained. "*' 
Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf identified that the main threat to 
the security of Pakistan stems from internal sources. These were economic breakdown, 
deteriorating law and order situation in the country, ethnic conflict in Sindh and 
Sectarian violence in the Punjab."° The two most important demonsfrations reasons for 
investors in South Asia are the political turbulence of the region and its primitive 
infrastructure. What South Asia needs is an economic strategy that will insulate its 
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economic development from its policies. South Asia could in fact enhance economic 
security which is a threat to national security, through joint development of economic 
infrastructure of the region to make it a more attractive destination for foreign direct 
investment. 
Drug Trafficking: The security of South Asian states is also being threatened by drug 
trafficking. The linkage between drug frafficking and the spread of armed violence has 
become a major source of insecurity in many parts of South Asia.'" The region contains 
two of the World's three largest drug producing areas. Myanmar grows 50 percent of the 
world's illicit opium, and the total area under opium cultivation in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan stood at 36, 450 hectares at the end of 1994."^ Narcotic trade has effected not 
only the social but the political system as well in countries like Pakistan and Myanmar 
which are deeply involved in drug trafficking in Southern Asia. The hidian north east 
and northwest border is geographically closer to the two most notorious centers of 
growing narcotics. The Golden Crescent (along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border) and the 
Golden Triangle (in the Myanmar-Thailand border) and consequently, smuggling them 
through hidian, Pakistani and Nepalese territories in collusion with a section of the 
political and military bureaucratic elite has become a flourishing business, the region 
through which drug traffic flows in inevitably afflicted by endemic violence and conflict. 
China's economic opening and setting up of free frade zones on its borders has given a 
boost to drug trafficking. 
What is worse, there is a close contact between the drug-traffickers, arms 
smugglers and various insurgent groups which has created serious problems not only for 
India's security but also for the secvirity of other states in the region."^ The situation in 
and around the Golden Crescent itself is no different except that the drug trafficking has 
gone on at a much higher scale, with patronage at higher levels. Drug trafficking started 
to increase significantly after 1979, and the profits were reportedly used to fund the 
procurement and supply of weapons to the Mujahideen. Being a port city, Karanchi was 
an obvious exit point for drugs. By 1992 the drug traffickers made their access through 
Punjab rout in hidia, the army had to be deployed by the Indian governments to control 
the arm conflict which had a multifarious dimension. Hence, the close collaboration 
between drug trafficking and arms smugglers poses serious threat to national security of 
the countries of South Asia. 
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Proliferation of Small Arms: The spread of small arms and light weapons is global in 
nature as much as armed conflict has been globalised. Proliferation problems seriously 
threaten the security of countries and society in South Asia. This problem has been most 
acute in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region where it now appears to have crossed the 
saturation point. So far South Asia is concerned the proliferation of small arms may be 
said to be a foil-out of the US war against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Since 
then a large quantities of weapons sent by the USA for Afghan Mujahideen during the 
1980s, soon found their way in the arms "bazaar" in Pakistan, with the connivance of the 
security officials. Many of these weapons are quite sophisticated and lethal. Many of 
these arms reached in the hands of militants in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. The 
quantity of arms seized by the security forces in Kashmir during 1991-92 was enough to 
equip a force of twenty thousand terrorists with such weapons as Kalasnikov Assault 
Rifles, grenades, rockets and rocket launchers, ammunition and explosive.""* 
The incident of arms dropping in Purulia in December, 1995, exposed not only 
the lapses in hidia's security system but also the dangers that may be posed to the state 
by the action of international arms smugglers, in collusion with local agents. Pakistan, 
which aided and abetted the smuggling of arms by the terrorists in Punjab and Kashmir, 
is now experiencing the consequences of its own lax-gum control measures. In Dir 
district of NWP, which emerged as one of the thriving centres for export of narcotic 
products during the early 1990s, one could find the largest concentration of small arms. 
The nimiber of Kalashnikov Assault rifles in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region outside 
governmental control could be as high as three million. In Karanchi a lone there is a 
large supply of Kalashnikov rifles over which the Pakistan government has little control 
and these have been fi-eely used in the ethnic violence in Karanchi."^ In 1994, the 
Pakistani government unsuccessfoUy declared Islamabad as 'Weapon fi-ee City' in order 
to control the open flouting of the existing lax regulation. In July, 1995 the government 
reportedly issued an ordinance specifying the death sentence for illegal possession of 
automatic weapons."^ 
In Sri Lanka, the LTTE has been able to procure enough sophisticated weapons 
through illegal means to fight IPKF, despite the deployment of 50,000 troops, assisted by 
aircraft and naval ship, and continues to fight the well-armed Sri Lanka Army. 
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Domestic threats to security have emerged as the major concern of the security 
forces in South Asia during the 1990s. The Sri Lankan armed forces have been tied down 
to fighting the LTTE, a major part of India's security forces have been busy combating 
insurgency in Kashmir and northeastern states. More Hves have been lost in Pakistan in 
ethnic violence in Karanchi. In Bangladesh, armed forces have been used more often in 
quelling internal disturbances. Thus the proliferation of light weapons have posed serious 
threat to their national security. So there is need to tackle collectively the problems of 
proliferation of light weapons in South Asia. The growing internalization of security 
threats in southern Asia demands greater regional and bilateral cooperation, if cross 
border movement of arms and extremists is to be addressed, refugee flow can be 
contained and natural resources can be managed. 
Regional security demands a balance between military and non-military elements 
and between internal and regional interests of regional security need to examine ways to 
mobilise interests resources to tackle drug trafficking, illicit arms transfers, ecological 
degradation and population pressure and refugee flows. Drugs trafficking and terrorism 
are directly tied to the proliferation of small arms. Countries in the South Asia need to 
discuss joint control of the cross-border movement of arms, drug and extremists. 
Environmental Security: The relationship between national security issues and 
environmental issues may not seem readily apparent, and indeed security experts have 
often viewed national security as a concept separate fi"om other disciplines. However, in 
the new era of global security, environmental and national security issues are 
inextricably linked and environmental security is seen as an important aspect of the 
comprehensive security discourse. Scarcity interacts with such factors as the character of 
the economic system, levels of education ethnic cleavages and factors varying according 
to context determined if environmental scarcity will produce harmfiil social effects such 
as poverty and migrations, contextual factors also influence the ultimate potential for 
instability or violence in society. 
Some describe this as ultimate seciirity. Certainly for a state like the Maldives in 
South Asian region, change in environment rises in global temperature would mean the 
extinction of the state itself Global warming has had the effect of rising sea levels, 
which in turn directly impacts upon the existence of islands. Such an impact hinders the 
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livelihoods of people residing in these areas, often resulting in a group of people known 
as environmental refuges. Environmental degradation in the mangroves of the Sunderban 
Delta has been accentuated over time, forcing states and the international community to 
take cognizance of the plight of the reftigee. Environmental security, which is largely a 
national problem, but can have regional and global overtones, for instance, deforestation 
in the Himalayas causing siltation and flooding in the rivers flowing into India from 
Nepal and Bhutan."^ Moreover, in the age of science and technology the concept of 
security has been expanded to include enviroimiental crisis, that has become a major 
threat to the survival of human beings. The environmental nightmares such as 
deforestation, soil erosion, acidification, global wanning induced by green house effect 
and depletion of Ozone layer, have made people scary about their future on the earth. On 
the other hand, soil erosion, forest cover depletion and loss of agricultural land has led to 
migration of populations across borders in South Asia. This has heightened security risks 
and brought about responses from state players on the military diamensions. Recently 
the Rio De Janerio sunmiit on envirormient protection encapsulated the great concern of 
humanity towards this threat. Now it seems that threat to security of a nation may arise 
less from the relationship among nations and more from the relationship between human 
being and nature."^ 
Unless South Asian Countries recognize the problems in dealing with indirect 
threats like envirormiental degradation, interstate migration, economic and political 
problems, they cannot develop a common or individual strategy to deal with them. As 
regarding terrorism and insurgency South Asian Countries recognized these threats but 
have not been able evolve a consensus to deal with them. Hence, to deal with the non-
nuclear (non-military) challenges to national security, they should evolve some 
institutional mechanism. 
It is beyond doubt that non-nuclear threats present baffling challenges for 
national security in South Asia. The complexities in the source of these threats and their 
impact on nations make them difficult to identify. A region like South Asia and a country 
like India are exposed to several such threats because of its geographical, socio-political 
and economic vulnerability. The region's political and cultural dynamics and mcomplete 
nation building process are rooted in its colonial traditions which place a premium on 
taking non-military threats seriously. 
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Chapter V 
Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrence 
Chapter-V 
Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrence 
The biggest changes in the post-world war II were the shift from multipolarity 
to bipolarity and the introduction of nuclear weapons. States co-exists in a condition 
of anarchy. Self help is the principle of action in a anarchic order, and the most 
important way in which states must help themselves is by providing for their own 
security. To build defences so potently strong that no one will try to destroy or 
overcome them, would make international life perfectly tranquil.' The other way to 
counter the intended attack is to build retaliatory forces able to threaten unacceptable 
punishment upon a would be aggressor. 
To 'deter' literally means to stop people from doing something by frightening 
them.^  In contrast to dissuasion by defence, dissuasion by deterrence operates by 
fHghtening a state out of attacking not because of difficulty of launching an attack 
and carrying it home, but because of the expected reaction of the opponent may result 
in one's own severe punishment. Political leader began to debate the issue of nuclear 
proliferation literally before the dust cast up from the explosion at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki had settled to earth. First they debated on power politics; the question was 
that what would happen ones the Soviet Union built its own nuclear weapons. 
Secondly the nuclear weapon will proliferate among the small powers. Political 
thinkers discussed whether proliferation is good or bad, have tended to split into two 
camps. The actual relationship between proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
likelihood of nuclear war depends on the durability of the deterrence.^ Defence and 
deterrence is often confused. Deterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend 
but through the ability to punish. The scholars opposed to the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons argued that the increase in the number of nuclear powers in the world would 
increase the likelihood of the nuclear war. Proliferation would put nuclear weapons 
into the hands of the less developed which usually have primitive economy and less 
responsible rulers. So there is chance, that if by miscalculation, on break down of 
communication between the countries may instigate the war situation, the new 
nuclear nations will face even greater challenges in building safe, survivable and 
credible nuclear arsenals. Proliferation pessimists see several reasons for concern 
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about the command and control of new nuclear forces. Sagan (1994) argues, exhibit 
tendencies such as inflexible routines, parochial interests and organisational biases 
that can lead to deterrence failure.'* The scholars who supported proliferation have 
argued that, though, proliferation may increase the probability of nuclear war in the 
short run, but in long run it will decrease and eventually eliminate the probability of 
nuclear war. 
Pierra Gallois, Brito, Kneth Waltz and Bueno de Mesquita supported the 
proliferation view.^ They argued that many nuclear power can launch a nuclear attack 
against any non-nuclear power, because there is no threat of retaliation. However, 
nuclear powers cannot attack other nuclear powers, because any such attack will be 
returned in kind. Proliferation in its early stages may raise the probability of nuclear 
war, because an increasing of nuclear powers would be poised to attack, a fairly large 
number of nuclear powers. But in its later stage proliferation will lower the 
probability of nuclear war because most states then would have the ability to retaliate 
and would thus be immune from nuclear weapons. In essence, waltz argues that logic 
that kept the world safe during the war nuclear confrontation is also applicable to 
new nuclear states. Waltz also suggests that new nuclear nations would be able to 
fashion credible nuclear forces and achieve deterrence not only vis-a-vis their 
possible regional nuclear adversary but even regarding the more established nuclear 
powers that have much larger nuclear arsenals. 
Both the arguments of optimists and pessimists make different assumptions 
about the ability of a nuclear power to deter a nuclear attack by another nuclear 
power. The pessimists argument assumes that deterrence is very fragile no state, even 
one possessing its own nuclear force can be assured of deterring another state from 
striking it with nuclear weapons. While the proliferation argument assumes that each 
step in the proliferation adds to the total number of relationships between pairs of 
states in which mutual deterrence precludes nuclear war. Thus the validity of both 
arguments hinges on the question of deterrence, because many theorists have 
understood that deterrence is not an all or nothing relationship. Rather, the stability of 
deterrence between two nuclear powers depends on many individual factors. 
Albert Wohlstetter (1959) described six specific conditions that a nuclear state 
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must meet in order to be assured of being able to retaliate against a nuclear attack. To 
the extent that successful deterrence depends on the ability of a country to retaliate. 
He talks about the following six conditions on which deterrence depends:-
(a) The maintenance of standing, reliable deterrence force in peacetime, (b) 
The ability of this force to survive a pre- emptive first strike, (c) The ability of 
national leaders to make the decision to retaliate and then transit this command to the 
military force, (d) The ability of retaliatory force to reach distant enemy territory, (e) 
The ability to penetrate enemy active defence and (f) the ability to over come enemy 
passive defenses. 
Thus, a state will be able to retaliate against its opponents only of it is able to 
meet all six conditions. Later on Daniel EUsberg formulized the wohlstetter argument 
by expressing the deterrence conditions in terms of an expected utility calculus.^ He 
showed how there could an interactive effect between the state that deters and the 
state that is supposed to be deterred. According to Ellsberg, a state could undermine 
deterrence by deploying forces that were especially well suited to striking first, but ill 
suited to striking second. Such forces might encourage an opponent to calenlate that 
its best option was to strike first in a crisis, in which case the state would be said to 
have undermined deterrence by 'provoking' its opponent into striking. But 
wohlstetter and Ellsberg theory is based on 'auxiliary assumption' it connects both 
anti-proliferation and pro-proliferation theories. It is the ideological attempt in 
western countries to rationalise and justify the induction, stockpiling and deployment 
of nuclear weapons that has given the doctrine of deterrence the elevated status it has 
had during the cold war period. 
In the early 1960s one line of argument suggested that nuclear weapons had 
made alliances obsolete. Facing the risk of complete destruction, no nation would risk 
to jeopardise its own survival for others, therefore all the countries must have there 
own nuclear arsenals to defend themselves from direct attack This was criticised by 
Henry Kissinger that it marked the end of collective security system and could lead to 
international chaos.* However, over-realism on the deterrence power of nuclear 
weapon can produce a psychological barrier in planning for other forms of power. 
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Nuclear Deterrence Theory: 
Deterrence evolved as the central organizing principles of relations between 
the super powers in 1960s. Nuclear deterrence retained its preeminence through the 
1970s, and 1980s. During the long reign of the deterrence concept as a central 
theoretical concept to frame the completion between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the strategic nuclear balance between the superpower's became melded with 
regional balance of power considerations, especially between the Northeast Asia and 
Europe where the United States of America extended its strategic umbrella over its 
allies threatened by Moscow's nuclear and conventional military superioty^ 
The advent of the nuclear age however, elevated the idea of 'deterrence' to 
prominence in strategies. In its most basic sense, the concept of deterrence implies 
deterring another state from doing something one does not wish them to do. Richar 
Med Lebow and Janice Stein offer a generally useful explanation of deterrence. 
"Deterrence seeks to prevent undesired behavior by convincing those who might 
contemplate such action that its costs would exceed its gains".'" whereas, John 
Mearsheimer suggests, in the broadest sense, deterrence means persuading an 
opponent not to invite specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the 
estimated costs and risks.'^ In the area of Security, deterrence usually attempts to 
prevent challenge; but it also can and has been used to try to prevent unaccepted 
deployments or non military action that defenders perceives as threatening to their 
national security. Deterrence requires the defender to define the behaviour that is 
unacceptable, publicise the commitment to punish or restrain transgressors, 
demonstrate the resolve to do so, and posses the capabilities to implement the threat. 
Despite the fact there is no defence against nuclear weapons, it has a major 
impact on deterrence in the nuclear realm. What distinguishes nuclear deterrence is 
the potential for mutual suicide or kill. If one were able to defend one self, one would 
have implied that one is relatively safe regardless of what the adversary does with 
military forces. Deterrence through punishment is about trying to influence the 
enemy's choices, one is secure not despite military attacks, but only if the enemy is 
dissuaded from attacking in the first place. Deterrence is therefore a psychological 
strategy as well as a purely military one. It is effort to use fear to ensure peace, the 
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enemy's fear of our relation is meant to keep him from starting the war. Because, 
given the enormous destructiveness on nuclear weapons, retaliation would impose 
cost far more than any conceivable potential gain he could hope to achieve. 
Therefore, deterrence, is like beauty lies in the eyes of beholder. Because, as long as 
perfect deterrence is not possible, each sides security rests, in part on the visions and 
discussion of the other. 
Deterrence may be taken to mean two sorts of things, one as a policy and 
second as a situation. A policy of deterrence is a calculated attempt to mduce an 
adversary to do something, or refrain from doing something, by threatening a penalty 
for non compliance. A deterrence situation is one where conflict is contained within 
the boundary of threats. These threats are neither executed nor tested, if it is tested 
and not executed is no longer a deterrence. So in deterrence situation, each party 
sees the other as having potential for harm. Deterrence comes into being because a 
clash of interests between and intentions seems to have occurred. 
The concept of deterrence implies that beyond a certain level of expected 
damage, States would prefer peace. This notion of deterrence level of distribution is 
entirely relative. It takes into account the geographical differences and demographic 
considerations. It is very difficult to define 'minimum deterrence' because no one can 
define with certainty what constitutes unacceptable damage. Moreover, it is possible 
that state make different assessments of the relationship between states and risk, 
while the risk depends on the cost of attack, on the one hand, and reprisals which it 
will invite on the other. In a conflict situation the risks are so high, it is difficult to 
see what gains could probably make up for the level of destruction by the reprisal. 
Thus, deterrence is believed to harbour the potential for the achievement of 
Sun Tzu's famous dictum, "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is 
not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is acme of skill".'^ So 
the deterrence is the way through which a state can protect its interests while 
avoiding the possibly of severe risks and costs of war. 
In 1946, a collection of Essays written by Fredrick Dunn, Bernard Brrodie, 
Arnold Wolfers, Percy Corbett and William fox presented a set of first principles for 
understanding the nuclear age entitled 'The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and 
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World Order' which dealt with the impact of nuclear weapons on international 
politics and its effect on the establishment of new post-war international order. 
Brodie viewed nuclear weapons as revolutionary devices, judged relation in kind to 
be the guiding strategic principles of the nuclear age, and international control of 
nuclear weapons would be very difficult to achieve.''* He considered nuclear weapons 
revolutionary as they alter the very nature of warfare by reducing the efficacy of 
defences and the benefit provided by quantitative and qualitative superiority on the 
battle field. It also highlighted an inescapably high degree of societal vulnerability to 
attack. This policy came to be labeled as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and 
relied on punishment for deterrence. 
The fiindamental logic of MAD was derived fi:om the belief that the fear of 
nuclear retaliation and the uncertainty that accompanied it provides the essential 
motivation that precluded the use of nuclear weapons. Hence, a sufficient condition 
for nuclear deterrence. It is the possibility of fighting the war rather than losing it that 
induces restraint. Policies of deterrence like Minimum Deterrence, Existential 
Deterrence and Finite Deterrence drew their logical sustenance fi"om this point of 
view.'^ The Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine with its emphasis on 'Minimum 
Deterrence' secured second strike capability essentially to draw its logical sustenance 
from the Borden view. Brodie argued that because the actual use of nuclear weapons 
could not be harnessed to any meaningfijl military objectives, the relation between 
weapons and war had been fundamentally altered'^. In case of nuclear war all major 
urban and industrial centres could be destroyed in a matter of hours as both 
adversaries have the capability to conduct such campaigns, the fear of retaliation 
would ensure deterrence against aggression.'' The other base of thinking about 
nuclear deterrence is motivated by a concern that deterrence might fail. W.L. Borden 
in his book entitled "There will Be No Time: the Revolution in strategy" maintained 
the awesome destructive aspect of nuclear weapons. He insists on thinking on 
through the possible use of nuclear weapons in ways familiar to traditional military 
strategy. This included contemplating their use in response to conventional 
aggression and maintaining the capacity for a wide range of option should be 
deterrence fail. He viewed regarding the failure of deterrence that 'a fiill scale nuclear 
war will not be won by destroying the enemy's military power of relation'. The war 
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fighting strategy is punitive in nature. The fact is that with the growth of nuclear 
weapons, war fighting looked impractical. Nuclear strategy increasingly came to be 
seen as a method to prevent nuclear war. Deterrence was supposed to achieve its aim 
by either denial or punishment. It could be symmetrical between super power and 
some small country. On the other hand, Borden in his "There will Be No War Time", 
argued that while these weapons were revolutionary in their destructive potential and 
would change the way wars are fought, they were, nevertheless, ultimate weapons of 
war, and if they differed from other weapons, this was a difference of degrees rather 
than of kind. Much later, the distinction between the actual use and deterrent force of 
nuclear weapons began to be discussed as deterrence by punishment and deterrence 
of denial.'^ 
No radically different conception of nuclear deterrence has emerged since 
Brodie and Borden have produced their seminal works. These two approaches have 
remained the most closely matched policy practices of nuclear deterrence. ^ Like all 
other theories, deterrence theory also had its fair share of ardent proponents and 
equally passionate opponents. Many Western deterrence optimists argued that 
weaponisation of hitherto unexercised nuclear capability in South Asia would be a 
welcomed development, as it will lead to peace and strategic stability^''. Devin T. 
Hegarty also argued that the past practices in South Asia shows that in the area of 
crisis stability, the logic of deterrence is more robust than the logic of 
nonproliferation Optimists argued that the nuclear weapon capability had not created 
strategic stability but has put South Asia on 'a short fuse' Thus, we can say that 
nuclear deterrence theory alone can't completely explain the behaviour of all nuclear 
states, particularly in the context of South Asia. 
Deterrence by Punishment: It seeks to prevent aggression by threatening 
unacceptable damage in relation, by the threat of punishment. Deterrence prior to the 
arrival of air power and long term bomber was almost synonymous with denial. The 
advent of strategic bomber and use of chemical biological weapons (CBW) and the 
large scale destruction produced by them away from battle area highlighted foe the 
first time the possibility of deterrence through the threat of punishment.^' The 1950s 
American strategies of massive retaliation and assured destruction are good example 
of deterrence by punishment. The central objective of assured destruction was 'to 
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deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States.... Massive retaliation was no 
different from this and was more explicit in its threat of punishment as the means to 
deter the Soviet Union. The credibility of American massive retaliation started 
getting questioned once Soviet forces began growing. The fundamental concern of 
the American forces then was the US ability to retaliate after surviving a Soviet 'first 
strike'. This added the term 'second strike' in nuclear literature. Credibility of the 
threat of a punishing retaliation therefore, became a focal point. There was a big 
information gap and American estimates of Soviet capability were off the mark. This 
lack of information only added to the threat perception. Even at the beginning of this 
century, US policy was based on using nuclear weapons once deterrence has failed. 
The question before the Mc Namara's strategy of 'Assured Destruction' was the 
extent of damage that constituted punishment. There is no definite answer of this 
question because, accepting that no a prior judgment can be made about the capacity 
of any society to tolerate punishment. The strategy of the massive retaliation was 
severely criticized but the criticism was about the capacity of the nuclear deterrent 
itself The primary objective of assured destruction "to deter deliberate nuclear attack 
upon the United States or its allies" '^* was no different than the objective of the 
doctrine of massive retaliation. 
Deterrence by Denial: As the term itself implies, deterrence by denial is a fiinction 
of defence. There is true distinction between the deterrence by punishment and 
denial. Though Glenn Synder suggested that difference between 'deterrence and 
defence'.^^ So the assumption that defence rather than deterrence is the true objective 
of the denial is premised on the failure of deterrence. The 'victory theorists' of 
American nuclear debate in 1970s provide the best example of deterrence by denial. 
They assumed that deterrence can fail and insisted on the need to plan for that 
eventually. They tried to prevent aggression of adversary by convincing the aggressor 
through defence preparation that its aggression would face certain failure. Colin Gray 
sate that "No one can guarantee that deterrence will always work".^ ^ 
Strategically, preparation for deterrence by denial is a complex task. There 
have to be strategic offensive forces, a command and control system that can survive 
nuclear exchange, strategic defensive forces, a society that is prepared for nuclear 
war. Theoretically, surviving after first strike and the capability of the force to go for 
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retaliation is a very difficult question. Ever since the advent of nuclear weapons, the 
concept of nuclear deterrence has become central to military strategy. However, the 
concept of deterrence appears simple but it has proved extremely complicated to 
implement in practice. The challenge of maintaining stable deterrence is revealed as 
the challenge of strategy. With the change of world political scenario new alliances 
are being formed to counter unforeseen enemies. Weapons of Mass Destruction have 
become linked to irrational non-state actors which make all theories of rational 
deterrence redundant. 
The central premise of deterrence is based on three assumptions that is 
adequate capability, a clearly communicated threat and a credible willingness to carry 
out the threat^^. Many theorist gave emphasis on material cost-benefit logic to 
deterrence and a strong rationalism, for instance, if one assumes that decision makers 
in states employing nuclear weapons are rational, than self-interest naturally deters 
the state, as retaliation would cause overwhelming devastation to the state and 
society. Even the pressure of over whelming nuclear weapons in a state and the 
prospect of completely annihilating the adversary do not provide deterrence, it is 
rationality that stops a state fi-om deploying its nuclear weapons. The US was perhaps 
facing such a dilemma during the Vietnam War, and yet it could not gamer itself to 
use nuclear weapons on Vietnam even though it was fighting a losing battle. So the 
theory of nuclear deterrence assumes that before initiating armed conflict, decision 
makers are going to perform a cost benefit analysis. It has often been pointed out that 
, the US did contemplate using nuclear weapons on many occasions, but it never used 
them after the Second World War. 
Existential Deterrence: It is based on the personal experience of Mc George Bundy, 
a member of Kennedy administration during Cuban Missile Crisis, he argues that 
nuclear deterrence is the primary function of the survivable thermo nuclear arsenals 
of both superpowers. Though he did not call it 'existential deterrence', Bundy has 
defined the concept, "As long as each side has thermonuclear weapons that could be 
used against the opponent, even after the strongest possible preemptive attack, 
existential deterrence is strong and it rests on uncertainty about what could happen.'^ * 
According to Bundy, existential deterrence was strong in every major crisis between 
the super power since 'massive retaliation' became possible for both of them in the 
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1950s. As every one closely involved recalls, such deterrence was particularly 
powerful during the Cuban missile crisis.^^ Bundy argues that "there has been 
literally no chance at all that any sane political authority .... Would consciously 
choose to start a nuclear war".^° Can existential deterrence work only in the presence 
of arsenals that U.S. and Soviet Union developed. Because there is confusion in his 
thinking about the kind of nuclear forces that are required for achieved existential 
deterrence. Later on he suggested that the balance of nuclear force is irrelevant for 
the working of nuclear deterrence which mean that the deterrent effect of smaller 
nuclear forces are similar to the super power arsenals of cold war period. He suggests 
that the destruction of just one city would be considered catastrophic, there would be 
little difference between having htmdred warheads and ten thousands of forces, there 
could be no complete guarantee that the larger forces would not be able to retaliate 
with at least a few nuclear warheads. 
During Cuban missile crisis, when despite a 17-to-l advantage in strategic 
nuclear warheads the United States gained no measurable advantage in dealing with 
Khrushchev. President Kennedy's Secretary of Defence, Robert Mc Namara, 
conctirred with this assessment. He said that during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) 
Washington was deterred from "even considering a nuclear attack by the knowledge 
that, although such a strike would destroy the Soviet Union, tens of their weapons 
would survive to be lunched against the United States. Then it would kill millions of 
Americans. No responsible political leader would expose his nation to such a 
catastrophe.^' 
Under condition of opacity, the role of existential deterrence is even more 
pronounced. Since each side in an opaque nuclear arms competition has only limited 
information about the other side's nuclear forces, any deterrence is not derived from 
nuclear capabilities and strategic doctrines but on the shared realisation that each side 
is nuclear capable, and thus that any outbreak of conflict might lead to nuclear war. 
Of course, there is a stark difference between the huge US-Soviet thermonuclear 
standoff and the comparatively tiny atomic bomb balance between India and 
Pakistan. 
Jasjit Singh has coined the term 'recessed deterrence'^^ a concept that 
178 
basically prohibits the mating of weapons with delivery systems. What is required to 
put in place are the plans, procedure and organization that are ideal for effective 
nuclear operation in any eventuality. George Perkovich calls it 'non weaponised 
deterrence'.^^ 
In its simplest and earliest form, nuclear deterrence predicts that the presence 
of nuclear weapons, particularly in a dyadic relationship will, guarantee the absence 
of nuclear war. The faith is based on the notion that use of nuclear weapons by one 
side will guarantee a nuclear retaliation by the other side and, therefore, there would 
be no incentive for either side to initiate a nuclear war except to commit suicide, 
which is irrational. The ultimate use of these weapons was governed by two doctrines 
that are denial and punishment. Deterrence by denial requires convincing the 
opponent that they will not attain goals in the battlefield while deterrence by 
punishment involves threatening to destroy large portions of an opponent's civilian 
population and industry. 
Regional Nuclear Deterrence: The main terms of non-interference policy is the 
belief that new nuclear states will be prone to preemptive nuclear escalation which 
Thomas C. Schelling called the condition of 'reciprocal fear of surprise attack'.^^ The 
low survivability of emerging prolifei-ant's second strike forces, and their 
unsophisticated command, control, communication and intelligence (C^I) capability 
could breed miscalculation of adversary actions or intentions that will lead to 
unnecessary hasty decision making. To reduce the vulnerability of their weapons, non 
nuclear states might adopt launch-on-waming producers, which in turn could promote 
their trigger reaction to perceived threats. 
Regarding regional nuclear deterrence Brad Roberts says "there are many 
reasons to think that the emergence of stable deterrence in the East-West context that 
had to do with unique cultural and geographical circumstances not found in the 
Middle East, South Asia and East Asia ... the political, technical and situational 
factors in the region differ sharply from the cold war nuclear framework"^^. Bruce G. 
Blair argues that "the super powers were themselves more vulnerable to crisis 
instability than is commonly believed and that aspiring proliferant's lesser 
technological capabilities make them even more subject to preemptive war 
179 
pressure".^^ He maintains that because the leader of US and Soviet Union knew that 
their C I^ system were vulnerable to disruption by even a few incoming war heads, 
Washington and Moscow delegated alert and launch authority to lower level in the 
chain of command and shortened response time of perceived attacks. Sophisticated 
early warning network created an extremely time sensitive interaction between the 
two C I^ system, which guaranteed intense escalation pressure^^. The emerging 
nuclear powers will face the same dilemma. The logic of nuclear deterrence 
downplays the likelihood of preemptive war between non-nuclear states. For Kenneth 
N. Waltz, preemption is viable "only if the would be attacker knows that the intended 
victim's warheads are in number, knows their exact number and locations, and knows 
that they will not be moved or fixed' before they are struck. To know all of these 
things, and to know that you know them for sure, is exceedingly difficult."^^ He 
further explained that nuclear weapons are easy to hide and move, creating 
uncertainty for the attacker and it does not require advanced technology John J. 
Waltman pointed out that the preemption is not viable for some region where short 
distances ...combine with economic and industrial constraints to suggest that local 
powers will never be able to achieve level of survivability in comparison to one 
another like the superpowers in cold war period. He further adds, however, "that high 
population densities in small areas"^  also characterize these region's; failure to 
eliminate every single deliverable weapons. It would risk catastrophe, and short 
distance means that no great sophistication in means of delivery is required for a 
successful counter value response. Although survivability in any regional nuclear 
balance will be lower than that between the superpowers, it will hardly be negligible. 
Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: 
Indo-Pakistan Posture: Until 1974 Deterrence in South Asia was purely of 
conventional nature. Although Pakistan's membership of CENTO, China's nuclear 
and missile development and India's Territory of Peace and Friendship with the 
Soviet Union did, in theory introduce the nuclear dimension to the region, it was not 
considered to be particularly significant for deterrence purposes. Though scared by 
the overwhelming military defeat by India in the 1971 war, the Pakistani government 
made a decision in January 1972 to pursue nuclear weapons to secure absolute 
protection and the nuclear means to deter India from ever again using its 
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conventional military edge against Pakistan in the manner it had done during 1971 
war. After 1971 war, there was a series of crises between India and Pakistan but all 
these crises stopped short of fiill scale war whereas these crises played out against the 
emerging nuclear scenario in South Asia. Since 1974, when India conducted its first 
nuclear test, Pakistan embarked on its nuclear weapons programme and China refined 
its nuclear capability. 
In 1983-84 there were persistent reports that India would attack Pakistan's 
nuclear weapons production facilities and Pakistan threatened to retaliate with similar 
attack on Indian facilities. During 1987 crises India conducted 'operation Brass-
tacks' its biggest military exercise ever, close to the border^'. Pakistan fearing that 
the exercise might be converted into an attack, launched its own defensive disposition 
'operation sledgehammer'"'*° The Indians then responded with a mobilization to 
counter Pakistan's deployment by operation Trident. Although the crisis was 
resolved, Pakistan indicated that it had acquired nuclear weapons capability. The 
1990 Indian Pakistan crisis started after Pakistan's biggest military exercise, Zar-b-i-
Momin, in the 1989. In the wake of this exercise there was a sudden spurt in the 
insurgency movement in Kashmir, India blamed Pakistan for operating camps and 
threatened to carryout 'hot pursuit' across the border into Pakistan to strike the 
military training camps. Pakistan had conveyed a massage in clear terms that it had 
the capability to inflict unimaginable damage on India if India took any action that 
threatened Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan's former Army 
Chief Mirza Aslam Beg openly stated that 'both the nuclear option and missiles act as 
a deterrent and these in turn contribute to the total fighting ability of the Army, which 
act as deterrent to the enemy. Despite nuclear capability, both countries were deterred 
fi:om war in 1990 by each side's knowledge that the other was nuclear weapon 
capable and that any military hostilities could escalate to the nuclear level. So in 
1990 crisis America's intervention may have been helpfiil, but it was 'logic of 
deterrence', even though 'opaque' that prevailed over them and it has continued in 
the years since.'*^ Seymour Hersh assert that a nuclear war did, in fact nearly break 
out in May 1990, and was averted only through America's intervention. Many 
scholars are still grappling with issues related to the 1990 crisis. Most of the 
strategists and scholars opine that the crisis can be best explained as the logic of 
nuclear deterrence under condition of opaque proliferation."*^ 
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By all accounts, nuclear deterrence is believed to exist between India and 
Pakistan which was not clear due to lack of actual declaration of nuclear status, 
acknowledgement of production or deployments of nuclear warheads by either 
country. The essence of this deterrence is ambiguity as articulated by President Zia-
ul-Haque, "with respect to their (India's) Nuclear capabilities, if they create 
ambiguity, that ambiguity is the essence of deterrence .. .the region had achieved a 
stable nuclear deterrent, relationship based on ambiguity as to whether India or 
Pakistan had nuclear weapons, and if they did, how many they possessed.'*'* Ashok 
Kapoor also expressed the same views that "India and Pakistan have long been 
playing a game of deliberate nuclear ambiguity, developing their nuclear options but 
refrain from actually acquiring a nuclear weapon since the option alone meets their 
diplomatic and military objectives"^^. Asheley J. Tellis observes that "India and 
Pakistan can both defend their territorial integrity adequately with the forces they 
currently have in place, but would be hard pressed to dramatically change the 
territorial status quo through a quick conventional or even nuclear attack. Former 
Secretary of India, Muchkund Dubey, argued that nuclear deterrence worked between 
India and Pakistan for a long period. He believed in non-weaponised deterrence. 
Jasjit Singh used the term 'recessed deterrence' instead of non-weaponised 
deterrence, which meant that a state had to have a nuclear technological base and that 
it was more than adequate to achieve weaponisation on short notice.'*^ 
The strategy of deterrence in the India Pakistan case has been based on 
uncertainty. Since the adversaries did not know exactly how long it could take for 
their revival to assemble a weapons, neither state could strike first with any certainty 
that prompt retaliation would not be the consequence. In 1997 K. Subramanyam 
stated that "we may be able to have the weapons on short notice May be a couple 
of days to couple of months...Pakistan also do not know how long it will take for 
India to make the bomb.... As tension grows, as India facts it may be used, it may 
even become two hours for it to be ready. The sheer uncertainty is keeping the two 
countries away from wars.... I think mutual deterrence is working between India and 
Pakistan".'*^ 
The deterrence situation prevailing between India and Pakistan before overt 
nuclearisation cannot be appropriately characterized through any of the known 
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models which were used to define the deterrence relationship between the 
superpowers during the cold war years. However, the term 'Non-Weaponised 
Deterrence' coined by George Perkovich very aptly described the relations between 
the two South Asian adversaries."*^ As Liven argued, Pakistan nuclear arsenals are the 
key deterrent of Pakistan against India. It plays the same role as did Western nuclear 
forces during cold war, it deters a potential adversary with a heavy superiority in 
conventional forces.^ 
The nuclear deterrent capability of the two sides was 'opaque' only to the 
extent of being willfully blind. In the aftermath of the nuclear tests of May, 1998 
each side has stated in justification of its actions, that the tests of the other only 
confirmed what it knew all along.^' The Kargil crisis of May-July 1999 provides a 
very good case for studying the various facets of theories of deterrence in South Asia. 
This was the first major crisis after both India and Pakistan tested several nuclear 
devices and declared themselves to be nuclear weapon states in May 1998.Unlike the 
past, in this crisis, both sides were well aware of the presence of the nuclear weapons 
in each other's arsenals. Both the countries moved their missiles in launching 
position.^^ 
Despite the fact that Kargil did not involve deployed nuclear weapons, it was 
centre of the threat of use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear dimension of the Kargil 
conflict became apparent when Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad gave 
an statement that 'Pakistan will not hesitate to use any weapons in its arsenal if 
Indian forces were found to be operating on Pakistan's sides of border.'^ The 
Pakistani action of crossing the LoC in the kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir 
signaled a major breakout and challenged the relative stability that had been 
established under the non-weaponised deterrence relationship between the two 
antagonists since the early 1980s. Kargil was different because it was the longest and 
perhaps bloodiest, military confi-ontation between the two countries, which did not 
end with bilateral negotiation. To a large extent, this crisis was resolved at the behest 
of a third party intervention. However, India showed utmost restraint and the 
escalation spiral was contained. Pakistani analysts see the role of external actor as 
central to India-Pakistan deterrence, while third party intervention is not taken into 
account in any of the theories of deterrence. This is in sharp contrast to the pre May 
183 
1998 period when the use of the term 'deterrence' was taboo. As K.C. Pant says India 
does not subscribe to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. However, India just cannot 
afford to overlook the fact that three major nuclear powers operate in its 
neighborhood. If we are to influence three major powers, then it becomes inescapably 
necessary for us to reckon with their nuclear deterrence belief concepts.^ ^ 
On December 15, 1998 A.V.Bajpayee spelt out in the Indian Parliament that 
the principal element of India's minimum deterrence are no-first-use, no use against 
non-nuclear power, and commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is clear 
that nuclear deterrence can range from acquisition to mere declaratory posture with 
covert demonstration of capabilities...a form of existential deterrence to deterrence 
based on a near total certainty and elaborate nuclear arsenal based on the triadic 
nature of deterrent, air, mobile land-based and sea assets with command and control 
system, leaving no doubt about the certainty of retaliatory strike.^ * 
This does not necessarily mean that Indians and Pakistani were unfamiliar 
with nuclear deterrence theory and the discourse surrounding it but simply that they 
chose not to articulate it. Why did India and Pakistan come to embrace nuclear 
deterrence theory and bring the dominant western discourse and all its encompassing 
thesis in the post May 1998 period? The best suited explanations of this question are, 
firstly an acknowledgement and articulation of nuclear deterrence theory implies an 
acceptance of the presence and possession of nuclear weapons. Before May 1998, 
India challenged the possession of nuclear weapons in the hand of nuclear weapon 
state and also denied their own possession. Besides, using nuclear weapons without 
actually having nuclear weapons would have been meaningless. Secondly, both India 
and Pakistan sought to justify and legitimize their entry into nuclear club using the 
nuclear deterrence. Finally, having conducted nuclear tests without much thought 
about the eventual deployment of new weapons in their existing arsenals in the 
strategists and officials of the two countries turned to the convenient, if somewhat 
inadequate, nuclear deterrence theory to plan for their use as primarily political 
tools." 
The India-Pakistan crisis of 2002 began with the terrorist attack on the Indian 
Parliament which was severely aggravated by Kaluchauk massacre. India mobalised 
184 
its conventional strike forces and argued for a 'limited war'. India's Prime Minister 
A. B. Vajpayee issued what can only be described as a nuclear threat. He declared 
that no weapon would be spared in self-defence whatever weapon was available, it 
would be used, no matter how it wounded the enemy'.'^ Within a week of this 
statement, India also test fired the 700 Km range Agni-1 on 25 January 2002. 
Subsequently Pakistan's president Pervez Musharaf also issued a nuclear threat in 
April 2002 and test fired three surface to surface ballistic missile system of the Hatf 
series. Both sides were also reported to have put their nuclear weapons on high alert. 
The nuclear brinkmanship was fiirther compounded by both sides closing down their 
official channels of communication and not allowing any back enhancement 
communication. Again in this crisis a high level shuttle diplomacy on the part of 
America ensured that deterrence worked, but only temporarily. Both India and 
Pakistan are still trying to grapple with making deterrence based on overt capabilities 
work and are learning through trial and error method. 
In the wake of the Kargil conflict Pakistan had a tacit first use doctrine and 
elaborated its nuclear command and control structure. India which has a declared no-
first-use doctrine and is working towards a second strike capability, articulated a 
draft nuclear doctrine.^' 
India has fi-equently declared its concept of a 'limited war' it is not clear 
whether it has even acknowledged the Pakistani message that even a conventional 
'limited war', could lead to nuclear response by Islamabad.^" As both countries are 
still in the process of formulating their concept of nuclear deterrence, the messages 
are at best not delivered or at worst are often contradictory. For instance, Pakistan's 
envoy to the United Nations stated that Pakistan could resort to the use of nuclear 
weapons even in conventional conflict which resented Pakistan President Pervez 
Musharaf and he dismissed the threat of nuclear war on 1, June 2002 crisis.^' Similar 
contradictions are evident on the Indian side. Indian President A.P.J. Abul Kalam 
declared that 'nuclear deterrence on both sides helped (them) not to engage in a big 
war and to avoid a nuclear exchange'. This statement contradicted the former Army 
Chief General Ved P. Malik's statement that 'if Pakistan persists with its proxy war 
or transborder terrorism policy, Indo-Pak war, cannot be ruled out.^ ^ 
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Bharat Kamard an Indian strategist explains three reasons which prevent 
South Asian crisis not escalating into nuclear exchange. First, the strong and intimate 
linkage between the two countries owing to ties of kinship, shared religion and 
culture, and the growing political consciousness and clout of the Indian Muslim 
Community. These factors politically prevent the Indian government from 
prosecuting a war of annihilation against Pakistan. 
Second, the resulting Indian system of restraint represented by passive-
defensive and reactive policy and acceptance of essential conventional military parity 
with Pakistan makes war non-feasible. 
Finally, the manifestation of nuclear disparity and an exchange ratio is highly 
unfavorable to Pakistan in case of nuclear war. This not only undermine the 
credibility of Pakistan's nuclear threats but mock deterrence theory models and 
concept from the cold war. 
The government on India and Pakistan are agreed that the possibility of 
nuclear hostilities between the two countries is remote, and they denounce the myth 
of South Asia as nuclear flashpoint.^^ The mere possession of the nuclear bomb does 
not constitute minimum deterrence, and the minimum deterrence should essentially 
be used to negotiate a better strategic balance. A strategic balance is required for 
South Asia region. Thus, one can conceive of deterrence moving towards peace in 
three overlapping stages and sets of policies on nuclear deterrence management, 
regional and domestic political regimes. Firstly, the stabilization of deterrence by 
cooperative security management including the organizing of orderly build up in 
parallel. Secondly, the building of economic cooperation and regional political 
regime leading to economic interpretation and mutual stakes on the patterns of 
European Union. Thirdly, political cooperation includes domestic reconstitution in 
line with non-discriminatory citizenship, secular state, federalism and power 
sharing.^'* 
Deterrence for the Subcontinent: 
The geo-strategic environment of the sub-continent has no parallel in the cold 
war. India and Pakistan share a border-link while the US and USSR did not. This 
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dramatically shortens the timeframe within which either country would have to 
decide, in the midst of a crisis or war, whether or not use nuclear weapons. ^ Hence, 
within the rational deterrence framework, three major requirements for stable 
deterrence must be created in the India-Pakistan context. Firstly, both countries must 
develop not just the ability to inflict acceptable damage to the other side, but also a 
sufficient degree of second strike invulnerability so that their forces could retaliate if 
attacked first. Secondly, the threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons for a nuclear 
attack must be credible. Thirdly, the nuclear arsenals must not be prone to accidental 
use.^^ 
At first, it appears that both India and Pakistan might have a kind of crude 
Weapons. Both sides acknowledge about the actual number and location of their 
nuclear devices. For the second strike capability the arsenals of both countries be 
technologically reliable, and there might be effective command, control and 
communication system. The ideal deterrence models for the subcontinent would be 
based on opacity on the grounds that declared thresholds and redlines undermine 
operational flexibility and increase nuclear risks during crises, and deterrence works 
through uncertainty. So transparency can only work when there is absence of 
continuous conflict and periodic crises. Restrains in nuclear deployment as a part of 
both India and Pakistan's policy of minimum nuclear deterrence might help in crisis 
stability in South Asia.^' For credibility, perception of intentions and political will 
are crucial. Deterrence theory suggests that both intentions and capability are 
important factors in stabilizing deterrence and it would be worthwhile for both the 
countries to moderate their rhetoric. Since deterrence primarily relies on the threat of 
future harm, the deterrer's credibility is obviously a key factor in making deterrence 
workable. In the South Asian context, the importance of the stakes involved in many 
of the potential deterrence situation may not be clear. The perception of deterrer's are 
not only determined by the objective realities but also by subjective interpretation of 
observed actions. 
Sumit Ganguly stated that there is no uniform view about the nuclear strength of 
Pakistan or for what strategic purpose it will use it against India. Furthermore, Pakistan's 
nuclear capability has added complexity to India's strategic environment and it will be a 
critical factor in India's security calculation.^* In South Asia, the intentions of parties 
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have always been opaque, particularly during crises. Dialogue and established channels 
of communication between India and Pakistan are, therefore essential factors in the 
maintenance of deterrence stability. The diplomatic, political and technological 
framework of confidence-building and crises management for stable deterrence is 
missing. Both the country need to put this in place as it will also address the problem of 
accidental or unauthorized use that may come from delegation of authority to use nuclear 
weapons. 
China in the Indian-Pakistan Nuclear deterrence: 
For considering issue involving nuclear weapons the geographical area of 
South Asia (excluding China) can't be accepted as a self-contained zone for 
discussion. The geographical considerations make it pertinent and realistic to 
accept India, Pakistan and China as constituting a zone of 'nuclear fraingle'.*^ 
Advocates of nuclear weapons in India also justify their demands on the basis of 
the deterrence value of nuclear weapons against both China and Pakistan . 
Regionally, even a numerically inferior nuclear force can establish effective local 
deterrence but its absence may make the nation vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. 
In a scenario where more than two states are engaged in trying to deter each 
other, the calculations are complex. All have different capabilities, weapons 
doctrines and intentions. India has to simultaneously deter China and Pakistan, 
the two countries that have different capabilities. It would be naive to believe that 
deterring more than one state is simple, since a state may run the risk of nuclear 
attack whose initiator might not be clearly identifiable. Deterrence works if the 
aggressor is persuaded that the risk of aggression outweigh its benefits. If the 
costs of suffering retaliation are immense, as in the case of nuclear attack, the 
probability of retaliation need not be very high to render aggression a clearly bad 
bargain for any plausible political gain. The challenge is to maintain stable 
deterrence, given a certain set of norms. This calculation becomes complex in the 
South Asian context as norms setting does not lat long, freaties are under stress, 
political rhetoric is high and non-state actors play an important role.^° It is also 
believed that India considers China, a competitor even though China is an extra-
regional power. India is dwarfed by China military strength in terms of 
conventional military. Indian targets are well within Chinese aircraft and missile 
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cover and the Sino-Indian nuclear equation is hopelessly asymmetrical. China 
therefore has ..." the strength to coerce India into unacceptable policies by virtue 
of her potential for nuclear blackmail/' As K. K. Nayar viewed, the Chinese real 
intentions as far as India is concerned have been projected by the relations it has 
maintained with Pakistan through transfer of sensitive and nuclear ballistic 
missile components'^. One cannot deny the fact that China has continued to 
maintain friendly relations with Pakistan and that friendliness developed into 
serious military-security relations after 1971. Such developments would 
adversely affected India's own security and India would then be forced to achieve 
a reasonable sufficiency vis-a-vis China in terms of a credible deterrence at the 
cost of its social and economic development. It is also believed that China 
assisted Pakistan in building a secret medium range missile factory in 
Rawalpindi.'^ 
China's nuclear deterrence doctrine has been in synchrony with its 
conventional war fighting doctrine. It was initially based on self-deterrence 
during the era of 'people's war'. It is gradually shifted to one of minimum 
nuclear deterrence during the 1860s and 1970s and now appears to have 
established a limited nuclear deterrence, which includes nuclear coercion. 
China's limited deterrence may be defined as a concept of "having enough 
capabilities to deter conventional threat and strategic nuclear war, and control and 
suppress escalation d\iring nuclear war".'"* The close collaboration that still exists 
between China and Pakistan has a direct bearing on India's security environment, 
and highlights that 'new strategic dimensions of the threat from China.'^ It is 
tough to separate the two nuclear configurations, India-Pakistan and India China 
and it is impossible to talk about the security concern of South Asia without fiiUy 
understanding India's concern over China. Stephen P. Cohen says "Keeping 
China out of the South Asian Problems means dealing with a region-and-a-
half .'^ Some Indian Think Tank have opined that the Chinese nuclear arsenal 
still provides the major impetus for India to have a nuclear deterrent and 
Pakistan's activities are a soiirce of concern.'' A senior Indian strategist K. 
Subrahmanayam says, " since one of the factors in our security calculation is 
China, in fact it is the major factor and has thermonuclear weapons.. .thus country 
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it is argued, should conduct a few thermonuclear tests in order to have a credible 
deterrent against China's". 78 
So for an effective deterrence between India and China required India to 
openly declare its possession of nuclear weapons. From the beginning India 
declared that it will require weapons sufficient merely to raise level of uncertainty 
for potential aggressors somewhat in order to induce adequate deterrence. Jasjit 
Singh argued that India did not need 500-500 weapons for par with China. If 
nuclear weapons are for potential use than a minimum deterrent capability is 
required.^" Regarding nuclear deterrence, and especially in the China-India case, 
in 1996 Raja Ramanna stated that "the use of plutonium bomb is sufficient 
enough to act as deterrent and we have that capability".^* For Pakistan, 
possession and use of nuclear deterrence is very attractive and the idea could 
become more acceptable as the imbalance in conventional military strength 
between India and Pakistan increases in favovjr of Pakistan. Indeed, it is possible 
to stand the proliferation chain argument. The argument has been that if China 
acquired nuclear weapons, India would acquire them and this in turn would lead 
to Pakistani bomb. 
Since nuclearisation of India and Pakistan in May 1998, the China's role 
in the nuclear relationship between the two nuclear countries of South Asia has 
not been as simple and straight forward as 'containing' and 'diminishing' India as 
it was by the mid 1960s. The nuclear tests of 1998 were to actually expose 
Beijing's lack of the firm grip on the evolution of Pakistan's and therefore South 
Asian nuclear deterrence. Nuclearised South Asia emerged as a major influence 
on China's nuclear policies and problems of neutrality vis-a-vis nuclear 
deterrence between India and Pakistan.^^ However, the centrality of China to 
South Asia's nuclear deterrence relationship does not end with India's and 
Pakistan's nuclear tests in May 1998.1n his speech Pakistani P.M. Nawaz Sharif 
expressed his gratitude to the 'time tested' relations with Beijing, understanding 
how, with these nuclear tests, 'our friendship has been fiirther strengthened'." 
On the contrary, the Indian Prime Minister blamed China for hidia going nuclear. 
He further explain after many years, India now has a credible nuclear deterrence 
against China, which it probably should have had many years ago.*"* 
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Though China refrains from backing Pakistan in Kashmir, it has been 
steadily supplying sensitive military materials and technology to Pakistan. In this 
way, the Chinese have made effort to promote a Sino-Pak dependency and 
thereby to use Islamabad as its bulk work in its South Asian policy. Ashok 
Kapoor pointed out that Pakistan is an extended arms of China in the Indian 
subcontinent.*^ From Indian prospective, the India-Pakistan nuclear deterrence is 
only a byproduct of India's quest to establish nuclear deterrence with China. 
After 1998, the nuclear triangle of China-India-Pakistan presents the only 
example of its kind in which three nuclear neighbours share disputed border that 
have resulted in wars and continued violence and terrorism. Indeed China's 
posture to take into account developments in India and Pakistan nuclear 
deterrence.^^In the end, the trilateral interface of China-India-Pakistan continues 
to determine the fiiture of their nuclear deterrence discourse. It will be difficult to 
visualize their equation within the confined region of South Asia. 
Implication of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: 
Because of mutual vulnerability, nuclear weapons have both decreased 
the chance of war and increased the destruction that would be result of such a war 
to occur. Neither side can impose its will on the other by superior military means, 
because the victor is virtually impossible. In Bernard Brodie's famous word, 
"thus for the chief purpose of the military establishment has been to win wars. 
From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other 
purpose".*^ Brodie noted in shift from the notion of war as a political option to 
the notion of war avoidance as the political objective. 
It is sometimes argued that because military victory is impossible in a 
nuclear war, nuclear weapons have little utility. Glenn Synder has called the 
stability instability paradox. Sfrategic stability creates instability by making lower 
levels of violence, like low intensity conflicts, relatively safe.** If therefore the 
probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero, they would no deter anybody. 
However, this logic is flawed. The basis of deterrence lies not in one's on an 
adversary, but on the adversary's uncertainty about possibility of such damage 
being inflicted upon it.*^ This is the consequence of the singularly 'incontestable' 
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quality of nuclear weapons; their capacity to cause immense destruction within a 
time frame that does not permit an adjustment of costs. This has an important 
bearing on 'credibility'. A deterrent is not credible because it might inflict 
cataclysm and there is chance of miscalculation to use or not to use armed forces 
in a conflicting situation. Deterrence politics is all about risk. 
Before May 1998, traditional nuclear deterrence theory suggests that India 
and Pakistan should discard opacity and strive for assured second-strike 
capabilities. These two countries of South Asia derived deterrent security from 
their nuclear capabilities. While the fact is that their weapons were unassembled 
that minimised the likelihood of nuclear accidents. Devin T. Hagerity pointed out 
the nuclear proliferation and nuclear deterrence issue in South Asia as the concept 
of the 'reciprocal fear of surprise attack'.'^ The notion that nuclear weapon states 
embroiled in crises will inevitably face strong, perhaps irresponsible, pressure to 
decapitate their opponent's nuclear forces preemptively is deductively appealing 
but empirically unsupported. 
There is an increasing emphasis on finding 'Combat' uses for nuclear 
weapons (war fighting or denial), rather than on the fraditionally prominent role 
of using nuclear weapons to deter the use of other nuclear weapons and that such 
offensive sfrategy can be the sources of greater nuclear danger. The best example 
of stable nuclear deterrence equation is the India-China dyad. Both India and 
China have adopted nuclear deterrence postures that put great confidence in the 
relatively small nuclear arsenals that the two countries have. Both have adopted 
purely retaliatory sfrategies by declaring a No-First Use policy.'' But the India-
Pakistan nuclear dyad clearly shows the instability caused by denial sfrategies. 
The denial sfrategy does not accept the nuclear capacity of small nuclear forces 
because they would not able to fight and prevail against a large nuclear force. But 
the deterrence by punishment emphasises on second strike and, more importantly 
capacity to deter large nuclear forces. 
Nuclear Deterrence and stability in South Asia: 
As John J. Mearsheimer defines stability 'the absence of war and major 
crises'. Deterrence stability comprises three essential elements; that are absence of 
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incentives for rapid qualitative or quantitative expansion of states nuclear arsenal vis-
a-vis that of an adversary, and the effectiveness of deterrence in reducing incentives 
for major coercive political changes.^^ Deterrence stability is crucial in preventing 
war between nuclear adversaries. As Thomas Schelling pointed out that 'Absence of 
deterrence- a situation in which the incentives on both sides to initiate war are out 
weighted by the disincentives is stable when it is reasonably secure against shocks, 
alarms and perturbations.^^ In other words it is stable when political events, internal 
or external to the countries involved, technological change, accidents, changes in the 
intelligence available to both sides are unlikely to disturb the incentives sufficiently 
to make deterrence fail. 
The overt nuclearisation of South Asia in May 1998 has led to the formation 
of two camps of deterrence theorist...over whether a nuclearised subcontinent will 
prevent a major conflict and foster escalation.^'* Deterrence optimists maintain that 
nuclear weapons by making war catastrophically costly, generates incentives for war 
avoidance between nuclear rivals and therefore creates stability between them. 
Kenneth N. Waltz an intellectual architect of deterrence optimism attributed four 
benefits to military posture based on nuclear deterrence, that are (a) deterrence 
strategies include caution all around and thus reduce the chances of war. (b) Wars 
fought in the face of strategic nuclear weapons must be carefiiUy limited because a 
country having them may retaliate if its vital interests are threatened, (c) Prospective 
punishment need only be proportionate to an adversary's expected gains in war after 
those gains are discounted for the many uncertainties of war, (d) Should 
deterrence fail, a few judiciously delivered warheads are likely to produce sobriety if 
the leaders of all of the countries are involved and thus bring rapid de-escalation. The 
former Minister of External Affairs of India, Jaswant Singh wrote, "If deterrence 
works in the west...as it so obviously appears to, since western nations insist on 
continuing to possess nuclear weapons....by what reasoning will it not work in 
India".^^ An Indian strategist K. Sundarji, flatly predicted that nuclear deterrence 
"will add to stability and peace that the only salvafion is for both countries to follow 
policies of cooperation and not confi-ontation..,. A mutual minimum nuclear deterrent 
will act as a stabilizing factor".'^ Pakistan will see it as counteracting India's superior 
power potential and providing a more level playing field. The chances of 
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conventional war between the two will be less likely than before. 
Jasjit Singh argued that, with the advent of offsetting nuclear capabilities on 
the subcontinent, "deterrence will continue, but on a higher level. 1 don't think we are 
going to use a slide towards instability. I don't think anybody will allow it to 
happen".^^ This view was widely echoed in Pakistan and General K. M. Arif declared 
that "the nuclear option will promote regional peace and create stability". Another 
General of Pakistan Mirza Aslam Beg expressed his view , "it is the nuclear 
deterrence that has kept wars in South Asia at bay".'°° Ashley Tellis has argued that 
India-Pakistan deterrence is more stable than it is given credit for, the prospects for 
deterrence stability are .. .high because no South Asian state is currently committed to 
securing any political objectives through the medium of major conventional and by 
implication nuclear war. This condition is only reinforced by the high levels of 
'defence dominance' obtaining at the military level, and thus it is not at all an 
exaggeration to say that deterrence stability in South Asia derives simply from the 
Indian and Pakistani ... inability to successfully prosecute quick and decisive 
conventional military operation, especially with respect to wars of unlimited aims... 
what makes this situation meta stable is the fact that neither India nor Pakistan... has 
the strategic capabilities to execute those successful damage limiting first strikes that 
might justify initiating nuclear attacks in a crises.'"' 
Deterrence pessimists viewed that the situation in South Asia are different 
from cold war situation and it s far from stability. As Neil Joeck, argues that, India's 
and Pakistan's nuclear capabilities have not created strategic stability and do not 
reduce or eliminate factors that contributed to past conflicts.... Far from creating 
stability, these basic nuclear capabilities have led to an incomplete sense of where 
security lies....Limited nuclear capabilities increase the potential costs of conflict, 
but do little to reduce the risk of it breaking out.'°^ V.R. Raghvan concludes that the 
possibility of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high, in the event the two 
countries are engaged in direct military conflict. Talat Masood has expressed his 
view that "it would be dangerous for either country to presume that its nuclear 
capability provides a cover for high risk strategies or gives immunity from an all out 
conventional war".'°^ John MuUer argues that "the nuclear weapons neither crucially 
defines a fundamental stability nor threaten severely to disturb it".'""* Therefore, the 
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pessimists have their view that the miUtary imbalance in South Asia is one of the 
reasons of instability of the subcontinent. From 1995 to 1999, South Asian military 
expenditure grew more than for any region of the world. There are many factors like 
territorial disputes, mistrusts, lack of institutionalisd crisis management mechanism, 
lack of understanding of the nuclear strategy and deterrence. 
Thus the presence of the destabilizing factors in South Asia, coupled with the 
outbreak of the Kargil War in 1999 in a nuclear environment and the prolonged 
India-Pakistan military Standoff in 2001-02 has led many analysts to argue that the 
prospects for strategic stability between India and Pakistan are bleak. So the Kargil 
crisis has jeopardized the stability of South Asia. India has lost confidence in 
Pakistan because it was responsible for initiating the crisis. Although no country 
officially crossed the line of control, India used air power for the first time since the 
1971 war. The crisis de-escalated without war, but it had tremendous impact on the 
overall stability in the region. This is not to suggest that India-Pakistan deterrence is 
secure against the risks of failure, but merely to point that the task of the management 
of their deterrent equation is not an impossible one. It can be made to work, provided 
both are willing to work together to seek strategic stability as an overarching goal. 
The best chance of defusing nuclear danger, controlling escalation and stabilising 
strategic stability lies in sustained and substantive political engagement 
Compellence: 
Compellence is an attempt by policy makers in state 'A' to force, by threat 
and or by application of sanction, policy makers in state 'B ' to comply with demands 
of state 'A', including but not limited to retract actions already taken.'°^ As S. Rashid 
Nairn pointed out, compellence is forcing another state to do something by 
threatening a nuclear strike-would only work, if one side were to have a monopoly of 
nuclear weapons or a military superiority, that would make it possible for the 
'compellence' to retaliate against the 'compellor'. At the very least , the demands 
made by the 'compellor' should not be viewed as so outrageous or so destructive to 
the nationhood of the 'compelee' as to make these demands unacceptable even under 
threats of nuclear attack.'°^ The theory and practice of compellence has been the 
subject of considerable discussion and debate. Analyst have investigated its diverse 
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components, including its relationship with crises, deterrence and escalation in the 
entire range of conflict relationship, especially in the context of nuclear dyads. It is 
often suggested that nuclear 'deterrence' differ in important respects from 
'conventional deterrence' and that extended deterrence is more difficult to pursue 
successfully than attempts to deter attack upon one's own nation. Morgan says, 
general deterrence is used to destablised policies of opposing nations who maintained 
armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is any where close to 
moimting an attack. 
The distinction between deterrence and compellence is important. Deterrence 
attempt to prevent on adversary action while compellene requires the adversary to 
react or initiate an action. Deterrence does not require the state attempting it to 
initiate an action, but compellence does. Deterrence has no time frame, but it is 
definite, where as compellence involves, or at least implies a deadline or short time 
frame work. 
India's post-December 13, strategy, which involved a massive conventional 
build up reinforced by the assertion of nuclear asymmetry, involved elements of both 
deterrence and compellence. C. Raja Mohan, a strategic analyst, noted the 'growing 
belief in Delhi that the time has come to call Pakistan's nuclear bluff lest India place 
itself in permanent vulnerability to cross border terrorism from Pakistan.'''^ Indian 
strategy underwent a significant shift from deterrence to compellence while it may be 
said that the demand that Pakistan cut back on its support to cross-border terrorism is 
a deterrence threat, it is also a compellent threat because it includes, among other 
things, the demand for a series of positive actions, including the handing over of 
terrorist. The threat was 'decomposed' and projected in a calibrated series of actions 
accompanied by parallel series of verbal statements designed to keep Pakistan off 
balance."" At the level of action, the first major move was made by India on 
December 22, to recall its ambassador and to end bus and train services between the 
two countries. Two days later, it was announced that Indian Army had 'moved' but 
not 'deployed', the nuclear capable short-range Prithvi missile, normally stored at 
Secunderabad in the south, to the border region."' Indian Defence Minister George 
Femandes said that India had deployed fighter jets at bases along the border and that 
its missiles were in position."^ The following day, Pakistan civilian aircraft were 
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prohibited from over flying India, and India ordered the strength of its mission in 
Islamabad, as well as that of the Pakistani mission in New Delhi, reduced by half. By 
this time military build up was at pick and exchanges of fire were occurring 
regularly. At the mean time India tested its intermediate range missile Agni with a 
declared range of 700-900 km. 
On the verbal plane, Indian rhetoric was strong. The consistent aim was to 
drive home the point that India stood by its plank no first use. If Pakistan were to use 
weapons first, it would be devastated by a counter-strike from India's large 
arsenal.''^ In other words Pakistan's nuclear capability would no longer deter India 
fi-om taking military acfion. The nature of India's military action was left unspecified 
but, given the extent of its deployment, conceivably included a major conventional 
thrust. The threat of nuclear desolation came regularly and from diverse sources. On 
December, Jana Krishnamurthy the President of BJP, warned that if Pakistan 
attempted to use nuclear weapons against India, its existence itself would be wiped 
out of the world map.'^'' On the same day, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee declares: 
"We do not want war, but war is being thrust on us, and we will have to face it"."^ 
On 29 December, Defence Minister George Femandes repeated the warning. 
Pakistan can't think of using nuclear weapons despite the fact that they are not 
committed to the doctrine of no first use like we are. We could take a strike, survive, 
and then hit back. Pakistan would be finished. I do not really fear that the nuclear 
issue would figure in a conflict.''^ The rhetoric declined after Musharraf s initial 
promise led to reduced tension, but rose against when tension grew in. Many 
observers did see the whole exercise as a bluff. 
The central aim was to show that nuclear weapons are not simple equalizers, 
and that asymmetry does matter. It was not so much an affirmation that the nuclear 
asymmetry in itself is significance as a assertion that the combination of nuclear 
asymmetry and conventional asymmetry gave India a distinct advantage."^ The cost 
of a nuclear war would be disproportionate. India would be hurt but Pakistan would 
not survive. In short, Pakistan was effectively deterred fi-om nuclear use altogether. 
The nuclear fi-eeze, however, left India at an advantage because of its superior 
conventional force, which could be used to carry out operation without fear, if a 
Pakistani nuclear first strikes. Even in a conventional war, Pakistan would be 
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continuously inhibited by the fear of a possible uncontrolled escalation leading to 
nuclear war.'^^ Thus, these were strategic space for a limited war to conflict costs on 
an economically and politically unstable Pakistan. So long as its core interests were 
not jeopardized, Pakistan would have no incentive to launch nuclear weapons against 
India.'"* Therefore, the nuclear-cum-conventional asymmetry shows that the role of 
nuclear weapons was not restricted to mutual nuclear deterrence. As India's Naval 
chief, Admiral Sushil Kumar, pointed out, 'The nukes are for negotiations, they are 
not weapons of war. "^ In general compellence shows a mixed picture.'^ Compellence 
may or may not work, depending on a wide range of factors in a specific context. 
Between nuclear weapon states, barring the recent South Asian Confrontation (India-
Pakistan) these have been only two serious crises that brought the adversaries to the 
verge of war that are Cuban Missile crises of 1962, and the Soviet-China border 
conflict of 1969 at Damansk island on the Ussuri river. 
In South Asia, however the regional rivals have found a new use of nuclear 
weapons since they went nuclear officially in 1998. Apart fi-om posing a divert 
compellence threat they have engaged in creative expansion of nuclear strategy to 
invite outside intervention in their conflict. This was first initiated by Pakistan in 
1999 during Kargil crisis. India also engaged in similar exercise in post-December 13 
build up. In Kargil crisis, Pakistan attempted to use the United States as a lever to 
compel India to negotiate on Kashmir. Whereas in the December 13 crisis, India 
compelled the United States to put intense pressure on Musharraf to abandon his 
support for Pakistan based terrorist groups operating in Kashmir. 
The Indian experiment with compellence in a nuclear context is subject to 
criticism on two grounds. Firstly the strategy may work or it may not. Secondly the 
attainment of one's objective is not fixed. The object of a compellence strategy may 
appear to succumb only to reverse its position at a time of its own choosing.'^' 
Compellence through a third party is inherently problematic because the interest of 
third party tends to be its own, and these may be a drag on the compelling power. 
Hence, a successful use of nuclear weapons leads to a rapid escalation of such use, a 
situation equally unacceptable to both sides because of the destabilising effects it 
would have and the risk of a subsequent nuclear exchange. Thus, constraints on use 
of nuclear weapons for compellence are strong, and it is doubtful if attempts at such 
use would succeed. 
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Conclusion 
Conclusion 
The first successful detonation of nuclear device by the United States at 
Alamogordo on July 16, 1945 unveiled the gigantic secret of atomic energy which if 
used cautiously, could be a blessing for humanity or else it could unleash catastrophe. 
'Weapons for peace' programme initiated by President Eisenhower in mid-fifties has 
been the basic factor responsible for proliferation. The bombing in Hiroshima on August 
6, 1945 heralded nuclear age in actuality. Between 1949 and 1964 the former Soviet 
Union, the United kingdom, France and China followed suit. India also conducted its 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974 and conducted more tests in 1998,that was 
emulated by Pakistan. Israel is known to have nuclear weapons. The unfortunate pattern 
set by the US in giving nuclear weapons more them necessary credibility in terms of 
power, status and supposed ability to deter war has impacted the other nations which 
turned nuclear. 
There is a diversion of opinion between the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and 
Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) about the question whether proliferation is a 
technical problem or political issue. The NNWS, mainly developing world, regard 
proliferation a political issue and not a technical issue as projected by the NWS. The 
nuclear reversal decision by West Germany, Canada, Sweden and South Afiica are 
mainly governed by their respective political constraints, despite the fact that these 
countries posses sophisticated nuclear technology However, the acquisition of nuclear 
technology by NNWS has been projected as determining factor for proliferation on the 
pretext of preventing nuclear proliferation, the NWS deliberately imposed technical 
constraint on NNWS to deprive them from the peaceful benefit of nuclear technology. 
The proliferation of nuclear weapon is a complex process and no particular 
perspective can solely explain the nuclear proliferation phenomenon. Each perspective 
holds some logic with regard to a particular proliferation case. It is indeed, very difficult 
to pin point the exact reasons for a state to initiate a nuclear weapon programme. The 
nuclear programmes of all countries of the world are shrouded in secrecy. Hence, it is 
difficult to take into account the exact nature of internal dynamics of a proliferation 
decision of a State. Therefore, secrecy, lack of understanding about the exact nature of 
internal dynamics of a proliferation decision and generally varied motivations of states to 
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go nuclear have led to the growth of a number of competing perspective about the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Weighing all the competing arguments it can be 
concluded that security concern perspective explains bulk of the cases of nuclear weapon 
proliferation. Even if other motives i.e. prestige, technological momentum domestic 
politics public opinion played their part in nuclear proliferation, security concern is the 
most important motive which compelled India and Pakistan like other nuclear states to 
acquire nuclear weapons. 
It is clear that times when China and India went nuclear were different. Their 
perceived adversaries were also different but their compulsion to go nuclear are similar 
that is national security threat. Chinese growing influence in South and South East Asia, 
the Sino-Pakistani collusion and the presence of US nuclear weapons in Indian Ocean 
base in Diego Gracia were serious threats to India security and the driving compulsion 
for Indian nuclear tests. For Pakistan, India is a constant source of national security 
concern and especially after the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, Pakistan made 
concerted effort to gain nuclear status. 
Since the nuclear tests by India and then Pakistan in May 1998, the focus on this 
region has been almost exclusively on the nuclear dimension of the confrontation 
between the two states. In reality, security in South Asia is challenged by an interplay of 
several factors acting on domestic, regional and global level. Security implication is the 
sole reason for nuclearisation of South Asia. The overt nuclearisation of India and 
Pakistan brought South Asia for a short while to the main focus of international stormy 
and sometimes heated discussion in international politics. The tests were condemned by 
the international community but their response was muted. The declared condemnation 
was also followed by limited sanctions. The tests were considered as blow on nuclear 
disarmament treaty i.e. NPT and CTBT. International pressure was mounted for signing 
NPT and CTBT and to roll back their nuclear programme. As per the definition of a 
nuclear weapon state in NPT, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear 
weapon states. 
The argument of NWS that NNWS are less responsible is fallacious and hurts the 
national pride of nation states. To merely suggest that if India and Pakistan were allowed 
to join the NPT as nuclear weapon states, they would abide by its rules and behave 
210 
responsibly is not convincing. It may be rightly argued that there should be proliferation 
of nuclear weapons but controlled one, hence preventing irresponsible countries to go 
nuclear. It is also said that possession of nuclear weapon in South Asia would serve as 
deterrent to western nuclear haves. Furthermore, it will go a long way to do away with 
nuclear hegemony of the west and herald security and stability in South Asia. The entire 
effort of non-proliferation appears to be a farce, for nuclear powers support the 
weaponisation and they are not penalized for the same. It is to be appreciated that unlike 
NWS, India has shown a good deal of restraint on export of nuclear materials. India 
firmly believes that the real and credible guarantee of security to NNWS against use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons could be provided only through nuclear disarmament 
especially when the nuclear weapons were completely eliminated. 
The survival of nations as territorial, political, socio-economic and cultural entity 
is the primary aim of all nations, but their national security problems are different in their 
nature and intensity. National security has two dimensions, one is nuclear (external) and 
the other is non-nuclear (internal). The external security is required to counter threats or 
challenges fi-om outside and Non-nuclear dimension of security is concerned with the 
problems related to socio-economic, inter state migration, drug trafficking, proliferation 
of small arms and environmental degradation. Clearly a resilient and responsive national 
security management system is necessary to meet the emerging challenges. The 
relevance of nuclear weapons for national security was claimed by both India and 
Pakistan during the Kargil conflict, which brought out both the strengths and limitations 
of nuclear weapons in the context of South Asia. For Pakistan nuclear weapons are the 
biggest equities. Thus it is argued that it is nuclear weapons which will turn India 
Pakistan relations into a secular mould. It is likely that knowing that the other side has 
the nuclear weapons each state will desist fi-om provoking a suicidal war. These can be 
no development if the security environment is not peaceful and stable. 
Domestic security threats that South Asian nations are likely to face in the 
coming decades are common in nature and need a regional approach for their solution, 
Major security threats are terrorism, drug trafficking, proliferation of small arms, poverty 
and environmental degradation. SAARC is bringing the countries and people of the 
region closer together. It could draw up a common defence and security structure. This 
would encourage regional peace and security and deter external or extra regional 
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interference in South Asia. The unavailability of nuclear umbrella drove India to be self-
reliant in their nuclear deterrent requirements. The dynamic nature of the contlict, 
geographical proximity and an extra regional nuclear power as an adversary made India 
more prone to nuclear weapon acquisition. So India's desire to develop a credible 
minimum nuclear deterrent against nuclear blackmail and the threat of use of nuclear 
weapons, justifies national security imperatives. As long as offensive nuclear deterrence 
continue to be so unabashedly practiced by most of the other NWS, India's defensive 
nuclear deterrence is totally justified. 
Any initiative for arms control which confines itself only to India and Pakistan 
will perhaps be unacceptable to India. All the geographically relevant countries in the 
region like China will also have to be included in any meaningfiil dialogue on nuclear 
proliferation in South Asia. The success of confidence building measures (CBM) in 
South Asia depends upon mutual good will, mutual reciprocity and mutual trust among 
India Pakistan and China. CBMs proved to be important device to reduce conflict in the 
region. The potential utility of CBM becomes evident as the focus of CBM shifted to suit 
the changing security concerns and the domestic compulsion of each coimtry. 
Following are the significant points which will go a long way to de-escalate 
tension brought on by nuclear weaponisation in South Asia. 
(a) Both India and Pakistan need to initiate a formal understanding on mutual 
assurance on No-First-Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. 
(b) India and China could also initiate a treaty on mutual non-targeting of nuclear 
weapons. 
(c) A meaningfiil nuclear dialogue at the global level needs to start, which would 
ensure a forward movement towards global nuclear disarmament. 
(d) Resumption of the diplomatic dialogue with Pakistan at the highest level to 
discuss the entire gamut of issue affecting Indo-Pak relations. 
(e) Intensification of the security dialogue between India and China with an 
emphasis on confidence building measure. 
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(f) Exploring the possibility for regional arms control negotiations with China 
and Pakistan. 
(g) Track II diplomacy between India and Pakistan to come up with bold 
solutions of the bilateral problems. 
(h) Reactivating the SAARC process in South Asia especially at the economic 
cultural and academic level. 
Though there has been a lot of talk to prevent nuclear weaponisation in South 
Asia, yet it has never been successfully put into practice, rather South Asia has gone 
nuclear. It seems that it would be wise to call for controlling proliferation and ultimately 
banishing nuclear weapons, else it may result in mishandling, and extermination of 
mankind from the face of the earth. NNWS not only in South Asia but throughout the 
world want nuclear disarmament and it is possible only when the world does away with 
the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
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